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Note
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Authorizing School
Vouchers, Education's Winning Lottery Ticket
Gia FontA *

I.

INTRODUCTION

One-fourth of all American children do not graduate from high
school.' Of the students who do graduate from high school, thousands
cannot make inferences or draw conclusions from what they have read. 2
While research indicates that students at public schools are reading at
higher levels today than they were twenty years ago, public school
students are still reading at far lower levels than those at private
schools.3 Thus, it is understandable that both legislators and some
parents have given up on the public school system. 4 Likewise, 5it is
understandable that many urban parents have cried out for vouchers.

* J.D. expected May 2004. I would like to thank my family and friends for their love,
support, and encouragement. In particular, I would like to thank my father, Richard Font, and
Isaac Colunga, who directed me to helpful sources for this article.
1. Robert Holland & Don Soifer, How School Choice Benefits the Urban Poor, 45 How. L.J.
337, 337 (2002).
2. Jo Ann Bodemner, Note, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional
Lemon-Aid from the Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273, 309 n.172 (1996) (stating that
"[flewer than two in five students in grade 12 can move beyond surface understanding of a text,
make inferences or draw conclusions" from their assigned readings).
3. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., No. NCES 2002-130, DIGEST
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2001, at 133 (2002) (demonstrating that seventeen-year-olds at
private schools have the "ability to find, understand, summarize, and explain relatively
complicated literary and informational material" and read at a proficiency rate twenty- two points
higher than seventeen-year-olds at public schools), available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/
pubs2002/digest200l/ch2.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
4. See Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the FirstAmendment, and
Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 308-09 (2000) (stating that many politicians and lowincome parents are looking to school choice programs, instead of the public school system, to
create educational equality); Holland & Soifer, supra note 1, at 371 (noting that not only
conservatives have given up on the public school system and embraced vouchers, but also liberals
are "embracing vouchers with growing ardor"); Joseph Byrd, Comment, Permissive School
Vouchers in Ohio: Magic Pill or Placebo? An Analysis of the Federal Ohio Application of the
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Public schools in Cleveland, Ohio, are no exception to the generally
failing condition of the public school system throughout the nation. 6 In
fact, after examining Cleveland's public schools, a United States
District Court declared an educational "crisis of magnitude." 7 With
only ten percent of its ninth graders passing basic proficiency tests and
less than one-third of its students successfully graduating from high
school, the Cleveland school district miserably failed to meet any of the
state performance standards. 8 In an attempt to remedy these problems,
the court placed the entire school district under state control;
subsequently, the Ohio legislature enacted its Pilot Project Scholarship
Program. 9 This program provided Cleveland families with the winning

Lemon-Agostini Test, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 563, 563 (2001) (noting that even political liberals
support vouchers).
5. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 308-09 ("An increasing number of policymakers,
education experts, politicians, and, perhaps most important, low-income parents believe that real
school choice [programs, such as vouchers, are] the best hope for increasing educational
opportunity and equality for all."). Vouchers are written documents redeemable for a specified
amount of money to cover the tuition costs of a private school. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1571-72 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a voucher as "[a] written or printed authorization to disburse
money"); Tyler Neal, Note, Mitchell v. Helms: Giving the Cleveland School Voucher Programa
Fighting Chance, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 343, 351 (2002) (defining voucher as a "piece of paper
redeemable for a designated sum of money, if, and only if, it is used to pay the cost of schooling
[a] child at an approved school").
6. See Clint Bolick, Solving the Education Crisis Through Parental Choice, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 245, 245 (2000) (stating that students in Cleveland's public school system "have a I
in 14 chance of graduating on time from high school at senior-level proficiency, and an
equivalent 1 in 14 chance each year of being a victim of a crime in their schools").
7. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2463 (2002) (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, No.
1:73 CV 1300 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 1995)). The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio made this statement in a school desegregation case after examining Cleveland's
public schools. See Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1994). The plaintiffs
in Reed v. Rhodes were a class of African-American public school students and their parents. Id.
at 1268. They brought suit against the Board of Education of the Cleveland City School District,
its members, and its Superintendent, as well as the Ohio State Board of Education, its members,
and its Superintendent. Id. at 1269.
8. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2460. The state board of education created a statewide testing
program, "designed to ensure that students who receive a high school diploma demonstrate at
least high school levels of achievement in reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social
studies."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.0710 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002). The board
administered tests to all students at the end of the third grade, fifth grade, seventh grade, eighth
grade, and tenth grade. Id. The Cleveland school district failed to meet any of the minimal
achievement standards set by these tests. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463. "A school district or
building shall be declared to be in a state of academic emergency if it does not meet more than
five of the applicable state performance indicators." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3302.03(B)(5)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
9. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463 (examining OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (West
1999 & Supp. 2002); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002)
(creating the Pilot Project Scholarship Program); infra note 171 and accompanying text
(describing the Pilot Project Scholarship Program).
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lottery ticket of education: the voucher. 10 With vouchers, Cleveland
parents could send their children to any participating public or private
school located within the school district's boundaries, regardless of the
school's cost or religious affiliation.1 1 Not surprisingly, Cleveland
at the chance to choose where their children would
parents jumped
12
attend school.
However, not long after the voucher program began, litigation
arose. 13 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,14 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether Cleveland's voucher program
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 15 In a 5-4
decision, the majority held that, although the program provided public
funds to religiously affiliated schools, the voucher program did not
offend the Establishment Clause because (1) the program was "neutral"
with respect to the religious status of the beneficiaries and service
providers, and (2) aid reached religious schools solely as the result of
"true private choice." 16 Thus, the Court upheld the program and
permitted the poor urban children of Cleveland to enjoy the benefits of
17
private education, as do millions of wealthy children across the nation.
Before examining Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Part II of this Note
will outline the historical origin of the Establishment Clause and its
early relationship to the American education system.18 Part II will then
discuss both what has been termed the Supreme Court's "empty

10. See Holland & Soifer, supra note 1, at 338 (stating that school choice enables
disadvantaged children to improve their scholastic achievement); Garnett & Garnett, supra note
4, at 310 ("[Slchool choice [such as a voucher program] is essential to achieving equality of
opportunity for American children, rich or poor.").
11. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463. However, participating private schools were subject to some
state regulations. Id. These regulations prohibited private schools from discriminating on the
basis of race or religion and from "advocat[ing] or foster[ing] unlawful behavior or teach[ing]
hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion." Id.
(citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6) (West 1999)). Moreover, private schools were
required to meet the same statewide educational standards as public schools. Id.
12. Id. at 2464 (noting that over 3700 students participated in the voucher portion of the Pilot
Project Scholarship Program).
13. Id. at 2465 (noting that, in 1996, Ohio taxpayers first brought suit in state court,
challenging the program on both state and federal grounds); see also infra Part II.B.1-3
(discussing the litigation in the Ohio State Supreme Court, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which addressed Cleveland's
voucher program).
14. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
15. Id. at 2465.
16. Id. at 2473.
17. See id.
18. See infra Part I.A-D (discussing the impetus of the Establishment Clause, the early
entanglement of church and state, and the state anti-religion constitution clauses).
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promise" of educational choice 19 and how school choice programs can
be used to fulfill the Supreme Court's promise. Part II will conclude
by discussing the modem pillars of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. 2 1 Part III will explore the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Zelman, where the Court ultimately held that Cleveland's
voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause. 2 2 Part IV
will then analyze the Supreme Court's holding and argue that the Court
correctly analyzed the facts of the case, applied Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and held that Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist was not controlling law. 23 Part IV will also
examine the dissents' contentions 24 and Justice Thomas's invitation to
reconsider the application of the Establishment Clause against the
states. 2 5 Finally, Part V will discuss the impact of the Court's decision
on voucher programs and note that 26voucher programs must still
withstand state constitutional challenges.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will begin with a discussion of the origin of the
Establishment Clause. 27 Next, this Part will address whether church
and state were ever truly "separate" in the United States, focusing on the
American school system. 2 8 This Part will then examine the anti29
religious establishment amendments found in most state constitutions.
This Part will also discuss the Supreme Court's empty promise of

19. See infra Part II.E (examining the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), where the Court affirmed the fundamental right of parents to educate their
children as they choose).
20. See infra Part H.F (discussing vouchers and other school choice programs).
21. See infra Part II.G (tracing the development of the two modem pillars of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence: neutrality and true private choice).
22. See infra Part III.A (discussing the facts of Zelman); infra Part IlI.B (discussing the lower
court's Zelman decisions); infra Part IlH.C (discussing the Supreme Court's Zelman decision).
23. See infra Part IV.A-C (analyzing the majority opinion in Zelman).
24. See infra Part IV.D (examining the dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
and Justice Breyer).
25. See infra Part IV.E (examining Justice Thomas's concurring opinion).
26. See infra Part V (predicting that voucher programs will expand and improve the education
system of America and noting that the state anti-religion clauses are a significant legal obstacle
for voucher programs).
27. See infra Part IIA-B (discussing the Framers' motivation for including the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights).
28. See infra Part I.C (noting that church and state were entangled in early America).
29. See infra Part II.D (examining state anti-religion amendments, known as the Blaine
Amendments).
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educational choice in Pierce v. Society of Sisters30 and how school
choice programs, such as vouchers, can provide all Americans with the
educational choice discussed in Pierce.3 1 Finally,
this Part will outline
32
modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
A. The Origin of the EstablishmentClause
The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." 3 3 An establishment of religion
34
generally denotes a "legal union of government and [one] religion."
This definition alone, however, does not reveal the legal implications of
the Establishment Clause. 3 5 Thus, to understand its legal implications,
an examination
of the origin of the Establishment Clause is also
36
necessary.

Many of the first colonists came to America to flee religious
persecution and to set up their own religious communities. 37 The main
purposes of their immigration to America were to establish communities
where their religion could flourish and to receive government support
instead of persecution. 38 Therefore, at the time of the American

30. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925); see also infra Part 1I.E
(discussing when the Court affirmed the fundamental right of parents to educate their children as
they choose, by permitting private schools to exist alongside of state public schools).
31. See infra Part LI.F (discussing vouchers and other school choice programs).
32. See infra Part II.G (tracing the development of the two modem pillars of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence: neutrality and true private choice).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 5 (2d ed. 1994); Neal, supra note 5, at
361 (quoting Levy's definition of the establishment of religion).
35. See LEVY, supra note 34, at 5; Neal, supra note 5, at 361; see also M. E. BRADFORD,
ORIGINAL INTENTIONS ON THE MAKING AND RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 95 (1993) ("[A] religious establishment was, in Anglo-American parlance, sensu
stricto, an institution able (with the assistance of government) to promulgate a creed or dogma, to
require official assent to that doctrine, to collect rates or some other tax in support of that religion,
and to require, at least from time to time, attendance at worship."); cf. T. JEREMY GUNN, A
STANDARD FOR REPAIR: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, EQUALITY, AND NATURAL RIGHTS 71
(1992) (noting that the term "establish" appears in the Constitution seven times and in every
instance the term implies "creating, instituting, rendering permanent, or setting up").
36. LEVY, supra note 34, at xxii ("With little guidance from the constitution text, we may
better understand the establishment clause if we understand the American experience with
establishments of religion at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.").
37. MARTIN S. SHEFFER, GOD VERSUS CEASAR: BELIEF, WORSHIP, AND PROSELYTIZING
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT xvii (1999); Brad J. Davidson, Comment, Balancing Parental
Choice, State Interest, and the Establishment Clause: Constitutional Guidelines for State-Choice
Legislation, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 452 (2002); Neal, supra note 5, at 360.
38. SHEFFER, supra note 37, at xvii; Neal, supra note 5, at 360. Moreover, many of the
original charters from England required the establishment of a state religion. SHEFFER, supra
note 37, at xvii.
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Revolution, most of the colonial governments maintained an
"establishment of religion" by supporting one particular religion
39
financially while prohibiting or discriminating against all others.
Yet, the American Revolution and its quest for secured, unalienable
40
rights triggered a movement for the disestablishment of religion.
Hence, many state constitutions adopted establishment clauses and
clauses guaranteeing the free exercise of religion prior to the creation of
the United States Constitution. 4 1 This anti-establishment movement did
not result in a federal establishment clause within the main text of the
Constitution.
In fact, the only reference to religion in the
39. See BRADFORD, supra note 35, at 95; LEVY, supra note 34, at 1; Mark W. Cordes,
Politics, Religion, and the FirstAmendment, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 111, 132 (2000); Neal, supra
note 5, at 361. In fact, establishments of religion existed in the southern colonies of Virginia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. LEVY, supra note 34, at 5. The Church
of England was the state religion in each of these colonies. Id. The northern colonies of New
York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire did not have traditional establishments of
one religion, but the largest religious group generally controlled the religious power within the
colony. Id. at 11. The four colonies of Rhode Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey
did not have any form of an establishment of religion. Id.
40. LEVY, supra note 34, at 27. The Declaration of Independence provides that "it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish" any government that destroys "certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Thus, the colonists reasoned that the establishment of one
state religion and the prohibition of other religions were contrary to the purposes of the
Revolution. See LEVY, supra note 34, at 27.
41. LEVY, supra note 34, at 27 (noting that many state constitutions contained clauses that
expressly prohibited the State from funding a particular religion); Cordes, supra note 39, at 13132 (stating that many states enacted clauses, after the revolution, to eliminate "compelled
financial support and compelled worship"); Neal, supra note 5, at 362 ("Many State Constitutions
contained specific anti-establishment provisions."). The most famous of these state religious
clauses is the Virginia Bill of Establishing Religious Freedom, promoted zealously by James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Neal, supra note 5, at 362. Madison, however, first wrote the
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in opposition of a proposed tax
assessment to support Virginia's established religion. Cordes, supra note 39, at 130. Madison
contended that government support of religion endangered "liberty of conscience" and the free
exercise of religion. Id. This memorial gave rise to the Virginia Bill of Establishing Religious
Freedom, the free exercise of religion clause written by Thomas Jefferson. Id. The bill stated
"[t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place,
or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested or burthened in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or
belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or
affect their civil capacities."
Neal, supra note 5, at 362 (quoting Thomas Jefferson's proposal for a religious freedom bill in
Virginia in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 346-47 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
42. See SHEFFER, supra note 37, at xix (noting that the main text of the Constitution refers to
religion only in Article VI, Clause 3). The Articles of Confederation also does not include a
disestablishment of religion clause; indeed, The Articles of Confederation protected no individual
liberties except the "privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States." ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION art. 4, para. I (1781).
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Constitution's main text is the prohibition afainst religious qualification
. uring the Constitutional
tests for those seeking federal public office.
Convention, George Mason 44 requested that a Bill of Rights preface the
Constitution, but the other Constitutional Framers4 5 rejected the
46
inclusion of Mason's proposal because they deemed it unnecessary.
The Framers reasoned that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary because the
federal government possessed only enumerated powers and, thus, could
not exercise powers that it did not have 47
to restrict the civil liberties
provided for in the proposed Bill of Rights.
Nevertheless, to secure ratification of the Constitution, James
Madison 48 promised to seek an amendment to the Constitution,
including a Bill of Rights. 49 Consequently, in 1789, the First Congress
43. SHEFFER, supra note 37, at xix. Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution states that "no
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3. In contrast, The Declaration of Independence makes
numerous references to religion or God, such as "the separate and equal station to which the Laws
of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them," "[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,"
and "with a firm reliance on the Protection of divine Providence." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 1, 2, 32 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
44. George Mason was one of the seven constitutional delegates from Virginia.
See
CATHERINE
DRINKER BOWEN,
MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA:
THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 3, 18 (1986). Mason, however,

refused to execute the Constitution, stating that the federal government had too much power and
would result in "a monarchy or a tyrannical aristocracy." Id. at 250-51. He had written
Virginia's Bill of Rights in 1776. Id. at 244. Thus, to appease George Mason, James Madison
promised to seek an amendment to the Constitution to protect civil liberties. LEVY, supra note
34, at 84.
45. See BOWEN, supra note 44, at 244. The Constitutional Framers were the fifty-five state
delegates who attended the Federal Convention of 1787 and created the United States
Constitution. See id. at 3. The most notable Constitutional Framers were George Washington,
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin Franklin, John Rutledge, John Dickinson,
George Wythe, and George Mason. Id. Not present at the convention, however, were John
Adams and Thomas Jefferson, both of whom were arranging treaties and seeking loans
internationally. Id. at 11.
46. LEVY, supra note 34, at 82. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts first moved for preparation
of the Bill of Rights; George Mason seconded his motion. BOWEN, supra note 44, at 244.
47. LEVY, supra note 34, at 82. Thus, Hamilton exclaimed: "For why declare that things shall
not be done which there is no power to do?" Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84 at 579-80
(Alexander Hamilton) (James E. Cook ed., 1961)).
48. James Madison was one of the most influential Constitution Framers. See JEROME A.
BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 7 (5th ed. 1996). Madison
proposed separating governmental power between the federal and state government to prevent
tyranny. Id. Also, Madison co-authored a series of persuasive articles now known as The
FederalistPapers to secure the ratification of the Constitution. Id. The FederalistPapers urged
the states to support the creation of a centralized federal government and to ratify the
Constitution. Id.
49. LEVY, supra note 34, at 84 ("Opponents of ratification feared most of all that the
centralizing tendencies of a consolidated national government would extinguish the rights of
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of the United States passed the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, and the necessary number of states ratified the First
Amendment and the other amendments constituting the Bill of Rights in
1791.50 The general purposes of the Establishment Clause were to
prevent the government from gaining excessive power, 5 1 to prevent the
government from requiring religious uniformity, 52 and to prevent
religious strife.5 3
The First Congress sought to prevent the government from gaining
excessive power through the Establishment Clause. 5 4 English rule had
left a general fear of tyrannical leadership within all of the American
colonists; the Framers, therefore, sought to avoid excessive government
power by precluding the national government from acquiring additional
power through religious institutions.5 5 Because religious institutions

states and individuals."); see also SHEFFER, supra note 37, at xix-xx (discussing Madison's
proposed amendments).
50. LEVY, supra note 34, at 104. On September 25, 1789, Congress passed the Bill of Rights,
including the Establishment Clause, when two-thirds of the Senate voted in favor it. Id. Because
Vermont already had become part of the union, eleven states then needed to ratify the
Establishment Clause and the remainder of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 106. Within six month, nine
states approved the Bill of Rights. Id. There is no record of the ratification debates in these
states. Id. at 111. Only Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Georgia delayed their
ratification. Id. at 106. On December 15, 1791, Virginia ratified the Bill of Rights, making it part
of the Constitution. Id. at 11. The ratification debate in Virginia specifically addressed the First
Amendment. Id. at 107. Eight state senators attacked the amendment as inadequate because it
did "not prohibit the rights of conscience from being violated or infringed: and although it goes to
restrain Congress from passing laws establishing any national religion, they might, not
withstanding, levy taxes to any amount, for the support of religion." Id. at 107. Some contend
that this statement proves that the Constitutional Framers, and the population as a whole, did not
believe that the Establishment Clause prohibited the government from directing aid to religious
institutions on a non-preferential basis. Id. at 108. Others, however, argue that this statement
was merely political rhetoric of anti-federalists who wanted Virginia to defeat the Bill of Rights,
thereby forcing Congress to readdress the amendments and, hopefully, to pass amendments that
would enhance state power. Id. at 109.
51. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (proposing that because the Framers sought
to avoid excessive governmental power, they enacted the Establishment Clause to preclude the
government from acquiring additional power through religious institutions).
52. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Framers created the
Establishment Clause out of the belief that religious diversity constituted an essential component
of democracy).
53. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (contending that the Framers created the
Establishment Clause in order to prevent the emergence of religious crusades in the United
States).
54. See Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 807, 811 (1999).
55. See BARRON, supra note 48, at 1 (noting the colonists' fear of tyranny). In fact, the
Declaration of Independence essentially indicted the King for his tyrannical acts. See THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration of Independence states:
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can greatly influence one's formulation of values and opinions, the
Framers concluded that tyranny would result if the national government
took control over religion. 56 Thus, to prevent the government from
gaining expansive control, the Framers enacted the Establishment
Clause.57
The Framers also designed the Establishment Clause to prevent
"government induced homogeneity" in religious beliefs. 5 8 Realizing
that all government actions have the tendency to encourage certain
conduct, while discouraging other conduct, the Framers sought to avoid
the suppression of religion by excluding the government from religious
matters all together. 59 Suppression of religion was intolerable because
the Framers believed that religious diversity was an essential component
of democracy.
In fact, James Madison reasoned that a stable
democracy could not exist in America without maintaining religious
diversity because religious groups constituted significant political
61
factions, and such factions lessened the threat of majority oppression.
The History of the present King of Great Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and
Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over
these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid World.
He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the
public Good.
He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly
Firmness his Invasions on the Rights of the People.
He has kept among us, in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the consent
of our Legislatures.
He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and
waging War against us.
Id. paras. 2-20. This list is not exhaustive; the Declaration enumerates over numerous tyrannical
acts of the King and Parliament of Great Britain. See id. paras. 3-30.
56. Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of Educational
Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 848 (1999) [hereinafter McConnell, Defense of Educational
Choice].
57. Id. at 848.
58. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 168
(1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Crossroads].
59. Id.
60. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 699 (1998) [hereinafter Viteritti, Blaine's
Wake].
61. Id. To secure the ratification of the Constitution, James Madison and others authored a
series of persuasive articles now known as The Federalist Papers. BARRON, supra note 48, at 3.

The Federalist Papers urged the States to support the creation of a centralized federal government
and to ratify the Constitution. Id. In the Federalist No. 52, James Madison explained that "[i]n a
free government the security of civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It
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Therefore, the Establishment Clause was62 necessary to ensure the
pluralist society envisioned by the Framers.

Finally, the Framers sought to prevent religious strife by enacting the
Establishment Clause. 63 The Framers remembered that many of the
original colonists immigrated to America to escape religious
discrimination and conflict. 64 Moreover, the religious persecution of
the European crusades remained in their minds. 5 Experience had
demonstrated that when government allies itself with one particular
religion, individuals with contrary beliefs are likely to face hatred and
persecution. 66 Social stability simply had no vitality without religious
tolerance. 67 Therefore, the Framers drafted the Establishment 68Clause to
prevent religious crusades from emerging in the United States.
B. Incorporationof the Establishment Clause
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to limit the actions of
only the federal government. 69 Thus, on its face, the text of the
consists inone case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other the multiplicity of sects. The
degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects... " Viteritti,
Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 700 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 324 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
62. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 700. Pluralism is a philosophical doctrine that
posits that society benefits from the total participation of minority groups within the dominant
society when the minority groups maintain their cultural differences.
RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1040 (Robert B. Costello et al. eds., 4th ed. 1996).
63. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2502 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Establishment Clause reflect[s] the Framers' vision of an American nation free of the religious
strife that had long plagued the nations of Europe."); BRADFORD, supra note 35, at 96-97 (noting
that the Constitutional Framers hoped to prevent religious conflict through the Establishment
Clause).
64. Davidson, supra note 37, at 452.
65. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947); see also Noah Feldman, From Liberty To
Equality: The Transformationof the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 680-81 (2002)
(noting that the Court, in Everson, stated that the Framers enacted the Establishment Clause to
prevent the European practice of religious persecution).
66. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2503 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
429 (1962)).
67. Id. at 2502 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (The Establishment Clause embodies an
"understanding, reached in the 17th century after decades of religious war, that liberty and social
stability demand religious tolerance.").
68. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. LEVY, supra note 34, at 147; Donald L. Beschle, Does the Establishment Clause Matter?
Non-Establishment Principlesin the United States and Canada, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 451, 453
(2002); see also infra notes 501-19 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's
contentions in Zelman that the courts should not apply the Establishment Clause to the states); cf
James McClellan, Hand's Writing on the Wall of Separation: The Significance of Jaffree in
Future Cases on Religious Establishment, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 43, 45 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1987) (contending that
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Establishment Clause prohibits only Congress from establishing a
religion. 70 In addition, the wording of a draft of the Establishment
Clause, which provided that "nor shall any national religion be
established," is evidence of the Framers' intention to limit the actions of
the Federal Government alone. 7 1 Moreover, James Madison proposed
another amendment to limit the actions of state governments regarding
the Framers designed the Bill of Rights to prevent the federal government from "encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of the states").
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the ight of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added); see also LEVY, supra note 34, at 95 (noting the
original wording of the Establishment Clause); McClellan, supra note 69, at 47 (pointing to the
original wording of the Establishment Clause); Edwin Meese & John Eastman, The Federalism
Side of School Vouchers (discussing the original wording of the Establishment Clause), at
http://www.claremont.orglwritings/precepts/20020703eastmanmeese.html (last modified July 3,
2002).
No information exists concerning why the select committee of the House of
Representatives deleted the word "national" in the First Amendment. LEVY, supra note 34, at 96.
However, the House notes, found in the Annals of Congress, do provide the debate that followed
the select committee's proposal. Id. The account states in part:
Mr. Sylvester had some doubts of the propriety of the mode of expression used in
[the first draft of the Establishment Clause]. He apprehended that it was liable to a
construction different from what had been made by the committee. He feared it might
be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether....
Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience....
Mr. Huntington said that he feared, with the gentleman first up on this subject, that
the words might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely harmful to the cause of
religion....
Mr. Madison thought, if the word national was inserted before religion, it would
satisfy the minds of honorable gentlemen. He believed that the people feared one sect
might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which
they would compel others to conform. He thought if the word national was introduced,
it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent.
Mr. Gerry did not like the term national, proposed by the gentleman from
Virginia.... It had been insisted upon [at the Constitutional Convention] by those who
were called antifederalists, that this form of Government consolidated the Union; the
honorable gentleman's motion shows that he considers it in the same light. Those who
were called antifederalists at that time complained that they had injustice done them by
the title, because they were in favor of a Federal Government, and the others were in
favor of a national one....
Mr. Madison withdrew his motion, but observed that the words "no national religion
shall be established by law," did not imply that the Government was a national one....
I ANNALS OF CONG. 757-59 (Joseph Gales & W.W. Seaton eds., 1834-1856), quoted in LEVY,
supra note 34, at 96-99. Accordingly, partly due to Elbridge Gerry's fears concerning federalism
and state rights, the Framers did not re-insert the word "national." See DONALD L. DRAKEMAN,
CHURCH-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: MAKING SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 68

(1991) (stating that Gerry had noted that the word "national" had "achieved some notoriety in the
Federalist-Antifederalist debates").

490

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

religion, which was not enacted.72 The mere fact that Congress
considered and rejected an amendment limiting state government
actions with respect to religion demonstrates that the Framers did not
intend for the Establishment Clause to apply to the states. 73 In addition,
in 1875, Congress again considered and rejected an amendment that
would have restricted state governmental actions regarding religion,
demonstrating that the Congressmen of the nineteenth century
did not
74
believe that the Establishment Clause applied to the states.
Nevertheless, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the doctrine of incorporation provided the means necessary to apply
the Establishment Clause to the states. 75 The doctrine of incorporation
posits that because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state
governments from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law," 7 6 it, in effect, prevents state governments

72. LEVY, supra note 34, at 105; see also Kenneth J. Brown, Comment, Establishing A Buffer
Zone: The Proper Balance Between the First Amendment Religion Clauses in the Context of
Neutral Zoning Regulations, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1507, 1528 (2001) (noting that because James
Madison was a strong proponent of state rights vis-a-vis the federal government, many have
interpreted the Establishment Clause as a limitation on the federal government alone). The
proposed amendment provided that "[n]o State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury." LEVY, supra note 34, at 105. The notes from the
House debates provide:
Mr. Madison conceived this to be the most valuable amendment in the whole list. If
there were any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from infringing
upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against
the State Governments. He thought that if they provided against the one, it was as
necessary to provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally
grateful to the people.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Joseph Gales & W.W. Seaton eds., 1834-56), reprintedin A SECOND
FEDERALIST: CONGRESS CREATES A GOVERNMENT 276 (Charles S. Hyneman & George W.
Carey eds., 1967). The House passed the amendment, but the amendment did not receive the
necessary votes in the Senate. LEVY, supra note 34, at 105. Levy states that "[hiad the Senate
passed it, a constitutional basis would have existed for interpreting the rights of conscience as
being contradictory to establishment of religion. Such an interpretation had to wait until long
after the Fourteenth Amendment imposed restrictions on the States." Id.
73. LEVY, supra note 34, at 147.
74. Id. at 148; BRADFORD, supra note 35, at 99; see also infra Part II.D (discussing the state
anti-religion clauses that resulted after the attempt to amend the United States Constitution). This
proposed amendment is commonly known as the "Blaine Amendment," in recognition of its
promoter James G. Blaine of Maine. LEVY, supra note 34, at 147. Although the Blaine
Amendment did not pass in Congress, Blaine's attempt to amend the Constitution did encourage
many states to amend their state constitutions to include anti-religion clauses. See Viteritti,
Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 671.
75. LEVY, supra note 34, at 148.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
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77
from depriving individuals of the liberties found in the Bill of Rights.
Therefore, although the Constitutional Framers did not necessarily

intend for the Establishment Clause to restrict state governments, the
Establishment Clause, through the Fourteenth Amendment,7 8 now
restricts state governments through the doctrine of incorporation.
The Supreme Court, in 1925, originally incorporated the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberties in
Gitlow v. New York.7 9 In Gitlow, a case dealing with free speech issues,
the Court stated that the First Amendment protections were incorporated
80
into the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, applied to the states.
The Court did not specifically apply the Establishment Clause to the
states until 1947 81 in Everson v. Board of Education.82 Since 1947, the
Court has consistently imposed
the limitations of the Establishment
Clause on state governments. 83
C. The Lack of True Separationof Church and State
The Establishment Clause expressly prohibits Congress from
establishing a national religion. 84 This disestablishment of religion is

life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
77. LEVY, supra note 34, at 148.
78. See id. at 225 (discussing the doctrine of incorporation).
79. Id. at 226; Beschle, supra note 69, at 453 n.7. In Gitlow, the Court held that the word
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated freedom of speech from the First
Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665 (1925). The Court stated that "we may
and do assume that freedom of speech and of press-which are protected by the First Amendment
from the abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States." Id. Thus, the Court held that state governments could abridge freedom of speech no
more than the federal government. Id.
80. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 665; see LEVY, supra note 34, at 226; Beschle, supra note 69, at 453
n.7.
81. JOHN M. SWOMLEY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SECULAR STATE 62-63 (1987);
Beschle, supra note 69, at 453 n.7; Meese & Eastman, supra note 71; see also infra Part IV.E
(discussing Justice Thomas's contentions in Zelman that the Court should not apply the
Establishment Clause to the states because the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause in
Everson without analysis); infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson
decision).
82. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
83. See infra Part II.G (discussing the jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause as applied to
the states).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the fight of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
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not, however, synonymous with the separation of church and state, for
the government may interact with religious institutions and even
provide public funds to religious institutions without establishing a
national religion. 85 Moreover, the phrase "separation of church and
state" does not originate from the text of the Constitution; it originates
from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. 86 In
this letter, Jefferson stated that "'the legislative powers of the
government reach actions only, and not opinions,-I contemplate with
sovereign reverence ... [the First Amendment] which declared that
[Congress] should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of
Jefferson's "wall of
separation between church and State."' 8 7
separation" has created the popular belief that the Establishment Clause
created a rigid wall of separation between church and state. 8 8 Many
commentators, however, point to America's early history as evidence
not prohibit the government and
that the Establishment Clause does 89
interacting.
from
institutions
religious
85. JOSEPH P. VITERIT'I, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY 16 (1999) [hereinafter VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY] ("While the argument
has become commonplace within the American legal establishment, translating disestablishment
into absolute separation represents a giant conceptual leap, even for imaginative legal thinkers.");
Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 662; see also STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE
CONSTITUTION: RACE, RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED 234 (1994) (contending that
the First Amendment does not mandate the separation of church and state because the
Constitutional Framers rejected Congressman Samuel Livermore's proposed amendment, which
stated that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of
conscience"); cf BRADFORD, supra note 35, at 87-88 (rejecting a First Amendment
understanding that emphasizes a separation of church and state); Scott W. Breedlove & Victoria
S. Salzmann, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Irrelevance of Legislative Motivation Under the
Establishment Clause, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 419, 447 (2001) (stating that the Constitutional
Framers would have been "hypocrites" if they intended the First Amendment to prohibit
government officials from making decisions based on religion or in support of religion because
the Framers gave evidence of their religious beliefs in the Declaration of Independence).
Consider M. E. Bradford's contention that to understand the meaning of the First Amendment,
one must ignore the Court's emphasis on the separation of church and state. BRADFORD, supra
note 35, at 87-88. He explains that the Court's emphasis on the separation of church and state
doctrine is erroneous because this emphasis began after only examining the thoughts of a
"selected group of early American leaders" who were deists and secularists and not at all
representative of the other Constitutional Framers. Id.
86. Davidson, supra note 37, at 450-51; Neal, supra note 5, at 364.
87. See Davidson, supra note 37, at 450-51 (quoting Jefferson's words found in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
88. Neal, supra note 5, at 364 ("Jefferson's 'wall of separation' has in many ways come to
stand for the de facto popular meaning of the First Amendment ....).
89. See Neal, supra note 5, at 365 ("Rather than strict separation, history supports the view
that Madison meant exactly what he said: 'no national religion shall be established."'); cf
Davidson, supra note 37, at 453 (stating that the organic laws of the United States demonstrate
that the Framers did not intend for the Establishment Clause to create a rigid wall of separation).

2003]

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Authorizing School Vouchers

493

For instance, commentators point to the Northwest Territory
Ordinance of 1787,90 which expressly encouraged the intermingling of
church and state and was enacted by the same Congressional members
who enacted the Establishment Clause. 9 1 Other examples of public
support for religious activity in early America include a day dedicated
to prayer and thanksgiving, a tax levied to pay for ministers' salaries,
and required religious tests for state public officials. 92 Moreover,
because clergymen administered early American schools, religion crept
into the education of American school children. 9 3 This religious
instruction was Protestant in nature because early America was
predominantly Protestant. 94 Children recited Protestant prayers and
sang Protestant hymns at school.9 5 Also, the school curriculum96 at that
time included reading from the King James version of the Bible.
In the early nineteenth century, state governments began funding and
administering schools; nevertheless, total separation of church and state
did not emerge suddenly. 97 In fact, moral training became the mission
98
of
these movement,
early public schools.
the leader
public
school
termed hisHorace
newlyMann,
created
schoolsof the
"common

90. ORDINANCE OF 1787: THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT art. III (U.S. 1787).
This ordinance created the temporary government of the United States territory northwest of the
Ohio River. Commentators point to the ordinance because it stated that "[r]eligion, morality, and
knowledge; being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged." Id.
91. Davidson, supra note 37, at 453 (contending that the Northwest Ordinance demonstrates
that the Framers did not intend for the Establishment Clause to create a rigid wall of separation);
Neal, supra note 5, at 364 (pointing to the Northwest Ordinance to prove that the strict
separationist approach is erroneous).
92. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 663 n.27 (noting that on the same day that the
House of Representatives passed the First Amendment, it also adopted a resolution that requested
the President to create the national holiday of Thanksgiving).
93. Id. at 663. In fact, Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, noted that "'[a]lmost
all education [wa]s entrusted to the clergy."' Id. at 663 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville I
DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 320 n.4 (Phillips Bradley ed., Random House 1945) (1839)).
94. See Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 666 (noting that Protestantism was the
mainstream religion of the nation).
95. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2503 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Viteritti,
Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 666-67.
96. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2503 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60,
at 666.
97. See McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 58, at 121 (noting that instructors taught
Protestant prayers in the publicly funded schools of the nineteenth century).
98. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY 72 (1988) ("[The public schools]
were to be controlled by local lay boards. And-this is important-they were to be charged with
the mission of moral and civic training, training that found its roots in a ground of shared
values.").
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schools." 9 9 The purpose of these common schools was not simply to
teach reading and math to American school children; the purpose was to
create a youth with common values, morals, and loyalties.' 0 Mann saw
the public school system as a necessity to unify the diverse citizens of
America and instill a shared set of American ideals in the entire
population. 10 1 Thus, common school proponents considered
public
1 2
education a critical element of the democracy experiment. 0
Patriotism and national pride, however, were not the only subjects
taught at common schools; common schools also forced Protestant
prayers and beliefs upon the school children. 10 3 At times, common
schools even indoctrinated school children with anti-Catholic and antiJewish bigotry. 104 Although Mann called for the "entire exclusion of
religious teaching" publicly, some scholars contend that Mann's true
intention was to force his Protestant beliefs on the immigrant and
1 6
1 5
largely Catholic population 0 that had recently exploded in size. 0
99. CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 4-5 (1988) (noting,
however, that Horace Mann did not truly invent the common school agenda, for the philosophers
of the French Enlightenment first recognized the importance of creating a shared national
identity); James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If, 35 B.C. L. REV. 619, 623 (1994).
Horace Mann was the secretary of education for Massachusetts. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra
note 60, at 666. He is responsible for both creating the first public school system of the nation in
Massachusetts and promoting the "common school" concept. Id.
100. GLENN, supra note 99, at 4.
101. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., concurring); BENNETT, supra note 98, at 72;
Peyser, supra note 99, at 623.
102. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 357.
103. McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 58, at 121. "Mann's schools required daily reading
from the King James version of the Bible.... The recital of [Protestant] prayers and the singing
of hymns were also regular school activities." Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 666-67.
104. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 58, at 121. For example, common school children
taunted the Jewish children in their schools, calling them "Christ killers" and "dirty Jews."
LEVY, supra note 34, at 23 1.
105. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 662, 668. As scholar Dennis Doyle notes,
every school has two curriculums: one visible and one invisible. Dennis P. Doyle, The
Excellence Movement, Academic Standards, A Core Curriculum and Choice: How Do They
Connect?, in THE POLITICS OF EXCELLENCE AND CHOICE IN EDUCATION 15-16 (William Lowe
Bowd & Charles Taylor Kerchner eds., 1988). The visible curriculum of books and homework
can, of course, greatly influence the ideas of children; however, it is the invisible curriculum of
beliefs and morals, which are purposefully taught to children, that is most powerful and
influential. Id. Thus, regardless of Mann's public rejection of church and state interaction and of
the actual physical books used in the common schools, the invisible curriculum of acculturation
prevailed. Id. Furthermore, Mann did not always publicly reject interaction between church and
state because in his 1848 final report to the Board of Education he stated that "[o]ur system
earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it welcomes
the religion of the Bible." VITERITT, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 85, at 149.
106. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 299-300 (2001) (noting that the number of Catholics in America
doubled from 1850 to 1860 and quadrupled to twelve million by 1900).
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Hence, Professor Viteritti states that "[t]he entire concept of a free,
universal secular education was in fact an institutional hypocrisy
perpetrated by the political establishment." 10 7
Similarly, others
described the common school as an agent of socialization and a "device
of class domination," with the State and Protestant Church thoroughly
108
intertwined.
Catholic Americans, however, did not quietly accept the Protestant
bias of the public school system. 10 9 Instead, during the late nineteenth
century, Catholics formed political alliances with other religious
minorities and launched an aggressive attack against the Protestant
majority. 1 10 Through these alliances, Catholics filed and won lawsuits
to remove the Protestant emphasis in public schools in several states.Ill
Moreover, Catholics began their own school system,
sometimes with
112
the help of public funds from state governments.
Therefore, by the
end of the nineteenth century, religion not only had taken a prominent
role within publicly funded schools, but also had claimed its own
schools through the Catholic school system. 113 Accordingly, the nation
14
had not truly erected a wall of separation between church and state.1

107. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 666.
108. See, e.g., GLENN, supra note 99, at 5.
109. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 304 (noting that Catholics filed multiple lawsuits
to remove the Protestant emphasis in the public schools). But see GLENN, supra note 99, at 179206 (noting that before the Catholics began their protest, Orthodox Protestants voiced their
opposition to the common schools because Horace Mann generalized the Protestant religion in
the common schools by eliminating many of the tenets of orthodox Christianity).
110. Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 13637 (2000); cf GLENN, supra note 99, at 197 (noting that in the Netherlands, Catholics and
Orthodox Protestants formed a political alliance to shape the nation's education policy).
11. Heytens, supra note 110, at 136. For instance, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
removal of the King James Bible from public schools in Cincinnati. Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23
Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872); see also Heytens, supra note 110, at 136 n.118 (noting the Minor
decision). Also, Catholics successfully rid the Chicago, New York City, Buffalo, and Rochester
public schools of the King James Bible. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 304. Yet, courts
often held that requiring school children to read from the King James Bible was not a violation of
religious freedom because "Protestantism had been so entrenched within the mainstream of
American culture that it was difficult for many to understand the concerns of religious
minorities." Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 668. For example, in Donahue v.
Richards, the Maine Supreme Court upheld the school board's required readings of the King
James Bible. Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 376, 379 (1854).
112. Heytens, supra note 110, at 136. In New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and Wisconsin, state governments funded religious schools. VITERIT-I, CHOOSING EQUALITY,
supra note 85, at 147; Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 664.
113. GLENN, supra note 99, at 215-19.
114. See McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 58, at 121 (noting that early American schools,
funded by state governments, required children to say religious prayers and sing hymnals).
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D. The ProtestantBacklash. The Blaine Amendments
To curb Catholic political gains in the education system, the
Protestant majority made a push for the state and its public schools to
separate from the Church.1 15 In fact, in his 1875 State of the Union
address, President Ulysses S. Grant called for a constitutional
amendment to officially prohibit public funds from reaching religious
institutions. 116 Congressman James G. Blaine1 17 of Maine took Grant's
challenge, sponsoring an amendment that would have forbidden any
state from establishing a religion and from raising money in support of
religious institutions. 118
Blaine's amendment fell short of the necessary votes; his attempt to
amend the United States Constitution, however, did propel an antiCatholic movement within the states. 119 Approximately thirty states
then amended their constitutions to include the restrictive language of

115. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 303-04 (stressing that the Protestants sought to
regain their dominance through many means, including constitutional amendments and statutory
changes).
116. Heytens, supra note 110, at 131-32 & 132 n.77 (citing Grant's State of the Union
Address, 4 CONG. REC. 174-75 (1875)). Interestingly, legal precedent at that time did not
indicate that public aid to religious institutions was unconstitutional. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake,
supra note 60, at 671.
117. Congressman Blaine was one of the most influential members of the Republican Party in
the House. Heytens, supra note 110, at 132. He had served as Speaker of the House until the
Democrats recaptured the House in 1874. Id. He then planned on running for president in the
1876 election. Id. However, he lost the Republican Party nomination to Rutherford B. Hayes.
HarpWeek, The Presidential Elections from 1860-1884, The Presidential Elections: 1876,
Overview, at http://www.elections.harpweek.com40verview/ overview- 1876-1.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2003). In 1876, Hayes became the President of the United States. BARRON, supra note
48, at xxxix.
118. Heytens, supra note 110, at 131-32; Eric W. Treene, The Grand Finale is Just
Beginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle Over the Blaine Amendments, 7, available at
http://www.ij.org/publications (last visited Feb. 13, 2003); see also Viteritti, Blaine's Wake,
supra note 60, at 671 n.64 (quoting Blaine's proposal). Blaine's proposal stated:
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any public lands devoted
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so
raised or lands devoted be divided between religious sects and denominations.
Id.
119. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 671; Heytens, supra note 110, at 133-34. The
House passed the Blaine Amendment with 180 members voting for the Amendment, 7 voting
against, and 98 abstaining from the vote. Heytens, supra note 110, at 133. The Senate then
debated the Amendment. Id. Ultimately, the Amendment failed in the Senate with only 28
Senators voting in favor of it, 16 voting against it, and 27 abstaining from the vote. Id. Senators
voted almost entirely along party lines, with all but one Republican Senator casting his ballot for
the Amendment and all of the voting Democrat Senators opposing it. Id. at 133-34.

2003]

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Authorizing School Vouchers

497

Blaine's amendment. 12 These state amendments are evidence of the
Protestant majority's refusal to permit Catholicism to flourish 12in1
America and of the governments' anti-Catholic sentiments.
Consequently, because many state constitutions expressly prohibit state
120. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 305; Heytens, supra note 110, at 134. This number is
an approximation because some dispute exists over which constitutional provisions constitute
Blaine Amendments. Heytens, supra note 110, at 123 n.32. The following provisions are
recognized as Blaine Amendments: ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. I, § 12;
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 3; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6; Ky. CONST. § 189; MASS. CONST. art. XVIII; MICH. CONST.
art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, art. XII, § 2; MO. CONST. art. X, § 6; MONT. CONST. art.
X, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; N.H. CONST. pt. 11, art. 83; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5;
PA. CONST. art. III, § 29; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, §
7; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 4, art. X, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYo.
CONST. art. 1, § 19. Id. The text of each Blaine Amendment varies, but the amendments typically
prohibit the government from extracting public funds from their treasuries to support religious
institutions. Id. For instance, the following is the text of Florida's Blaine Amendment:
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or
penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices
inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any
political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of
any sectarian institution.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. The text of the Blaine Amendment of Wisconsin states:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect
or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall
any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any
preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor
shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or
religious or theological seminaries.
WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 18. Another variation is the Blaine Amendment of New York, which states:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit or any
public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination,
or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legislature may
provide for the transportation of children to and from any school or institution of
learning.
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. Finally, the following is the text of the Illinois Blaine Amendment:
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school district, or
other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public
fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or
sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or
scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor
shall any grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made by
the State, or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose.
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3.
121. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 303-05.
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public funds from reaching religious institutions, today these institutions
not only must withstand United States constitutional challenges when
22
seeking public aid but also state constitutional challenges.1
E. Pierce v. Society of Sisters: The "Empty Promise" of a Parent's
Right to Choose Education
As America's Catholic and Jewish populations increased during the
twentieth century, Protestant religious dominance subsided. 12 ' As a
result of the immigrant influx, America lost its identification as a
Protestant nation, and Protestants largely accepted America's new
religious pluralism. 124 Indeed, religious pluralism received support in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, where the Supreme Court unanimously held
that American parents could send their children to Catholic schools
instead of Protestant-dominated public schools. 125 The Supreme Court
explained that state governments could not mandate attendance at public
schools because parents have a liberty interest "to direct the upbringing
and education" of their children. 126 In essence, Pierce affirmed the
fundamental right of parents to educate their children as they choose b
permitting private schools to exist alongside state public schools. l '

122. See infra Part V.D (discussing the limitations that the Blaine Amendments place on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris).
123. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 305. Protestants remained the most numerous
religious sect in America and continued to control American politics; however, "the Protestant era
in American life had come to its end." Id. (quoting Robert T. Handy, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA:
PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES 58, 213 (1971)). By the twentieth century, the
Protestant majority had learned to accept the fact that Americans came in three forms: Protestant,
Catholic, and Jew. Id.
124. Id. at 305-06.
125. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925). This case came in front of the
Court prior to the incorporation of the First Amendment. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60,
at 677 n.98. The Supreme Court decided the case on due process and liberty principles of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
126. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. The Court also noted that private schools have a "business
and property" interest that the Constitution protects. Id. at 535-36.
127. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 85, at 130; SHEFFER, supra note 37, at 38;
Frank J. Kemerer, The Constitutionalityof School Vouchers, 101 EDUC. L. REP. 17, 19-20 (1995)
[hereinafter Kemerer, Constitutionality of School Vouchers]; Viteritti, Blaine 's Wake, supra note
60, at 677-78; Davidson, supra note 37, at 444-45; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (affirming parents' right to choose the education of their children by permitting children to
learn in non-English languages if their parents so desire). The Supreme Court in Pierce explained
that
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
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The case, however, did not address the issue of government funding of
12 8
Nevertheless, Pierce did validate the existence of
religious schools. 129
schools.
religious
Some commentators contend that the Pierce decision can be read as
containing an implied promise that parents may choose to send their
children to religious schools. 130 Yet, these commentators note that this
implied promise is an empty promise, for most parents cannot afford the
fees of private school. 13 1 Therefore, although the Court in Pierce broke
the states' monopoly on education, the decision did not truly provide
American parents with the right to choose the education of their
children. 132 In fact, because the Court provided parents with the
constitutional right to send their children to religious schools without
providing parents with the financial means, the Court in Pierce
effectively encouraged parents to place their children in public
schools. 133 As one commentator explained, the "selective funding"
permitted by Pierce "exerts powerful-and highly questionablefinancial pressure on dissenting parents to conform their educational
choices to the majority's values by enrolling children in public schools

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. More recently, in Roe v. Wade, the Court described parents' right to
educate their children according to their own preferences as fundamental, stating that the
fundamental right of privacy "has some extension to activities relating to ...child rearing and
education." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
128. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536; Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 677-78;
Davidson, supra note 37, at 445.
129. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 677-78;
Davidson, supra note 37, at 445.
130. VITERITrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 85, at 130; Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra
note 60, at 677-78.
131. VITERITri, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 85, at 130; Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra
note 60, at 677-78 ("But the promise of choice implied by the two rulings [of Pierce and Meyer]
would prove to be somewhat empty."); see also Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Findingsfrom the
Condition of Education 1997: Public and Private Schools: How Do They Differ? (1997)
("Because most private schools charge tuition, only parents with the personal financial resources
or financial aid to afford the tuition truly have the option of selecting a private school. Thus, the
rate of private school attendance in 1993 increased with family income."), at
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003)
http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=97983
[hereinafter Findings].
132. VITERITr, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 85, at 130; Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra
note 60, at 677-78.
133. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
937, 942 (1996); Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 677-78; cf Davidson, supra note 37,
at 448 ("[Some commentators] argue that from an economic perspective, because many parents or
guardians cannot bear the cost of private schooling or cannot spare the time to home school due to
both spouses working, the public school system in the United States has a practical monopoly on
elementary and secondary education.").
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to avoid the heavy financial burden of private school tuition." 134 In
fact, some argue that government funding of both private and public
schools may be constitutionally required in order to achieve the promise
135
of Pierce.
F. School Choice: Vouchers
The Supreme Court has never reconciled Pierce's apparent implied
promise that parents may choose to send their children to religious
136
schools with the public school system's monopoly on free education.
Consequently, parents are frequently forced to forfeit free education if
they choose to send their children to private schools or are forced to
accept the dilapidated condition of the public school system. 137 This
choice usually permits only affluent children to avoid the public school
system, while locking
America's urban poor into the failing public
38
school system.1
Thus, for the purposes of this Note, the first question to consider is
whether the public school system is truly failing. Research indicates
that, in fact, the public school system is teaching its students
inadequately and that educational reform is therefore essential. 139 For
134. Gilles, supra note 133, at 942. Gilles explains that "government may not do indirectly
what it is forbidden to do directly." Id. at 1008. He cites commentator Cass Sunstein and states
that "when the government engages in selective funding it is attaching 'strings' to the exercise of
constitutional rights, and although this may sometimes be permissible, 'the pressure imposed by
the strings ... is constitutionally troublesome."' Id.
135. See Robert F. Drinan, The Constitutionalityof PublicAid to ParochialSchools, in THE
WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 56 (Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963) ("A plausible argument can
be made for the proposition that the Pierce decision elevated the private school to the status of a
publicly recognized institution which cannot logically and fairly be granted state accreditation
and denied state subsidization."). See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding
Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991) (comparing the
constitutional right affirmed in Pierce to the constitutional right to abortion recognized in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973), and considering whether, to avoid unconstitutional
discriminatory funding, both abortion and private religious schools must be funded).
136. Drinan, supra note 135, at 55 ("The fundamental issue in the controversy over public
funds for private schools, including parochial schools, therefore arises out of the fact that private
schools are public schools for the purpose of compulsory attendance laws [due to Pierce], but
have not been designated as public schools capable of being beneficiaries of public funds.");
Gilles, supra note 133, at 937.
137. Gilles, supra note 133, at 988.
138. Id. at 989; Michael J. Frank, The Evolving Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and
School Vouchers, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 999 (2002); Holland & Soifer, supra note 1, at 337;
see also Findings, supra note 131 (suggesting that only parents with personal wealth or access to
financial aid have the option to send their children to private schools because of the cost of
private school tuition). The average tuition of a private elementary school in 1993 was $2138,
and the average cost of a private secondary school was $4578. Findings,supra note 131.
139. See Bolick, supra note 6, at 245 (discussing the poor performance of public school
students in areas where voucher programs are in place); Holland & Soifer, supra note 1, at 337
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instance, average Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") scores have fallen
approximately seventy-five points in the last thirty years. 140 Cleveland
public school students have a one-in-fourteen chance of graduating from
high school with senior-level proficiency. 14 1 Moreover, half of all
minorities in American public schools do not graduate from high
school. 142 Therefore,
few commentators contend that the public school
14 3
system is a success.
These statistics have triggered the school choice movement. 144 All
school choice programs aim to return control to parents and enable them
(noting that half of all minorities in America's public schools do not graduate from high school);
Peyser, supra note 99, at 626 (noting public school children's poor performance on standardized
tests). Although this Note focuses on using vouchers as a tool for educational reform, other
reform options exist. See generally Robert L. Manteuffel, The Quest for Efficiency: Public
School Funding in Texas, 43 Sw. L.J. 1119, 1129-44 (1990). For instance, some contend that
public schools should simply receive more money from the state. Id. at 1129. This option would
lessen the inequality between districts, but ultimately requires the state either to decrease its
funding of some other service or to increase its taxes. Id. at 1129, 1143. Others call for "district
power equalizing," which would reduce the disparities between school districts by "allocating the
state's educational funds based upon the amount of local 'tax effort."' Id. at 1129. The effect of
this option is to shift funds from wealthy districts to poor districts. Id. at 1143. Another
education reform option is for the state legislature, instead of individual school districts, to fully
fund the public school system. Id. at 1129. The state would collect money for the schools and
then allocate the funds "back to the individual school districts based on per capita amount that can
be adjusted to reflect regional cost differences or costs associated with teaching handicapped or
disadvantaged children." Id. This option would create some equality between the various school
districts. Id. However, because this option substantially changes the school finance system,
many are likely to oppose it. See id. Finally, some argue that the state legislature should
radically change the method through which schools receive funding by not tying school funding
to property taxes. Id. at 1143-44. They contend that reliance on property tax bases creates
disparities among school districts. See id. at 1143-44. Instead of property taxes, public schools
could receive their funding through sales tax or income-related taxes. Id. at 1144.
140. Peyser, supra note 99, at 626. The SAT is a three-hour exam that assesses both verbal
reasoning and mathematical problem solving skills. COLL. ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BD.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SAT 2 (2002), at http://www.collegeboard.com/
prod-downloads/sat/satguide/SATQnA.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). The purpose of the test is
to predict one's "readiness for college work." Id. The average combined math and verbal score
in 1963 was 978; in 1993, the average combined math and verbal score was 902. Peyser, supra
note 99, at 626. Because more-varied students now take the SAT, however, this comparison may
be skewed. Id. Yet, the absolute number of students receiving a score of 600 on the verbal
section had dropped by thirty percent, indicating that the broader cross-section of students now
taking the SAT is not the sole reason that SAT scores in the public schools have declined. Id.
Therefore, unsurprisingly, a report by the National Commission of Education Excellence
remarked that "average achievement of high school students on most standardized tests is now
lower than ... when Sputnik was launched." Id.
141. Bolick, supra note 6, at 246. In Milwaukee, only half of all public school students
graduate from high school. Id.
142. Holland & Soifer, supra note 1, at 337.
143. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 342; Peyser, supra note 99, at 626.
144. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 343. Economist Milton Friedman first proposed a
form of school choice-vouchers-in 1955. Neal, supra note 5, at 348. Friedman argued that
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to make some decisions concerning where their children will attend
school. 14 5 The following are the six main types of school choice
14 6 inter-district public choice, 14 7
programs: intra-district public choice,
charter schools, 14 8 magnet schools, 149 privately funded voucher
programs, 150 and publicly funded voucher programs.
The first four school choice programs operate within the public
school system. 152 Intra-district public choice programs permit parents
to send their children to any traditional public school within their school
district. 15 3 Inter-district public choice programs allow parents to
transfer their children to a traditional public school in a different school
district. 15 4 Charter schools, also known as community schools, are not
traditional public schools; they are self-managed public schools that do
not answer to local school district boards and therefore have less
bureaucracy than traditional public schools. 155 Consequently, charter
schools have less bureaucracy than traditional public schools and can be
more responsive to the needs of their students. 156 Charter school
programs permit parents to choose from one of the self-managed public
the quality of the public school system had deteriorated due to the government's increased control
over the school districts and the bureaucratization of the public school system as a whole. Id. at
348-50. Friedman proposed empowering parents by providing them with tuition vouchers that
they could use to send their children to private schools for little or no cost. Id. at 350-51. Today,
the quality of education within the public school system has dramatically decreased since
Friedman made his proposal. Id. at 351. Therefore, it is not surprising that a large support basis
for school choice has finally emerged. See Garnett & Gamett, supra note 4, at 343.
145. See Jerry Ellig & Kenneth Kelly, Competition and Quality in Deregulated Industries:
Lessons for the Education Debate, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 335, 340 (2002) (noting the various
school choice programs that provide parents with control over where their children will attend
school); Peyser, supra note 99, at 621 (same).
146. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 620.
147. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 620.
148. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 620; James E. Ryan
& Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, Ill YALE L.J. 2043, 2073-78
(2002).
149. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2464-65 (2002); Ryan & Heise, supra note
148, at 2070.
150. See Bodemner, supra note 2, at 289-90.
151. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 620.
152. See Peyser, supra note 99, at 621; see also Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (noting that
magnet schools are public schools); Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340 (stating that intradistrict school choice, inter-district school choice, and charter schools all are public schools).
153. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 621.
154. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 621.
155. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 621.
156. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 350; Ryan & Heise, supra note 148, at 2074 ("The
schools are freed from complying with various regulations-relating to such issues as teacher
hiring, curriculum, calendar, and length of school day-in exchange for accountability of
performance.").
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schools in the area. 15 7 Magnet schools, which are operated by local
school districts, are public schools that emphasize a specific curriculum
or teaching style. 158 Magnet school programs, therefore, enable parents
to send their children to schools with a special emphasis that may spark
interest in their children. 159 Research indicates that many of these
public school choice programs have improved the scholastic
achievement of their students; some contend, however, that the
students' scholastic achievement levels will not improve dramatically
160
without the inclusion of private schools in a school choice program.
The only school choice programs that enable parents to send their
children to private schools are voucher programs. 16 1 Such programs
enable children to attend private schools at little or no cost. 162 There
163 are
two types of voucher programs: privately funded programs
and
publicly funded programs. 164 Privately funded voucher programs are
funded by private donations. 165 Because privately funded voucher
157. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340 (noting that independent school boards usually
run charter schools); Peyser, supra note 99, at 621 (stating that charter schools are independently
managed); see also Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 349-50 (discussing the details of the
highly successful charter school program in New York City's Harlem neighborhood).
158. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2464-65 (2002) (noting that magnet
schools emphasize a particular teaching style, subject area, or service to the student); Ryan &
Heise, supra note 148, at 2070 (noting that oftentimes the purposes of magnet schools are to
"foster racial integration and typically to use racial balance criteria in selecting students").
159. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (noting that magnet schools emphasize a particular
teaching style, subject area, or service to the student); Ryan & Heise, supra note 148, at 2070.
Magnet schools do restrict admissions, however, and typically use race as a factor for enrollment.
Id. Use of race-based criteria to determine admission into magnet schools is both politically and
legally controversial. Id. "Politically, magnet schools are controversial because they cost more to
operate and restrict admissions, taking away resources from other pubic schools while
simultaneously limiting the opportunities of resident students to attend the schools in order to
assure racial balance." Id. at 2070 n. 129. Legally, magnet schools are controversial because race
criteria may be subject to constitutional challenge.
Id. For more information on the
constitutionality of race criteria, see Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions
Programsin Public Elementary andSecondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1999).
160. See, e.g., Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 349. For example, the charter school
program in New York City's Harlem neighborhood has been described as the "the Miracle in East
Harlem" because of its success. Id. Prior to implementation of the charter school program, less
than sixteen percent of Harlem public school students could read at their grade level. Id. After
Harlem created its charter school program, sixty-three percent of Harlem school students could
read at their grade level. Id.
161. See id. at 349 (noting that charter schools and public-school-only choice programs
exclude private religious schools); supra note 5 (defining the term "voucher").
162. See Peyser, supra note 99, at 621.
163. See Bodemner, supra note 2, at 289-90.
164. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 340; Peyser, supra note 99, at 620.
165. See Bodemner, supra note 2, at 289-90. Privately funded voucher programs are
scholarship programs organized by both not-for-profit organizations and individuals and are
funded by the donations of private individuals and corporations. Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145,
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programs receive no government assistance, they circumvent
Establishment Clause issues. 166 Privately funded vouchers are not
without problems, however, because their total existence depends on the
Publicly funded voucher
generosity of private benefactors. 167
programs, on the other hand, operate independently from private
charity.' 68 Publicly funded vouchers receive all funding from the
government. 169 As of November 2002, three publicly funded voucher
programs existed: one in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 170 one in Cleveland,
Ohio; 17 1 and one statewide in Florida. 172 Because these voucher

at 386. The cities of San Antonio, Texas; Washington, D.C.; New York, New York; Dayton,
Ohio; and San Francisco, California, all have some form of a privately funded voucher program.
Id. at 386-92. Today, "[m]ore than 57,000 children participate in approximately 79 privately
funded voucher programs across the United States." Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: The
Answer to a Failing Public School System, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 73, 89-90 (2001).
166. See Bodemner, supra note 2, at 290.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 292 (noting that publicly funded voucher programs receive direct government
support).
169. Id.
170. See Laura Athens, Is the Wall Between Church and State Crumbling?, 81 MICH. B.J. 18,
22 (Sept. 2002) (noting that a voucher program exists in Milwaukee, Wisconsin). Milwaukee's
program began in 1990. Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 376. The program limited voucher
recipients to low-income families. Id. The program initially limited the number of participants to
one percent of Milwaukee's total public school system enrollment. Id. Today, however, the
program permits fifteen percent of the students in Milwaukee to participate in the program. Id.
Also, the program initially excluded religious schools. Id. at 377. Today, the program allows
both religious and non-religious public schools to participate in the program. Id. Milwaukee's
parental choice program, in part, provides:

(2)(a) Subject to par. (b), any pupil in grades kindergarten to 12 who resides within the
city may attend, at no charge, any private school located in the city if all of the
following apply:
1. The pupil is a member of a family that has a total family income that does not
exceed an amount equal to 1.75 times the poverty level determined in accordance with
criteria established by the director of the federal office of management and budget ....
(b) No more than 15% of the school district's membership may attend private schools
under this section. If in any school year there are more spaces available in the
participating private schools than the maximum number of pupils allowed to
participate, the department shall prorate the number of spaces available at each
participating private school.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
171. See Athens, supra note 170, at 22 (noting that a voucher program exists in Cleveland,
Ohio); see also infra Part III.A (discussing the facts of Zelman). See infra notes 277-82 and
accompanying text for a detailed description of Cleveland's Pilot Project Scholarship Program,
which provides, in part:
(A) The superintendent of public instruction shall establish a pilot project scholarship
program and shall include in such program any school districts that are or have ever
been under federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of
the district by the state superintendent. The program shall provide for a number of
students residing in any such district to receive scholarships to attend alternative
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programs require the government to provide financial assistance to

religious institutions, some contend that such vouchers violate the
Establishment Clause. 173 Therefore, to determine if the implied
promise of school choice made in Pierce v. Society of Sisters is to be

schools, and for an equal number of students to receive tutorial assistance grants while
attending public school in any such district.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002). Also, the Pilot Project
Scholarship Program provides preference to low-income families:
(A)(1) Each registered private school shall admit students to kindergarten and first,
second, and third grades in accordance with the following priorities:
(a) Students who were enrolled in the school during the preceding year;
(b) Siblings of students enrolled in the school during the preceding year, at the
discretion of the school;
(c) Children from low-income families attending school or residing in the school
district in which the school is located until the number of such students in each grade
equals the number that constituted twenty per cent of the total number of students
enrolled in the school during the preceding year in such grade. Admission of such
twenty per cent shall be by lot from among all low-income family applicants who
apply prior to the fifteenth day of February
prior to admission.
(d) All other applicants residing anywhere, provided that all remaining available spaces
shall be filled from among such applicants by lot.
Id. § 3313.977(A).
172. See Athens, supra note 170, at 22 (noting that a voucher program exists in Florida).
Florida began its statewide program in 1998. Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 384. The program
first provides that the quality of all Florida public schools be tested in the areas of writing,
reading, and math. Id. at 383-84. If a public school receives two "F' grades based on the
statewide testing, then its students receive vouchers to attend any private school or betterperforming public school. Id. at 384. The Florida Opportunity Scholarship provides in part:
(I) Findings and intent.-The purpose of this section is to provide enhanced
opportunity for students in this state to gain the knowledge and skills necessary for
postsecondary education, a technical education, or the world of work. The Legislature
recognizes that the voters of the State of Florida, in the November 1998 general
election, amended s. 1, Art. IX of the Florida Constitution so as to make education a
paramount duty of the state. The Legislature finds that the State Constitution requires
the state to provide the opportunity to obtain a high-quality education. The Legislature
further finds that a student should not be compelled, against the wishes of the student's
parent or guardian, to remain in a school found by the state to be failing for 2 years in a
4-year period. The Legislature shall make available opportunity scholarships in order
to give parents and guardians the opportunity for their children to attend a public
school that is performing satisfactorily or to attend an eligible private school when the
parent or guardian chooses to apply the equivalent of the public education funds
generated by his or her child to the cost of tuition in the eligible private school as
provided in paragraph (6)(a). Eligibility of a private school shall include the control
and accountability requirements that, coupled with the exercise of parental choice, are
reasonably necessary to secure the educational public purpose, as delineated in
subsection (4).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537 (West 2003).
173. See Bodemner, supra note 2, at 292.
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fulfilled, an74analysis of modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
necessary. 1

G. Modern Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Many scholars and commentators criticize the Supreme Court for its
inconsistent interpretations of the Establishment Clause. 175

Critics

point to the Supreme Court's haphazard and unsystematic use of the
17 6
Lemon test, the three-part test that emerged from Lemon v. Kurtzman
in 1971 to determine if government programs contravene the
Establishment Clause. 177 Yet, some commentators suggest that while
the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the Lemon
test has varied over the years, 178 the Court has consistently stressed the
importance of religious neutrality. 179 Moreover, commentators point
out that, since 1983, the Supreme Court has consistently applied the
principle of private, independent choice when interpreting the Lemon
test.18 0 Therefore, some commentators argue that, despite the apparent
174. See Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 678 (noting that Pierce's implied promise
of choice-the implied promise that parents may send their children to religious schools if they so
desire-is empty, for most cannot afford the fees of private school).
175. Cordes, supra note 39, at 143 ("[M]ost commentators agree in their lament over the
Court's often incomprehensible and inconsistently applied set of principles."); Hamilton, supra
note 54, at 824-25 ("The Supreme Court's doctrine in the Establishment Clause arena has been
treated to more internal and external criticism for its lack of consistency, perhaps, than any other
constitutional doctrine."); McConnell, Defense of Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852
(noting that the Supreme Court's cases involving aid to religious schools are commonly criticized
for their inconsistencies).
176. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
177. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 318 ("The Lemon test has been applied
haphazardly, to put it kindly, by the Supreme Court ever since the case was decided."). In Lemon
v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court established a three-step test to determine whether a government
program violates the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Many of the Supreme Court Justices themselves have
criticized the test and called for its overruling, yet the test remains. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1279 (2001). Indeed, Justice Scalia described the test as "a ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried." Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. Frank, supra note 138, at 1038 ("The United States Supreme Court's understanding of
the Establishment Clause has obviously meandered over the years.").
179. Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil Libertarian Casefor the Constitutionalityof School Choice,
10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 15 (1999-2000) (noting the Supreme Court's consistent
application of the neutrality-to-aid principle to education cases following Everson v. Board of
Education, with only a few exceptions).
180. See, e.g., Kemerer, Constitutionality of School Vouchers, supra note 127, at 21 (noting
that the recent aid-to-education cases have followed the reasoning of Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983), and applied the principle of private, independent choice); McConnell, Defense of
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inconsistent use of the Lemon test, the basic pillars of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence have been, and continue to be, neutrality and
private, independent choice. 18 1 Today, a government program does not
violate the Establishment Clause if the program is neutral with respect
to religion and if public funding reaches religious institutions solely as
182
the result of the private choices by individuals.
1. Neutrality
Neutrality, and modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence as a
whole, has its roots in the 1947 Supreme Court case of Everson v.
Board of Education.183
In Everson, the Court upheld a state
Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852 (noting that the Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld
programs that provide public funding to religious institutions when the programs are neutral with
respect to religion and the funding reaches religious institutions solely as the result of private,
independent choice). Although the Court has abandoned many of the constitutional criteria that
emerged from the Lemon test, the Lemon test itself remains "the doctrinal ordeal any state's real
school-choice program must endure." Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 318.
181.

See McConnell, Defense of Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852 ("In fact, with the

exception of a few aberrant decisions in the 1970's and early 1980's, several of which have been
overruled, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld aid to students attending nonpublic schools,
provided 1) that the aid is neutral among educational choices, and 2) that any religious use is the
product of private independent choice."); cf James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the
Public into the Religious Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 963, 981 (2001) ("[T]he neutrality
position has come to dominate judicial application of the Establishment Clause."); Davidson,
supra note 37, at 483 ("A survey of relevant case law has shown that in order to pass

constitutional muster under Establishment Clause jurisprudence, such a program should include
provisions adhering to the overarching principles of: (1) secular purpose; (2) neutrality; and (3)
private choice."). See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 77-97 (1995) (discussing the pillar of

neutrality). But see Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 280 (contending that no true principles of
law govern the Establishment Clause and that the entire body of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is a product of politics).
182.

McConnell, Defense of Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852 ("In fact, with the

exception of a few aberrant decisions in the 1970's and 1980's, several of which have been
overruled, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld aid to students attending nonpublic schools,
provided 1) that the aid is neutral among educational choices, and 2) that any religious use is the
product of private independent choice."); cf Davidson, supra note 37, at 483 ("A survey of
relevant case law has shown that in order to pass constitutional muster under Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, such a program should include provisions adhering to the overarching
principles of: (1) secular purpose; (2) neutrality; and (3) private choice.").
183. Cordes, supra note 39, at 143; see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)
(holding that public aid could reach a religious school because, in part, the government program
was neutral with respect to religion). The New Jersey statute at issue in Everson v. Board of
Education authorized local school districts to enact rules regarding the transportation of children
to school. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. Pursuant to this authority, Ewing Township in New Jersey
began reimbursing all parents the transportation costs of sending their children to school. Id.
Ultimately, the Court upheld this program even though one of its results was that "children are
helped to get to church schools" and "some of the children might not be sent to the church
schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets."
Id. at 17.
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government program that reimbursed parents for their children's bus
fares to school, regardless whether the children attended public schools
or religious private schools. 184 In reaching its decision, the Court found
that the Establishment Clause did not require the government to be the
church's adversary. 185
Rather, the Establishment Clause merely
to be neutral with respect to religion.
government
required the
Consequently, the Court held that the program was constitutional,
despite the fact that some parents might not have sent their children to
religious schools if the government had not funded the transportation
costs. 187 This was the first time that the Court expressly held that
government must be neutral toward religion. 188 Yet, in dictum, the
Court did state that the Establishment Clause prohibited the government
from levying taxes in support of any religious activity. 1 9 More
importantly, the Court, for the first time, made the Establishment Clause
fully applicable to the states through incorporation under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 190
Nevertheless, some commentators contend that,
regardless of the conflicting dicta, Everson was the first case to
establish the Court's emphasis on religious neutrality. 191
184. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 17.
187. Id. (upholding the government program although the publicly funded bus fares may
enable some parents to send their children to religious private schools, even though those parents
otherwise would have to forgo religious education because of the cost of transportation).
188. See Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 487 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993); Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 53 (1997); see also BARRON,
supra note 48, at 1239 (noting that Justice Black expressly mandated neutrality). But see
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). In Bradfield v. Roberts, the Court upheld the
disbursement of public funds to religious hospitals. Id. at 299-300. The Court did not
specifically mention neutrality, but the program was neutral with respect to religion. Id.
189. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions ...").
190. See supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause). In
Everson, the Court did not analyze thoroughly whether the First Amendment applied to the State
of New Jersey. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. Instead, the Court first noted that it had already
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to apply against "state action abridging religious freedom"
and cited cases demonstrating the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Free Exercise
Clause, such as Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. Then,
the Court stated that "[t]here is every reason to give the same application [against the states]...
to the 'establishment of religion' clause." Id.
191. See Cordes, supra note 39, at 143-44 (contending that Everson established the
conflicting constitutional principles of neutrality and strict separation between church and state);
Johnson, supra note 179, at 12 (stating that, since Everson, the Court has emphasized neutrality,
but noting that even in Everson the Court "took pains" to point out that aid to religious
institutions is not always constitutional); Laycock, supra note 188, at 53 ("[T]he essence of both
the no-aid [separationist] and the nondiscrimination [neutrality] theories is succinctly laid out in
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The Court's emphasis on neutrality continued in Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 192 In Nyquist, the

Court held that a government program was unconstitutional because it
expressly prohibited the participation of public schools and, thus, was
not religiously neutral. 193 The program in Nyquist provided tuition
reimbursement to and tax relief for parents who send their children to
religious schools; the program also provided grants to the religious
schools themselves for the purposes of maintaining and improving
school buildings. 19 4 Although the Court held that the "grant and tax"
program was unconstitutional, 19 5 the Court limited its holding in
footnote thirty-eight.' 96 In the footnote, the Court distinguished the

two paragraphs of the Court's opinion in Everson."); Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at
705-06 (noting that Everson provides support for neutrality but also provides support for
separationists); see also Richard T. Weicher, If a Public School Is Labeled "Failing," Could
More Really Be Less?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 298 (2001) (contending that Everson
established two principles: "the general applicability of government aid programs and the content
of the aid these programs distributed"). The Court's emphasis on neutrality continued in Board of
Education v. Allen. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In Allen, the Court upheld a
state government program that loaned textbooks to all students, regardless of which schools the
children attended. Id. at 238. The Court here, just as in Everson, noted that the program was
neutral with respect to religion, for all children could receive textbooks on loan. Id. at 243.
192. Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973). The
New York program at issue in Nyquist provided tuition grants and tax relief for parents who sent
their children to religious schools, as well as grants to the religious schools themselves for the
purposes of maintaining and improving school buildings. Id. at 761-76.
193. Id. at 794. The Court held that New York's program violated the Establishment Clause
because the program did not merely "indirect[ly] and incidental ly]" benefit religious schools; the
program directly "subsidize[d] and advance[d] the religious mission of sectarian schools." Id. at
775, 779-80.
194. Id. at 761-76.
195. Id. at 794.
196. Id. at 782 n.38. Because the Court held a tuition reimbursement program to be
unconstitutional in Nyquist, voucher opponents incessantly point to the case as precedent. See,
e.g., Br. for Resp'ts Doris Simmons-Harris, et al. at 7, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct.
2460 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777 & 00-1779), available at 2001 WL 1636772; see also infra
Part IV.C (demonstrating that the majority correctly held that Nyquist was not controlling law in
Zelman). Footnote thirty-eight provides:
Allen and Everson differ from the present litigation in a second important respect.
In both cases the class of beneficiaries included all schoolchildren, those in public as
well as those in private schools. See also Tilton v. Richardson, supra, in which federal
aid was made available to all institutions of higher learning, and Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
supra, in which tax exemptions were accorded to all educational and charitable
nonprofit institutions. We do not agree with the suggestion in the dissent of THE
CHIEF JUSTICE that tuition grants are an analogous endeavor to provide comparable
benefits to all parents of schoolchildren whether enrolled in public or nonpublic
schools. 413 U.S., at 801-803, 93 S. Ct., at 2990-2991. The grants to parents of
private schoolchildren are given in addition to the right that they have to send their
children to public schools 'totally at state expense.' And in any event, the argument
proves too much, for it would also provide a basis for approving through tuition grants

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

197
non-neutral Nyquist program from the neutral program of Everson.
Thus, footnote thirty-eight suggests that the Court would have decided

Nyquist differently if the program had neutrally provided assistance
19 8
without regard to the religious status of the beneficiaries.
Accordingly, although the Court held the tuition grants at issue in
that
Nyquist to be unconstitutional, it qualified its holding and implied
199
neutral tuition grants would not violate the Establishment Clause.
2. The Lemon Test and Its Early Inconsistent Applications
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court established a three-step
test to determine whether a government program violates the
Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
After
excessive government entanglement with religion."' 20 0
announcing the Lemon test and until establishing the criterion of private,
independent choice in 1983, the Supreme Court issued a number of
inconsistent opinions flowing from a variety of philosophical principles,
the complete subsidization of all religious schools on the ground that such action is
necessary if the State is fully to equalize the position of parents who elect such
schools-a result wholly at variance with the Establishment Clause.
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tuition grant issue, we need
not decide whether the significantly religious character of the statute's beneficiaries
might differentiate the present cases from a case involving some form of public
assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited. See Wolman v.
Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 412-413 (SD Ohio), aff'd 409 U.S. 808, 93 S. Ct. 61, 34
L.Ed.2d 69 (1972). Thus, our decision today does not compel, as appellees have
contended, the conclusion that the educational assistance provisions of the 'G. I. Bill,'
38 U.S.C. § 1651, impermissibly advance religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
197. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38; Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 321 (discussing the
Nyquist decision).
198. Kemerer, Constitutionality of School Vouchers, supra note 127, at 20-21 (discussing
footnote thirty-eight of Nyquist).
199. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38; Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 321 (discussing the
Nyquist decision).
200. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The States of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania both enacted laws that
directed aid to private religious schools. Id. at 606. The Rhode Island statute provided a salary
supplement to teachers of secular subjects in private religious schools. Id. at 607. The
Pennsylvania statutes reimbursed the private religious schools for the teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and any instructional material of a secular subject. Id. at 609. The Court held that the
two government programs that partially paid the salaries of private school teachers were
unconstitutional because the programs excessively entangled the government with religion. Id. at
620-21.
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The inconsistent
which the Court has since abandoned.20 1
third
prongs of the
and
the
second
concerned
principles
constitutional

Lemon test, for the Court's examination of the first prong of the Lemon

test typically was cursory; it remains so today. 20 2 Thus, a state's
the quality of
interest in lowering the cost of education or improving
20 3
education usually satisfies the secular purpose prong.
On the other hand, many have blamed the inconsistencies of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence on the Lemon test's third prong,
which prohibits the government from excessive entanglement with
religion.2 04 Some contend that the entanglement prong rendered the
Lemon test a "conundrum," with the second prong preventing the
government from granting aid that had the effect or purpose of
advancing religion, but the third prong precluding the government from
monitoring the use of any aid.20 5 Others criticize the Court's use of the
political divisiveness doctrine in conjunction with the entanglement
prong.206 Through the political divisiveness doctrine, the Supreme

201. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 60, at 708-09 (noting that the Supreme Court "issued
a wide-ranging set of pronouncements that did not appear to flow from a consistent formulation
of philosophical principles" until Mueller v. Allen in 1983).
202. Frank, supra note 138, at 1010 ("The purpose of the aid is frequently one that is
particularly important to society, such as health care or education, and the Court has been wise
enough not to second-guess the legislature on this point."); Bodemner, supra note 2, at 294
("When applying the secular legislative purpose test to religious aid legislation the Court's review
is generally a cursory one."); see also Davidson, supra note 37, at 484 ("The secular purpose is
most easily satisfied .... ). Justice Scalia has criticized the secular purpose prong, contending
that it has no historical basis and is illogical because "[t]he number of possible motivations ... is
not binary, or indeed even finite .... To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is
probably to look for something that does not exist." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet, scholar Erwin Chemerinsky noted that the Supreme Court has
consistently examined the legislative motivation within Equal Protection jurisprudence, despite
the difficulties of the inquiry. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 177, at 1280.
203. See Bodemner, supra note 2, at 295.
204. McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 58, at 141 (noting that many blame the entanglement
prong for the "chaotic and inconsistent results" of Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
205. BARRON, supra note 48, at 1243; see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In Aguilar v. Felton, the Court takes advantage of the 'Catch-22'
paradox of its own creation, whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the
supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement."). Not all commentary concerning the
entanglement prong is negative; indeed, some argue that the excessive entanglement prong
properly served as an "early warning system" for a statute's impermissible purposes or effects.
See, e.g., Kenneth Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religious Clauses - A Ten Year
Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1980).
206. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 58, at 130 ("[F]or more than a decade the Court
embellished the entanglement prong with the notion of 'political divisiveness."'); Feldman, supra
note 65, at 691-92 ("The connection between divisiveness and entanglement lay in an
'inevitabl[e]' political conflict between supporters of parochial schools and the opponents of state
aid to religious institutions.").
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Court struck down legislation simply because litigation arose
concerning the statute, for the litigation demonstrated the statute's
political divisiveness. 207 This doctrine armed opponents of state
funding of religious institutions with a seemingly unbeatable weapon
because their mere opposition could be the basis for the invalidation of
the legislation. 2 08 The Supreme Court, however, has disregarded this
doctrine since the mid-1980s, and in 2000, the Court expressly
renounced
placing
constitutional
significance
on
political
divisiveness. 20 9 Finally, many commentators have questioned whether
the analysis of the entanglement prong differs from that of the primary
effect prong. 21 In 1997, the Supreme Court addressed that question,
concluding that the analysis used for the entanglement prong was really
an aspect of the constitutional inquiry of the second prong.
Therefore, the Court condensed the Lemon test and eliminated the
2 12
separate analysis of the entanglement prong.
Just as the entanglement prong created inconsistencies in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the courts have struggled with
applying the second prong of the Lemon test. 2 13 For a period of time
when analyzing the second prong of the Lemon test, the Supreme Court
invalidated statutes if they disbursed funds to institutions that were
"pervasively sectarian." 2 14 The Supreme Court circularly defined a
207. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 58, at 130.
208. Id. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court explained why political divisiveness violated the
Establishment Clause, stating that "political division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622 (1971). Some criticized the Court for establishing this constitutional doctrine without
much explanation. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 65, at 692-93. Regardless of the basis for the
doctrine, commentator Michael McConnell contended that the political divisiveness doctrine
"blamed the religious side of any controversy for the controversy." McConnell, Crossroads,
supra note 58, at 130. McConnell described the doctrine as an "invincible weapon" because the
doctrine, in essence, required the Court to invalidate any state funding of religious institutions
simply because some individuals opposed the funding. See id.
209. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825 (2000); see infra notes 252-57 and accompanying
text (discussing the Mitchell decision).
210. See, e.g., BARRON, supra note 48, at 1252.
211. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (modifying the Lemon test by eliminating
the third prong of excessive entanglement).
212. Id.
213. See Frank, supra note 138, at 1013 ("As in most Establishment Clause cases, the parties
grappled over the primary effect of the statute.").
214. Id. at 1017 ("In previous cases, th[e] label [of pervasively sectarian] had been the death
knell for government aid programs .. ");Johnson, supra note 179, at 16 (noting that the
Supreme Court invalidated some government programs based on the rationale that the aid would
advance the religious goals of pervasively sectarian institutions). The most notable and last cases
to strike down government programs based on the pervasively sectarian rationale are Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236, and School District of
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pervasively sectarian institution as "an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the
religious mission." 2 15 The Court reasoned that if public funds reached a
pervasively sectarian institution, there was a greater chance that the
public aid would have the effect of advancing religion. 2 16 In recent
years, however, the Supreme Court ignored the pervasively sectarian
distinction in its analysis until, finally, in Mitchell v. Helms, 2 17 the
Court expressly renounced the inquiry. 2 18 The Court explained that the
pervasively sectarian inquiry2 19was merely a tool to discriminate against
Roman Catholic institutions.
For a period of time when examining the second prong of the Lemon
test, the Supreme Court also struck down statutes if the government
program provided funding directly to a religious institution, rather than
to a third party who later conferred the benefit on the religious
institution. 220 The Court reasoned that a prohibition against direct aid
was necessary to prevent the "subsidization" of religion. 2 2 1 However,
as early as 1986, the Court departed from its prohibition against direct
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236. See Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. at 826. In Aguilar, a government program authorized public school teachers
in New York City to instruct students at private schools in remedial subjects. Aguilar, 473 U.S.
at 406. The program had a system to monitor the religious content of the classes taught by the
public school teachers. Id. at 409. The Court described the grammar school as pervasively
sectarian and held that the program was unconstitutional. Id. In Ball, a government program
authorized public school teachers to teach both remedial and enrichment courses at private
schools, which were mostly religiously affiliated. Ball, 473 U.S. at 375. The government
program also permitted public school instructors to teach non-core classes, such as arts and crafts,
at private schools after regular school hours. Id. at 376. The Court described the grammar school
as pervasively sectarian and held that the program was unconstitutional. Id. at 385.
215. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
743 (1973)).
216. Id. at 610; see also Frank, supra note 138, at 1017 (noting that the Court repeatedly has
struck down government programs because the programs were pervasively sectarian).
217. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). In Mitchell, the Court upheld a government
program that loaned educational materials, such as computer software and library books, to both
non-religious and religious private schools. Id. at 801. The Court held that the program was
constitutional because the program distributed educational materials without regard to the secular
or non-secular nature of the school and because aid reached religious schools solely due to private
choice. Id. at 813. The Court described the pervasively sectarian inquiry as "offensive," stating
that the inquiry, "born of bigotry, should now be buried." Id. at 829.
218. Frank, supra note 138, at 1032 ("[B]uilding on what was implicit in Bowen, Zobrest and
Rosenberger, the plurality finally took the extra step of explicitly renouncing the Court's prior
practice of assessing whether an institution is 'pervasively sectarian' [in Mitchell v. Helms].").
219. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829 (describing the pervasively sectarian inquiry as "offensive" and
"bur[ying]" the inquiry); Frank, supra note 138, at 1032.
220. Frank, supra note 138, at 1050.
221. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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aid and began to prevent the subsidization of religion by ensuring
private, independent choice. 2 22 In Mitchell v. Helms, the Supreme
Court specifically renounced the constitutional relevance of the
direct/indirect aid distinction. 223 The Court explained that labeling a
program as direct or indirect was often arbitrary 224 and an irrelevant
formality. 225 Most importantly, the Court noted that the purpose of the
direct/indirect aid distinction could be achieved
through application of
2 26
the principle of private, independent choice.
3.

Private and Independent Choice

In Mueller v. Allen, 227 the Court set forth the second pillar of modem
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: the requirement of private and
independent choice. 22
The Mueller Court upheld a government
222. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225 (concluding that Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), eliminated the prohibition on direct aid because the
principles of private choice and neutrality could prevent government funds from improperly
subsidizing religion); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 816 (stating that Agostini properly concluded that
Witters found the direct/indirect aid distinction irrelevant).
223. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820 (refusing to recognize a "rule" for all cases that prohibited
direct aid to religious institutions). Justice O'Connor, however, in her concurring opinion, did
state that the direct/indirect aid distinction has some utility. Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 818 ("Whether one chooses to label this program 'direct' or 'indirect' is a rather
arbitrary choice, one that does not further the constitutional analysis.").
225. Id. The Court pointed out that the cases relied on by the plaintiffs to further their
contention that direct aid to religious institutions violates the Establishment Clause, Meek v.
Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter, actually undermine their contention. Id. at 817-18 (citing Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)). In Meek, the
Supreme Court invalidated a government program because religious schools directly received
educational materials from the government. Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-63. In Wolman, the Supreme
Court invalidated the exact same government program, although the program loaned the materials
to the students, rather than directly to the religious institution. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250. The
Court, in Wolman, stated that "it would exalt form over substance if this distinction were found to
justify a result different from that in Meek." Id. at 250. Not surprisingly, in Mitchell, the Court
stated "[t]hat Meek and Wolman reached the same result, on programs that were indistinguishable
but for the direct/indirect distinction, shows that that distinction played no part in Meek."
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818.
226. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 816.
227. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). In Mueller v. Allen, Minnesota's government
program permitted all state taxpayers to take a state income tax deduction for the expenses
incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children attending elementary
or secondary school. id. at 391. The plaintiffs argued that, although the government program
was facially neutral, the program violated the Establishment Clause because parents of children in
religious schools took most of the deductions provided by the program. Id. at 400. "They
contend that most parents of public school children incur no tuition expenses, see MINN. STAT. §
120.06 (1982), and that other expenses deductible under § 290.09(22) are negligible in value;
moreover, they claim that 96% of the children in private schools in 1978-1979 attended
religiously-affiliated institutions." Id.
228. See id. at 391-402 (holding that the government tax deduction program was
constitutional because of the elements of neutrality and private choice).
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program providing a tax deduction to all taxpayers with dependent
children in school. 229 In reaching its decision, the Court introduced the
principle of private and independent choice, 230 while continuing to
stress neutrality. 23 1 The Court stated that because public funds
benefited only religious schools as a result of the private decisions of
individual parents, the program was constitutional.2 3 2 The Court
explained that the element of independent, private choice eliminates any
appearance of state endorsement of religion. 233 Moreover, the Court
noted that, in past cases, when public funds reached religious
institutions indirectly, the government program was constitutional.2 3 4
Finally, the Court explained that the Constitutional Framers did not
intend the Establishment Clause to prevent aid from reaching religious
institutions through the private choices of individuals. 235 Accordingly,
because aid reached religious schools solely as the result of private
choice and the program
was religiously neutral, the Court upheld the
23 6
government program.

229. Id. at 390.
230. Id. at 399.
231. Id. at 401; Hamilton, supra note 54, at 831-32 (discussing the Mueller decision). In
reaching its decision, the Court expressly relied on Nyquist's footnote thirty-eight. Mueller, 463
U.S. at 398; see supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text (discussing Nyquist's footnote thirtyeight). The Court emphasized that the Mueller program was neutral with respect to religion, for
the tax deduction covered the educational expenses of all children, without considering whether a
school was secular or non-secular. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391; Hamilton, supra note 54, at 831-32
(discussing the Mueller decision). Furthermore, the Court stressed that the program was neutral
even though most of the tax deductions benefited parents sending their children to religious
private schools. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
232. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 400. The Court stated that it was "noteworthy that all but one of our recent cases
invalidating state aid to parochial schools have involved the direct transmission of assistance
from the state to the schools themselves. The exception, of course, was Nyquist, which, as
discussed previously is distinguishable from this case on other grounds." Id. at 399. The Court,
in Mueller, did not think that Nyquist was controlling because the program in Nyquist provided
funds only to religious schools, whereas the Mueller program was neutral with respect to religion.
Id.
235. Id. at 400 ("The historic purposes of the [Establishment C1lause simply do not
encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of
individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax
benefit at issue in this case."); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the origin and purposes of the
Establishment Clause).
236. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

4. Recent Application of the Pillars of Neutrality and
Private, Independent Choice
Subsequent to Mueller, the Court has upheld every program that
provides financial assistance to religious schools where the program is
neutral with respect to religion, and the funding reaches the religious
schools as the result of private and independent choices. 23 7 For
example, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
the Court held that state vocational rehabilitation services could
financially assist a blind student as he studied to become a minister at a
Christian college. 2 38 The Court upheld the financial assistance because
the program was neutral with respect to religion and the aid arrived
at a
239
choice.
private
true
of
result
the
as
solely
institution
religious
Similarly, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,2 40 the
Court found that public funds could be used to pay a sign-language
interpreter who worked in a religious school, without violating the
Establishment Clause. 24 1 The Court noted that the program provided
237. See Kemerer, Constitutionality of School Vouchers, supra note 127, at 21 (noting that
several recent cases have followed the reasoning of Mueller).
238. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986). The
Washington State Supreme Court, however, later invalidated the blind student's tuition grant,
basing its decision on Washington's Blaine Amendment. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind,
771 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Wash. 1989) (en banc). That decision provides evidence that state
establishment clauses may be another substantial legal hurdle for voucher proponents. See
Heytens, supra note 110, at 123 (noting that voucher programs must also withstand legal
challenges regarding the Blaine Amendments); Treene, supra note 118, at 2 (noting that voucher
programs must also withstand legal challenges regarding the Blaine Amendments). The plaintiff
in Witters was Larry Witters, a practically blind man who sought to become a Christian minister.
Witters, 474 U.S. at 481. He applied for financial assistance, through a Washington state program
for the disabled, to attend a private Christian college to study to become a minister. Id. The State
of Washington denied his request for financial aid based on the Establishment Clause. Id.
However, in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that Witters could receive public aid
to attend a Christian college to become a minister without violating the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 489.
239. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. Just as in Mueller, the Witters Court expressly relied on
footnote thirty-eight of Nyquist, finding that Washington's program was neutral with respect to
religion and distinguishing Washington's program from the program in Nyquist. Id. The Court
explained that because the program's benefits were "'made available generally without regard to
the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited,"' the program
was neutral. Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
782 n.38 (1973)). The Court further explained that "[a]ny aid provided under Washington's
program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely
independent and private choices of aid recipients .... [therefore, the] decision to support religious
education is made by the individual, not by the State." Id. at 487-88.
240. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
241. Id. at 10. James Zobrest was a deaf student at a Catholic high school who required the
assistance of a sign-language interpreter. Id. at 3. The Catalina School District refused to supply
Zobrest with an interpreter, contending that doing so would violate the Establishment Clause
because the interpreter would be translating both secular and religious subjects for Zobrest. Id. at

2003]

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris:Authorizing School Vouchers

517

or
benefits to any student, regardless of whether he attended a public 242
affiliation.
religious
school's
the
of
regardless
private school and
Also, the Court noted that the program paid for the interpreter to work
at a religious school only because of the private, independent choice
exercised by the deaf child's parents. 24 3 Therefore, because the
program was neutral and involved true private choice, the Court held
that the program was constitutional. 24
Likewise, in Agostini v. Felton,24 5 the Court held that public school
246
teachers could travel to religious schools to teach remedial education.
Because the program provided remedial education to all students, on a
religion-neutral basis, and aid reached religious private schools only as
a result of private and independent choice, the Court held the program
to be constitutional. 247 In reaching its decision, the Court overruled
Aguilar v. Felton24 8 and its companion case, School District of Grand

4. The district court and the Ninth Circuit accepted this argument. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court
reversed, however, holding that the school district could provide Zobrest with a sign-language
interpreter without violating the Establishment Clause because all deaf children can receive
assistance from a publicly funded sign-language interpreter and the Zobrests alone caused the
interpreter to work in a religious school. Id. at 10.
242. Id. at 10 (noting that the program distributed "benefits neutrally to any child qualifying
as 'disabled'... without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature"' of the
school).
243. Id. The Court stated that because a decision by the Zobrests alone caused the interpreter
to work at a Catholic high school, "an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state
decisionmaking." Id.
244. Id. at 13-14. "[G]overnment programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of
citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit." Id.
at 8.
245. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
246. Id. at 208-09. In Agostini, the government program provided federal aid to public and
private schools alike by channeling federal funds through local educational agencies. Id. at 209.
The purpose of these funds was to assist participating students meet the educational standards of
the State of New York. Id. Therefore, the local educational agencies used the pubic funds to
provide remedial education to students in private schools. Id. at 210-11.
247. Id. at 226. In reaching its decision, the Court set out three criteria: (1) whether
government aid results in indoctrination; (2) whether a program defines recipients by religion;
and (3) whether a program creates excessive entanglement of church and state. Id. at 234. The
Court, however, modified the excessive entanglement portion of the Lemon test, explaining that
determining whether the program created excessive entanglement and determining the primary
effect of the program really required the same constitutional analysis. Id. at 232-33. Moreover,
the Court specifically rejected placing constitutional significance on the number of religious
students that benefited from the program. Id. at 229.
248. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236. In
Aguilar, a government program authorized the public school teachers of New York City to
instruct students at private schools in remedial subjects. Id. at 406. The program had a system to
monitor the religious content of the classes taught by the public school teachers. Id. at 409. The
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Rapids v. Ball,249 cases that relied on abandoned interpretations of the
Lemon test.25
Moreover,
the Court eliminated the entanglement
25 1
portion of the Lemon test.
Most recently, in Mitchell v. Helms, the Court again emphasized the
Establishment Clause pillars of neutrality and private, independent
choice. 252 In Mitchell, the Court upheld a government program that
loaned educational materials, such as computer software and library
books, to both non-religious and religious private schools. 25 The Court
held that the program was constitutional because it distributed
educational materials without regard to the secular or non-secular nature
of the school and because aid reached religious schools solely due to

Court held that, because this monitoring system would result in the excessive entanglement of the
government and religion, the program was unconstitutional. Id.
249. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S.
at 236. In Ball, a government program authorized public school teachers to teach both remedial
and enrichment courses at private schools, which were mostly religiously affiliated. Id. at 375.
The government program also permitted public school instructors to teach non-core classes, such
as arts and crafts, at private schools after regular school hours. Id. at 376. The Court held that the
government program was unconstitutional because it could result in the promotion of religion. Id.
at 385. The Court never held that the government program had the "primary effect" of advancing
religion. See id. Instead, the Court merely examined the speculative results of the program. Id.
Because the Ball Court bypassed the Lemon test and reached its decision on possible secondary
results, it is not surprising that the Court overruled Ball in Agostini. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at
235.
250. See Agbstini, 521 U.S. at 235. The Court held that the more recent cases of Zobrest and
Witters undermined the reasoning the Court previously had relied on in Aguilar and Ball;
therefore, the Court overruled Aguilar and Ball in Agostini. Id.; see also supra notes 238-44 and
accompanying text (discussing the Witters and Zobrest decisions).
251. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33 (noting that the same factors are used to assess the effect of
the program and the degree of entanglement and, thus, that "it is simplest to... treat [the
entanglement prong] . .. as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect"); see also supra Part
II.G.2 (discussing the Lemon test).
252. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). In Mitchell, the government program provided
federal aid to public and private schools alike by channeling federal funds through local
educational agencies. Id. at 802. The purpose of these funds was "the acquisition and use of
instructional and educational materials, including library services and educational materials
(including media materials), assessments, reference materials, computer software and hardware
for instructional use, and other curricular materials." Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 735 1(b)(2) (1994));
see also Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious
Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1281, 1290-91 (2002) (noting that both
the plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion emphasize neutrality and private
choice); Leslie C. Griffin, Their Own Prepossessions: The Establishment Clause, 1999-2000, 33
Loy. U. CHt. L.J. 237, 251-54 (2001) (noting that the Court in Mitchell emphasized neutrality
and private choice).
253. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801. The amount of aid received by each private school depended
upon the number of children attending the school. Id. at 802. Moreover, the government
program required that all materials provided to religious schools be "secular, neutral, and
nonideological." Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7351 (a)(]) (1994)).
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private choice. 254 Furthermore, because the Court had not examined

whether an institution was "pervasively sectarian" in its recent decisions
and the inquiry was rooted in discrimination, the Court renounced this
constitutional inquiry. 25 5
Similarly, the Court rejected placing
constitutional significance on the likelihood that "political divisiveness"
could result due to the government program. 256 Therefore, through
Mitchell, the Court clarified the proper Establishment Clause inquiry
and reaffirmed the two pillars of modern Establishment
Clause
257
jurisprudence: neutrality and private, independent choice.
Accordingly, some commentators argue that the basic pillars of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence have been, and continue to be,

254. Id. at 813. In reaching its decision, the Mitchell plurality assessed the three criteria set
forth in Agostini: whether the government aid resulted in indoctrination; whether the program
defined recipients by religion; and whether the program created excessive entanglement of church
and state. Id. at 808 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234). Guided by the Agostini criteria, the Court
emphasized the importance of neutrality and private choice because both prevent government
indoctrination and relate to whether the program defined recipients by religion. Id. at 829-31.
The Court held that because the program allocated aid based on the number of students at the
school, the amount of aid reached the private schools as the result of private, independent choice.
Id. at 830. Moreover, the Court held that the program was neutral with respect to religion
because both religious and non-religious schools could receive the aid. Id.
255. Id. at 826-29. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District and in Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court refrained from thoroughly analyzing
whether the recipients of the government funding were pervasively sectarian. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 838 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3-10 (1993). Thus, although the Court expressly rejected the pervasively
sectarian criterion in Mitchell, the Court had already implicitly rejected the pervasively sectarian
criterion. Frank, supra note 138, at 1032 ("[B]uilding on what was implicit in Bowen, Zobrest
and Rosenberger, the plurality finally took the extra step of explicitly renouncing the Court's
prior practice of assessing whether an institution is 'pervasively sectarian' [in Mitchell v.
Helms]."). The Court explained that the "pervasively sectarian" criterion was simply a method of
discrimination against religious institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church. Mitchell, 530
U.S. at 828; see also supra Part II.G.2 (discussing the various constitutional principles that
emerged from the Lemon test, which the Court has since abandoned).
256. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 825-26; see also supra Part II.G.2 (discussing the various
constitutional principles that emerged from the Lemon test, which the Court has since
abandoned).
257. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-14 (clarifying the rule established in Agostini that emphasized
private choice and neutrality); Garnett, supra note 252, at 1290-91 (noting that both the plurality
opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion emphasized neutrality and private choice);
Davidson, supra note 37, at 481 (noting that Establishment Clause jurisprudence requires
government programs to have secular purposes, to be religiously neutral, and to direct aid to
religious institutions as the result of private choice); Neal, supra note 5, at 394-400 (noting
Mitchell's emphasis on neutrality and true private choice and arguing that the Court's analysis in
Mitchell would lead to the constitutionality of Cleveland's voucher program); cf Dwyer, supra
note 181, at 981 ("[Tlhe neutrality position has come to dominate judicial application of the
Establishment Clause.").
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neutrality and private, independent choice. 25
These commentators
suggest that, while the Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause and the Lemon test has varied over the years, 259 the Court, from
the outset, has stressed consistently the importance of religious
neutrality. 2 6 Moreover, these commentators point out that, since 1983,
the Supreme Court has consistently applied the principle of private,
independent choice when interpreting the Lemon test. 2 6 1 Therefore,
these commentators probably would contend that Cleveland's voucher
program should be upheld only if the program were neutral with respect
to religion, and government funding reached
the religious schools as the
2 62
result of private, independent choice.

258. McConnell, Defense of Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852 ("In fact, with the
exception of a few aberrant decisions in the 1970's and early 1980's, several of which have been
overruled, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld aid to students attending nonpublic schools,
provided 1) that the aid is neutral among educational choices, and 2) that any religious use is the
product of private independent choice."); cf Dwyer, supra note 181, at 981 (2001) ("[T]he
neutrality position has come to dominate judicial application of the Establishment Clause.");
Davidson, supra note 37, at 483 ("A survey of relevant case law has shown that in order to pass
constitutional muster under Establishment Clause jurisprudence, such a program should include
provisions adhering to the overarching principles of: (1) secular purpose; (2) neutrality; and (3)
private choice."). See generally SMITH, supra note 181, at 77-97 (discussing the pillar of
neutrality). But see Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 280 (contending that no true principles of
law govern the Establishment Clause and that the entire body of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is a product of politics).
259. Frank, supra note 138, at 1038 ("The United States Supreme Court's understanding of
the Establishment Clause has obviously meandered over the years.").
260. Johnson, supra note 179, at 15-17 (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently
applied the principle of neutrality to aid-to-education cases following Everson v. Board of
Education, with only a few exceptions).
261. McConnell, Defense of Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852 (stating that the
Supreme Court has consistently upheld government programs that direct aid to religious schools
when the programs are neutral with respect to religion and "religious use is the product of private
independent choice"); see Kemerer, Constitutionalityof School Vouchers, supra note 127, at 2122 (noting that the recent aid-to-education cases have followed the reasoning of Mueller and
applied the principle of private, independent choice). Although the Court has abandoned many of
the constitutional criteria that emerged from the Lemon test, the Lemon test itself remains "the
doctrinal ordeal any state's real school-choice program must endure." Garnett & Garnett, supra
note 4, at 318.
262. See McConnell, Defense of Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852.
In fact, with the exception of a few aberrant decisions in the 1970's and early 1980's,
several of which have been overruled, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld aid
to students attending nonpublic schools, provided (1) that the aid is neutral among
educational choices, and (2) that any religious use is the product of private independent
choice.
Id.; cf Davidson, supra note 37, at 481 (noting that Establishment Clause jurisprudence requires
government programs to have secular purposes, to be religiously neutral, and to direct aid to
religious institutions as the result of private choice).

2003]

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris:Authorizing School Vouchers

521

III. DISCUSSION
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court held that
Cleveland's voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause
because the program was neutral with respect to religion and aid
reached religious schools as a result of private, independent choices of
parents in Cleveland. 263 This decision was the culmination of a long
legal battle regarding the constitutionality of Cleveland's voucher
program. 2 64 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, as well as the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, initially
invalidated the voucher program. 265 After the non-public schools and
the parents participating in the voucher program successfully petitioned
for certiorari, however, the United States Supreme Court validated the
voucher program in a 5-4 decision. 266 Justices O'Connor 26 7 and
26 9
Thomas 268 filed concurring opinions, while Justices Stevens,
Souter, 27 and Breyer27 1 each dissented.
A. Facts
In 1995, after examining the workings of the Cleveland City School
District, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio declared a "crisis of magnitude." 2 72 With only ten percent of its
ninth graders passing basic proficiency tests and less than one third of
its students successfully graduating from high school, the Cleveland
school district miserably failed to meet any state performance
standards. 2 73 In an attempt to remedy these problems, the district court
placed the entire school district under state control. 274 In response, the
Ohio legislature enacted its Pilot Project Scholarship Program to
263. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002).
264. See infra Part lII.A-B (discussing the facts and procedural history of the Zelman
decision).
265. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2465.
266. Id. at 2462-63.
267. Id. at 2473-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see infra Part 1II.C.2 (discussing Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion).
268. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2480-84 (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra Part III.C.3 (discussing
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion).
269. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2484-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra Part III.C.4 (discussing
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion).
270. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2485-502 (Souter, J., dissenting); see infra Part III.C.5 (discussing
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion).
271. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2502-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra Part III.C.6 (discussing
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion).
272. Zeibnan, 122 S.Ct. at 2463.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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provide families living in the failing district with fresh, publicly funded
educational opportunities. 2 75 This program not only provided tuition
aid, or "vouchers," for Cleveland students to attend other participating
public and private schools but also provided tutorial
276 aid for students
who chose to remain in Cleveland's public schools.
The voucher portion of the program enabled Cleveland students, in
kindergarten through eighth grade, to attend any participating public or
private school located within the school district's boundaries. 2 77 Both
religious and non-religious private schools could participate in the
program. 278 Forty-six of the fifty-six private schools that participated in
the voucher program, however, had a religious affiliation. 2 79 Families
with income levels below 200% of the poverty line were first to receive
the tuition vouchers and could receive up to $2250 to cover a private
school's tuition. 28 Other families could then receive tuition vouchers
for up to $1875 if the number of available scholarships exceeded the
28 1
number of low-income children participating in the voucher program.
Any suburban public school located adjacent to the Cleveland school
district could participate in the program and would receive an additional
$2250 for each student admitted.2 8 2 However, no adjacent public
schools chose to participate in the voucher program. 283 The schools
that did participate, however, could not discriminate on the basis of
religion, race, or ethnic background, and the Ohio school district could
284
not coerce families to choose one particular school over another.

275. Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002)
(setting forth the provisions of the Pilot Project Scholarship Program); supra note 171 and
accompanying text (discussing the program's purpose and implementation).
276. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463. Through the tutorial aid portion of the program, "[plarents
arrange for registered tutors to provide [educational] assistance to their children and then submit
bills for their services to the State for payment." Id. at 2464.
277. Id. The schools that participated in the program must also meet the statewide educational
standards. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2464.
280. Id. The amount of money provided for each student could not exceed 90% of the tuition.
Id. The program, however, did prevent private schools from charging a parental co-payment
greater than $250. Id.
281. Id. The amount of money provided for each of these students could not exceed 75% of
the tuition, and no co-payment cap existed for these families. Id. The Ohio Superintendent for
Public Instruction determines the number of scholarships available for each covered district
annually. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.978(A)-(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
282. Id. at 2463 n.l.
283. Id. at 2464.
284. Id. at 2463-64.
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Like the voucher portion of the Pilot Project Scholarship Program,
the distribution and amount of tutorial aid for students also depended on
the financial status of the family. 2 85 Moreover, the program required
the number of tutorial aid offered to students remaining in the district to
equal the number of vouchers provided.28 6 Finally, parents could
choose to enroll their children in a community school or a magnet
school. 287 If parents chose to send their children to one of these special
public schools, then the school received substantial funding from the
state, through various other educational programs, in excess of the
288
amount received by a traditional state school.
B. The Lower Court Decisions
The legal battle began in the Franklin County Court of Common
28 9
Pleas, where the trial court granted summary judgment for the State.
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals declared the school voucher
program unconstitutional. 29 0 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held
that the voucher program neither violated the United States Constitution
nor the religious provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 2 9 1 The plaintiffs
then brought suit in federal court, where the United States District Court

285. Id. at 2464. Families with income levels below 200% of the poverty line could receive
up to $360 to cover 90% of a tutor's cost, and all other students could receive 75% of the tutor's
cost. Id.
286. Id. Section 3313.975 of the current Ohio Code provides:
The state superintendent shall award as many scholarships and tutorial assistance
grants as can be funded given the amount appropriated for the program. In no case,
however, shall more than fifty per cent of all scholarships awarded be used by students
who were enrolled in a nonpublic school during the school year of application for a
scholarship.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
287. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464-65; see also supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text
(defining "community" and "magnet schools").
288. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
289. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ohio 1999), rev'g 1997 WL 217583
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The trial judge granted the state's motion for summary judgment, stating
that because aid reached private religious schools only indirectly, the voucher program did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Gatton v. Goff, 1996 WL 466499 (Ohio Common Pleas July,
31, 1996).
290. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206 (holding that the voucher program violated the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution; the School Funds Clause of Section 2,
Article VI of the Ohio Constitution; the Establishment Clause of Section 7, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution; and the Uniformity Clause of Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution; but
also holding that the voucher program did not violate the Thorough and Efficient Clause of
Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution or the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II
of the Ohio Constitution).
291. Id. See generally Byrd, supra note 4, at 563 (examining the Ohio Supreme Court's
reasoning).
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for the Northern District of Ohio, 292 as well as the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, invalidated the voucher program. 293 The United States
certiorari, and in a 5-4 decision
Supreme Court, however, granted
294
upheld the voucher program.
1. Ohio State Court
In 1996, a group of Ohio taxpayers brought suit in state court,
2 95
challenging the voucher program on both state and federal grounds.
Specifically, the taxpayers contended that the voucher program violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution 296 and the Ohio State Constitution's Establishment
Clause, 297 School Funds Clause, 29829
Thorough and Efficient Clause,29 9
292. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Ohio 1999), aff'd, 234 F.3d
945 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
293. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 963 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2460
(2002).
294. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2462-63 (2002).
295. Simmons-Harris,711 N.E.2d at 206.
296. Id. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
297. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206. See generally OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 7. The
Ohio Establishment Clause provides:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to
the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or
support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his consent;
and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be
required, as a qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a
witness on account of his religious belief; but nothing herein shall be construed to
dispense with oaths and affirmations. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however,
being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass
suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its
own mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
298. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206. See generally OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. The
School Funds Clause of Ohio provides:
The General Assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with
the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient
system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects,
shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of any part of the school funds of this
state.
OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
299. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206. See generally OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. The
Thorough and Efficient Clause of Ohio provides:
The General Assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with
the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient
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Uniformity Clause, 30 and one-subject rule.3° 1 The Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas granted the State's motion for summary
judgment. 30 2 On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals declared the school
voucher program unconstitutional, holding that the program violated
both the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution and
30 3
various provisions of the Ohio State Constitution.
In May 1999, the State appealed, bringing Cleveland's voucher
program before the Ohio Supreme Court. 304 The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the voucher program violated neither the United States
Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution, except for Ohio's one-subject
rule, which
prohibits legislative bills from containing more than one
5
subject.

30

The Ohio Supreme Court applied the condensed Lemon test to
determine whether the program violated the Establishment Clause of the

system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects,
shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this
state.
OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
300. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206. See generally OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26. The
Ohio Uniformity Clause provides that "[a]ll laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform
operation throughout the state; nor, shall any act, except such, as relates to public schools, be
passed, to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General Assembly, except,
as otherwise provided in this constitution." OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26.
301. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206. See generally OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(D).
Ohio's one-subject rule provides that "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall
be clearly expressed in its title. No law shall be revived or amended unless the new act contains
the entire act revived, or the section or sections amended, and the section or sections amended
shall be repealed." OHIO CONST. art. 1I, § 15(D).
302. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206. In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the
condensed Lemon test. Id. at 208. The court held that the voucher program had a proper secular
purpose, but had the impermissible effect of advancing religion because the program was not
neutral with respect to religion and the amount of aid was substantial. Id.
303. Id. at 206. The court held that the voucher program violated the Establishment Clause of
the United States Constitution; the School Funds Clause of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio
Constitution; the Establishment Clause of Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; and the
Uniformity Clause of Section 26, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; but that the voucher
program did not violate the Thorough and Efficient Clause of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio
Constitution or the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Id. In
reaching its conclusion, the court applied the condensed Lemon test. Simmons-Harris v. Goff,
Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997). The
court held that the voucher program had a proper secular purpose, but had the impermissible
effect of advancing religion because the program was not neutral with respect to religion and the
amount of aid was substantial. Id.
304. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206. The case reached the Ohio Supreme Court
"pursuant to the allowance of discretionary appeals and a cross-appeal." Id.
305. Id. See generally Byrd, supra note 4, at 575-85 (examining the Ohio Supreme Court's
reasoning).
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United States Constitution. 30 6 Applying the condensed Lemon test, the
Ohio Supreme Court first examined whether the program had a secular
legislative purpose. 307 The court found that the voucher program had a
valid secular purpose because it merely provided certain children with
scholarships to attend alternative schools. 30 8 The Ohio Supreme Court
then analyzed whether the voucher program's primary effect advanced
or inhibited religion. 30 9 The taxpayers argued that Cleveland's voucher
program was unconstitutional under Nyquist, in which the United States
Supreme Court had held a tuition reimbursement program to be
unconstitutional. 3 1° The Ohio Supreme Court, however, declined to
case law had undermined the
follow Nyquist, stating that subsequent
311
holding.
Nyquist
the
vitality of
Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court followed the criteria set forth in
Agostini v. Felton,3 12 examining: "(1) whether the program results in
governmental indoctrination, (2) whether the program's recipients are

defined by reference to religion, and (3) whether the program creates an
excessive entanglement between government and religion." 3 13 Because
public funds could reach a sectarian school only as the result of the
private and independent choice of a Cleveland parent, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the program did not result in governmental

306. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 208; see also supra Part II.G.2 (discussing the Lemon
test). Although the Supreme Court has abandoned many of the constitutional criteria that
emerged from the Lemon test, the condensed Lemon test itself remains "the doctrinal ordeal any
state's real school-choice program must endure." Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 318. The
Court applied the condensed Lemon test that emerged from Agostini. Simmons-Harris, 711
N.E.2d at 208. Thus, the Supreme Court first examined if the program had a valid secular
purpose. Id. Then, the Court examined whether the voucher program's primary purpose or effect
advanced or inhibited religion by applying the three factors set forth in Agostini: "(1) whether the
program results in governmental indoctrination, (2) whether the program's recipients are defined
by reference to religion, and (3) whether the program creates an excessive entanglement between
government and religion." Id. at 208-09.
307. Simmons-Harris,711 N.E.2d at 208.
308. Id. ("On its face, the School Voucher Program does nothing more or less than provide
scholarships to certain children residing within the Cleveland City School District to enable them
to attend an alternative school.").
309. Id.
310. Id.; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist
decision).
311. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 208 (referring toAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)); see also
supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist decision); supra notes 238-39
and accompanying text (discussing the Witters decision); supra notes 246-51 and accompanying
text (discussing the Agostini decision).
312. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-33.
313. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 208-09 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-33); see also
supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Agostini decision).
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indoctrination. 3 14 Yet, the Ohio Supreme Court also held that one
provision of the statute did improperly define who could receive the
vouchers by religion. 3 15 Nevertheless, the court explained that the
improper provision of the statute could be "severed" easily from the rest
of the statute to validate the voucher program. 3 16 Finally, the Ohio
Supreme Court applied the third prong of the Agostini criteria and held
that no excessive entanglement resulted through the voucher program
because aid reached sectarian schools indirectly only by the private and
independent decisions of Cleveland parents. 3 17 Accordingly, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the voucher program did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. 3 18 Moreover,
the court held that the voucher program did not violate the religious
3 19
provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
2. District Court
In July of 1999, Ohio taxpayers again challenged the constitutionality
of the amended voucher program, this time in the federal court
system. 3 2 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio granted summary judgment for the taxpayers, holding that the
program violated the Establishment Clause. 32 1 In reaching its decision,
314. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 209.
315. Id. at 210. Under the original Pilot Project Scholarship Program,
[r]egistered private schools admit students according to the following priorities: (1)
students enrolled in the previous year, (2) siblings of students enrolled in the previous
year, (3) students residing within the school district in which the private school is
located by lot, (4) students whose parents are affiliated with any organization that
provides financial support to the school, and (5) all other applicants by lot.
Id. The court concluded that priority (4) favored religion and, therefore, held that section
3313.977(A)(4) was unconstitutional. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 211.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 211-16. The court, however, did hold that the voucher program violated a
procedural rule of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 211-16. This rule, Section 15(D), Article II of
the Ohio Constitution, states that "'[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be
clearly expressed in its title."' Id. at 214 (alteration in original) (quoting OHIO CONST. art. II, §
15(D)). The Ohio legislature quickly cured this procedural defect, however, so that students
could continue to receive vouchers. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (2002).
After the amendment, the basic provisions of the program remained the same as the original Pilot
Project Scholarship Program enacted by the Legislature in 1995. Id.
320. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465. Because the Ohio legislature had changed the voucher
program slightly to cure its violation of the one-subject rule, the plaintiffs were able to bring an
entirely new action against the revised voucher program in federal court. Id.
321. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1999), affid, 234 F.3d
945, 963 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002). See generally Byrd, supra note 4, at 564
(examining the federal district court's reasoning).
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the district court first noted that the condensed Lemon test was
applicable. 322 Because the voucher program had a valid secular purpose
and no party contended that the program created excessive
entanglement between the government and religion, the Court focused
its inquiry on whether the voucher program had the improper effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion. 323 After examining Nyquist, the court
3 24
held that the voucher program did advance religion impermissibly.
The court explained that the facts of Nyquist were indistinguishable
from the details of Cleveland's voucher program. 325 Moreover, the
court rejected the State's contention that subsequent case law
undermined the Nyquist holding. 326 Therefore, the district court held
that the voucher program violated the Establishment
Clause and granted
32 7
the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment.
3.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed the district court, holding that the
voucher program violated the Establishment Clause because neither
neutrality nor parental choice distinguished the voucher program from
the unconstitutional program of Nyquist.32 8 Like the district court, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the condensed Lemon test to the
voucher program and compared the voucher program to the tuition

322. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 844; see also supra Part II.G.2 (discussing the Lemon test).
Although the Supreme Court has abandoned many of the constitutional criteria that emerged from
the Lemon test, the condensed Lemon test itself remains "the doctrinal ordeal any state's real
school-choice program must endure." Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 318.
323. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
324. Id. at 849; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist
opinion).
325. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
The Voucher Program is clearly similar to the tuition reimbursement program in
Nyquist in two respects. First, while both public and private schools are eligible, only
private schools have chosen to participate in the Program, and the vast majority of
them are parochial.... Second, as in Nyquist, the Voucher Program provides
unrestricted tuition grants to parents whose children are eligible for the Program and
who attend qualifying schools.
Id.; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
326. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 850-64 (rejecting the contention that Mueller, Witters,
Zobrest, or Rosenberger undermined Nyquist); see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying
text (discussing the Nyquist opinion); supra notes 227-36 and accompanying text (discussing the
Mueller decision); supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Witters decision);
supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Zobrest opinion).
327. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
328. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 953 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2460
(2002).
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reimbursement program of Nyquist.3 29 Specifically, the court of appeals
examined whether the voucher program was distinguishable from
Nyquist due to its neutrality or due to the
extent that private choice
3 30
determined the destination of the vouchers.
The court of appeals held that the vouacher program was not neutral
with respect to religion because few non-religious private schools and
no public schools participated in the program. 3 3 1 The court explained
that "facial neutrality alone does not bring state action into compliance
with the First Amendment." 332 Moreover, the court stated that the
program's tuition cap actually discouraged non-religious private school
participation because such schools usually had higher tuition than
religious schools. 33 3 Thus, the mere fact that non-religious schools
could participate in the voucher program did not render the program
neutral, and therefore, the program was not distinguishable from the
334
program at issue in Nyquist.
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that parental choice was not
the main reason public funds reached religious institutions under the
Ohio program. 335 The court explained that the parents lacked true
choice because no adjacent public schools and few non-religious private
329. Id. at 959; see also supra Part II.G.2 (discussing the Lemon test); supra notes 193-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion). Although the Supreme Court's application
of the Lemon test has changed with time, the Court still applies a condensed version of the Lemon
test to all school choice programs. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 318.
330. Simmons-IHarris, 234 F.3d at 955; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text
(discussing the Nyquist opinion). The United States Supreme Court had found that various
programs were constitutional after noting their neutrality and the role of private choice in Mueller
v. Allen, Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, Agostini v. Felton, and
Mitchell v.Helms. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 955-57. Thus, the court examined whether the
voucher program was neutral with respect to religion and if the aid reached religious schools
solely as the result of private choice, as in Mueller, Witters, Agostini, and Mitchell, or whether
the voucher program was more similar to Nyquist. Id.; see also supra notes 227-36 and
accompanying text (discussing the Mueller decision); supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text
(discussing the Witters decision); supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text (discussing the
Zobrest opinion); supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell opinion).
331. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959.
332. Id.
333. Id. ("Practically speaking, the tuition restrictions mandated by the statute limit the ability
of nonsectarian schools to participate in the program, as religious schools often have lower
overhead costs, supplemental income from private donations, and consequently lower tuition
needs."); see also Findings, supra note 131 ("In 1993-94, the average tuition paid by private
school students was about $3100, but ranged from a low of about $1600 in Catholic elementary
schools to a high of about $9500 in nonsectarian secondary schools.").
334. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959 ("The school voucher program is not neutral in that it
discourages the participation by schools not funded by religious institutions, and the Cleveland
program limits the schools to which a parent can apply the voucher funds to those within the
program."); see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
335. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959-60.
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schools participated in the program. 3 36 Therefore, the parental choice
within the program was "illusory" and could not be used to validate an
otherwise improper program. 33 7 In fact, the court stated that it was
inappropriate to hold the voucher program to be constitutional on the
basis of parental choice because the government greatly restricted the
available choices by mandating tuition caps. 338 Therefore, the court
held that parental choice did not distinguish the voucher program from
the program in Nyquist.339 Accordingly, because neither neutrality nor
parental choice distinguished the voucher program from Nyquist,340 the
court of appeals affirmed the district court,
holding that the voucher
34 1
program violated the Establishment Clause.
Unhappy with the Sixth Circuit's decision, the State petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari.3 4 2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in September 2001. 34 3 The court of
appeals stayed its mandate pending the decision of the Supreme
Court. 344 In June 2002, approximately six years after the taxpayers first
brought suit, the United States Supreme Court decided whether
34 5
Cleveland's voucher program violated the Establishment Clause.
C. The Supreme Court Decision
In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. 34 6 The majority held that the voucher
program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the program
was religiously neutral and directed aid to religious institutions only
through private, independent choices and, thus, did not impermissibly
advance or inhibit religion. 3 47 Justice O'Connor concurred, stressing
-that the majority had correctly analyzed the issue and had not radically

336. Id. ("The alleged choice afforded both public and private school participants in this
program is illusory in that the program's design does not result in the participation of the adjacent
public schools from outside the Cleveland school district ....
Therefore, the program clearly has
the impermissible effect of promoting sectarian schools.").
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. ld.; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
340. Simmons-Harris,234 F.3d at 959.
341. Id. at 961; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist
opinion).
342. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (2002).
343. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).

344. Id.
345.
346.
347.

Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465.
Id. at 2462.
Id. at 2473; see also infra Part II.C. 1 (discussing the majority's opinion).
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departed from prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 34 8 Justice
Thomas also concurred and questioned whether the Establishment
Clause should even apply to state governments. 349 Justice Stevens
dissented, criticizing the majority for wrongfully focusing on
Cleveland's "educational crisis," the non-traditional public school
options, and private choice when determining the constitutionality of
the voucher program. 350 Justice Souter's dissent contended that the
majority's Establishment Clause test as a whole was improper;
alternatively, Justice Souter argued that the voucher program did not
meet the majority's Establishment Clause test of neutrality and private
choice. 35 1 Finally, Justice Breyer dissented,
arguing that the voucher
35 2
program would create religious conflict.
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority held that the voucher program did not violate the
Establishment Clause because the program had a valid secular purpose
and did not advance or inhibit religion. 353 Specifically, the Court
reasoned that the voucher program did not advance religion because the
program was religiously neutral and directed aid to religious schools
only due to private, independent choices. 354 The Court compared the
voucher program to the neutral programs of genuine private choice in
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest and found Cleveland's voucher program
indistinguishable from them. 355 However, the Court held that the
voucher program was distinguishable from Nyquist because, unlike the

348. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473; see also infra Part III.C.2 (discussing Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion).
349. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2481-82; see also infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion).
350. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2484-85; see also infra Part III.C.4 (discussing Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion).
351. Zelnan, 122 S. Ct. at 2485-2502; see also infra Part III.C.5 (discussing Justice Souter's
dissenting opinion).
352. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2502-07; see also infra Part III.C.6 (discussing Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion).
353. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465, 2473. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 2473. A
government program has a valid secular purpose if the purpose of the program is to advance a
legitimate government goal and not to advance religion or a religious belief. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
354. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473.
355. Id. at 2466-71 (comparing the voucher program to Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest); supra
notes 227-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Mueller decision); supra notes 238-39 and
accompanying text (discussing the Witters decision); supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text
(discussing the Zobrest decision).
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Nyquist program,35 public schools could participate in Cleveland's
voucher program.
After noting that the Establishment Clause applied to the states
through the doctrine of incorporation, 357 the Court began its .opinion
with the condensed Lemon test. 35 8 Because all parties agreed that the
voucher program had a legitimate secular purpose of improving
educational options for Cleveland students, the Court immediately
looked to whether 3the
voucher program had the effect of advancing or
59
inhibiting religion.
The Court explained that programs providing aid to religious
institutions do not have the effect of advancing religion if the programs
are "neutral" with respect to the religious status of the beneficiaries or
the service providers, and the aid reaches religious institutions solely as
a result of "genuine and independent private choice. " 36° The Court
noted that it has consistently upheld such neutral government programs
involving "true private choice." 3 6 1 To demonstrate the propriety and
longstanding use of the neutrality and private choice analysis, the Court
362
surveyed several recent cases with neutral private choice programs.

356. Id. at 2472-73 (comparing the voucher program to Nyquist); see also supra notes 193-99
and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
357. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465: see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the Everson opinion, in which the Court first expressly held that the Establishment
Clause applied to the states); supra Part II.B (examining the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause).
358. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465; see also supra notes 200-26 and accompanying text
(discussing the Lemon decision); supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (discussing the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court established the
three-step Establishment Clause test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion... ;
finally, the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion." Lemon,
403 U.S. at 612-13. The Court in Agostini v. Felton later condensed the Lemon test, stating that
the third prong of entanglement was merely "an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect" (the
second prong). Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997); see also supra notes 246-51 and
accompanying text (discussing the Agostini decision). Thus, the condensed Lemon test requires
government programs to have secular legislative purposes and to neither advance nor inhibit
religion. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232. Although the Court has abandoned many of the
constitutional criteria that emerged from the Lemon case, the condensed Lemon test itself remains
"the doctrinal ordeal any state's real school-choice program must endure." Garnett & Garnett,
supra note 4, at 318.
359. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465.
360. Id. at 2467.
361. Id. at 2466 (noting that although the jurisprudence regarding direct aid programs has
changed substantially, the jurisprudence regarding private choice programs has remained
"consistent and unbroken").
362.

Id. at 2466-67.
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Specifically, the Court examined Mueller v. Allen, 363 Witters v.
for Blind,364 and Zobrest v.
Washington Department of Services
36 5
District.
School
CatalinaFoothills
Subsequently, the Court held that, like the programs in Mueller,
Witters, and Zobrest, Cleveland's voucher program was neutral with
respect to religion. 3 66 The Court explained that because all schools and
children in the Cleveland area were eligible to participate in the
program, the voucher program was neutral. 36 7 Furthermore, the Court
found that families received no financial incentive to attend a religious
private school.3 6 8 In fact, the Court noted that the amount of money
allocated to a student was substantially less if the family chose to enroll
him in a private school instead of one of the community or magnet
schools. 369 Moreover, the Court stated that the only non-neutral portion
of the program was its preference for low-income families when
distributing the aid. 370 Finally, the Court rejected the taxpayers'
contention that the voucher program gave the impression of government
endorsement of religion. 37 1 The Court stated that it has repeatedly
noted that "no reasonable observer" would think that the government
was actually endorsing religion when neutral aid reached religious
institutions solely through private choice. 372 Therefore, because the
363. Id. at 2466 (examining the Mueller decision, which upheld a school choice program in
Minnesota because it was a program of "true, private choice"); see also supra Part II.G.3
(discussing the Mueller decision).
364. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466 (examining the Witters decision, which rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a vocational scholarship program); see also supra notes 23839 and accompanying text (discussing the Witters decision).
365. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467 (examining Zobrest, where the Court rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a federal program that permitted a sign-language interpreter to
assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools); see also supra notes 241-44 and accompanying
text (discussing the Zobrest decision).
366. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467; see also supra Part II.G.3 (discussing the Mueller decision);
supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Witters decision); supra notes 241-44
and accompanying text (discussing the Zobrest decision).
367. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467-68 (noting that the voucher program gave no preferential
treatment to parents or schools with religious affiliations). Any parent could choose for his or her
child to participate in the program; however, there were a limited number of vouchers available,
and low-income parents were the first parents to receive vouchers. Id. at 2468.
368. Id.
369. id.; see also supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (defining "community" and
"magnet" schools).
370. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
371. Id.
372. Id. (citing Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and Mitchell); see also supra Part II.G.3 (discussing
the Mueller decision); supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Witters
decision); supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Zobrest decision); supra
notes 252-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell decision).
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program placed no emphasis on the religious affiliation of the schools or
parents, created no financial incentive to attend a religious school, and
gave no impression of government endorsement of religion, the 373
Court
held that the voucher program was neutral with respect to religion.
The Court then examined whether the voucher program was a true
374
private choice program like those in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest.
Although forty-six out of the fifty-six participating private schools were
religiously affiliated, the Court held that the voucher program satisfied
the private choice portion of its constitutional inquiry. 375 The Court
explained that because parents may choose to keep their children in
Cleveland's public schools or to send their children to community
schools, magnet schools, or one of the ten non-religious private schools,
the families of Cleveland do have genuine opportunities to enroll their
children in nonreligious schools. 376 Furthermore, the Court held that
the number of participating religious schools and the number of
individuals attending religious schools did not indicate a lack of genuine
choice. 37 7 The Court explained that the level of certainty necessary in
gathering such statistics and the degree of "principled standards"
necessary to evaluate statistics for constitutional purposes simply did
not exist. 378 Moreover, the Court had specifically rejected attaching
constitutional significance to the number of students enrolled in
religious schools in Mueller.379 Thus, the Court found that the voucher
program was a true private choice program in which aid reached
religious schools only as a result
of the genuine and independent
380
parents.
Cleveland
of
decisions

373. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
374. Id. at 2468-70; see also supra Part II.G.3 (discussing the Mueller decision); supra notes
238-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Witters decision); supra notes 241-44 and
accompanying text (discussing the Zobrest decision).
375. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 2469-70. The Court explained that because the preponderance of religious schools
did not occur as a result of the voucher program, the number of religious schools participating in
the program was irrelevant. Id. In fact, the Court stated that
[t]o attribute constitutional significance to this figure... would lead to the-absurd
result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in some parts of Ohio,
such as Columbus, where a lower percentage of private schools are religious
schools ... but not in inner-city Cleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programs
most sorely needed, but where the preponderance of religious schools happens to be

greater.
Id. at 2470.
378. Id. at 2470.
379. Id.; see also supra Part II.G.3 (discussing the Mueller decision).
380. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469-70.
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Finally, the Court held that the Nyquist decision did not control the
fate of Cleveland's voucher program. 3 8 1 The Court distinguished
Cleveland's voucher program, stating that the Nyquist program was not
neutral because it expressly prohibited benefits from reaching public
schools. 382 Then the Court pointed to footnote thirty-eight in Nyquist,
which reserved judgment regarding cases in which aid was made
available to a broad class of individuals and religion was not a
determining factor. 38 3 Therefore, the Court held that Nyquist did not
govern the neutral private choice voucher program of Cleveland.3 84
Accordingly, the majority held that the voucher program did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and reversed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit's decision. 38 5
Cleveland's voucher program placed no
significance on the religious affiliation of the participating parents or
schools. 386 Moreover, public funds reached religious schools only as a
result of private decisions, made by Cleveland parents, to send their
children to religious schools. 3 87 Under these circumstances, the
majority held
that the State's voucher program was constitutionally
3 88
permissible.
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor joined in the majority's opinion. 3 89 However,
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to emphasize that the majority's
opinion was not a drastic shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and that the majority appropriately considered all educational options
390
open to Cleveland parents.
First, Justice O'Connor stated that the majority's opinion was not "a
dramatic break from the past" because the religious schools did not
receive a significant amount of public money through the voucher
program. 39 1 She noted that community schools and magnet schools
381. Id. at 2472; see also.supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist
opinion).
382. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2472; see also supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text
(discussing the Nyquist decision).
383. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2472.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 2473.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 2473 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
390. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
391. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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received a far greater amount of public funds than the private schools
received through the voucher program. 39 2 Moreover, she stated that
religious institutions already receive a substantial amount of money
federal, state, and local government programs, such as
through various 393
tax exemptions.
Justice O'Connor then explained that the majority's opinion was
consistent with prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence.3 94 Noting
Everson's emphasis on religious neutrality, Justice O'Connor stated that
the constitutional inquiry has basically remained the same for forty
years. 39 5 She reasoned that any refinements in the law since Everson
merely clarify how to apply the condensed Lemon test and Everson's
pillar of neutrality. 396 Therefore, Justice O'Connor stated that the
were consistent with precedent and not a
majority's inquiry and answer
3 97

drastic constitutional shift.

Second, Justice O'Connor stressed that the majority correctly
examined all of the educational options available to Cleveland
parents. 39 8 She stated that because Establishment Clause jurisprudence
required the Court to evaluate whether genuine choice existed between
religious and non-religious schools, the Court properly examined the
non-religious and religious private schools participating in the program,
the community schools, the magnet schools, and Cleveland's public
schools. 399 By examining the full range of schools, the majority's

392. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the State provides community schools with
about $4518 per pupil and magnet schools with about $7097 per pupil, whereas religious schools
can receive only a maximum of $2250 per pupil through the voucher program).
393. Id. at 2474 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice O'Connor noted that public
aid reaches religious institutions through educational programs such as the Pell Grant program
and the G.I. Bill, through public health programs like Medicare, and through child care programs
such as Child Care and Development Block Grant Program. Id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
394. Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
395. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the Everson decision).
396. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("What the Court clarifies in these
cases is that the Establishment Clause also requires that state aid flowing to religious
organizations through the hands of beneficiaries must do so only at the direction of those
beneficiaries. Such a refinement of the Lemon test surely does not betray Everson."); see also
supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
397. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
398. Id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 374-80 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's analysis of whether the voucher program provided genuine choice
to Cleveland parents).
399. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 374-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis of whether the voucher program provided
genuine choice to Cleveland parents).
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analysis was not skewed and the majority saw how Cleveland's
educational system actually functioned.4 °°
Concluding, Justice
O'Connor stated that the majority's opinion was both "consistent with
the realities of the Cleveland educational40 system"
and consistent with
1
prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
3.

Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion

Although Justice Thomas joined in the majority's opinion, he wrote
separately because he questioned whether the Court should apply the
condensed Lemon test to the states. 40 2 Justice Thomas stated that the
Establishment Clause applies solely to the federal government. 40 3 He
noted that only through the Fourteenth Amendment and the
incorporation doctrine does the Establishment Clause apply to the
states. 40 4 Justice Thomas then explained that because the general
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to advance individual liberty,
the Court should not use the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict
individual liberty. 40 5 Justice Thomas stated that it would be a "tragic
irony" to use the Fourteenth Amendment's
assurance of individual
40 6
liberty to prohibit educational choice.
Instead, Justice Thomas suggested that courts
action with terms different from those used to
government: terms with more latitude and
constraints. 407 Justice Thomas argued that the

should evaluate state
evaluate the federal
fewer constitutional
states must have the

400. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To do otherwise is to ignore
how the educational system in Cleveland actually functions."); see also supra notes 374-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis of whether the voucher program provided
genuine choice to Cleveland parents); supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the
Everson decision).
401. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 374-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis of whether the voucher program provided
genuine choice to Cleveland parents).
402. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2480-81 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra Part ll.G.2
(discussing the Lemon test).
403. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2481 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra notes 69-78 and
accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
404. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2481 (Thomas, J., concurring).
405. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("When rights are incorporated against the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain, individual liberty."); see also
supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause).
406. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2482 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("There would be a tragic irony in
converting the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of individual liberty into a prohibition on the
exercise of educational choice."); see also supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (discussing
the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
407. Zehnan, 122 S. Ct. at 2482 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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freedom to experiment with education, for only with education can one
exercise the personal and political liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 08 Finally, Justice Thomas pointed to Cleveland's failing
school districts as evidence of the need for educational reform and
argued that to deny Cleveland parents educational choice through the
Fourteenth Amendment greatly disadvantaged the neediest
American
40 9
citizens and misconstrued the principles of the Constitution.
4. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens dissented, criticizing the majority for wrongfully
focusing on various factual matters throughout its opinion.4 1 Justice
Stevens argued that the constitutionality of Cleveland's voucher
program should not turn on such facts as Cleveland's "educational
crisis," the alternative public school options, or the voluntary nature of
parental choice. 4 11 Also, he noted his fear that the voucher program
could result in religious strife.4 12
First, Justice Stevens observed that the terrible state of Cleveland's
public school system was irrelevant to the constitutionality of the
voucher program and should not be a reason for state-funded religious
education. 4 13 Second, Justice Stevens contended that the wide range of
educational options within the public school system was also irrelevant
to the constitutionality of the voucher program. 4 14 He believed that the
majority's conclusion-that genuine choice existed because parents
could choose to send their children to traditional public schools,
sectarian schools, magnet schools, or community schools-was
408. Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("Respondents advocate using the Fourteenth Amendment to
handcuff the State's ability to experiment with education. But without education one can hardly
exercise the civic, political, and personal freedoms conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment.");
see also VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 85, at 197 ("First there is the obvious: how
providing poor people access to better schools gives them the resources needed to pursue a fuller
political and economic life [sic].").
409. Zelnan, 122 S.Ct. at 2482-83 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra notes 69-78 and
accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause). Justice Thomas
explained that "[a]lthough one of the purposes of public schools was to promote democracy and a
more egalitarian culture, failing urban public schools disproportionately affect minority children
most in need of educational opportunity." Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., concurring).
410. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2484 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 2484-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
412. Id. at 2485 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Admittedly.... I have been influenced by my
understanding of the impact of religious strife on the decisions of our forbears to migrate to this
continent, and on the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, North Ireland, and the Middle East to
mistrust one another.").
413. Id. at 2484 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the situation in Cleveland was grave, but
rejecting the educational crisis as a factor in the constitutional analysis of the voucher program).
414. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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flawed.4 1 5 Third, Justice Stevens stated that the voluntary character of
genuine private choice was also irrelevant to the voucher program's
constitutionality. 4 16 Finally, Justice Stevens stated that the majority had
increased the risk of religious strife by permitting aid to reach religious
schools through the voucher program. 4 17 Therefore, because the
majority wrongfully focused on various factual matters throughout its
opinion and because of the voucher program's potential for religious
strife, Justice Stevens respectfully dissented.4 18
5. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
criticized the majority for ignoring prior Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and, alternatively, for ignoring reality when it applied its
Establishment Clause test of neutrality and private choice. 4 19 Justice
Souter explained that a tough problem, such as a failing school system,
was no reason to ignore proper constitutional analysis. 42
Finally,
Justice Souter argued that the
majority's
holding
was
"profoundly
at
421
Constitution.
the
with
odds
Justice Souter first argued that the majority's Establishment Clause
test as a whole was improper because the test ignored the ruling of
Everson v. Board of Education.422 In Everson, the Court expressly
prohibited the government from levying taxes in support of any
religious activity. 4 23 Thus, Justice Souter contended that the majority
effectively overruled Everson with its ruling on Cleveland's voucher

415. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 2485 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the mere fact that Cleveland parents
would like to send their children to religious schools, although they could not afford such schools,
did not justify the impermissible use of public funds in support of religious private institutions).
417. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
418. Id. at 2484-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
419. Id. at 2486 (Souter, J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 2485 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing, as did Justice Stevens, that Cleveland's
failing school district should not be a factor when determining the constitutionality of the voucher
program).
421. Id. at 2497 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter contended that the program was
"profoundly at odds with the Constitution" because the amount of money allocated to religious
schools through the program was unprecedented and the voucher program directly defied the
purposes of the Establishment Clause. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
422. Id. at 2486 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the Everson decision).
423. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2485-86 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 183-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision). "No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions... " Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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program. 424 Justice Souter explained that the Court's Establishment
Clause analysis had changed over time; nevertheless, he noted that not
until this ruling had the Court ignored the extent of aid as a factor in its
analysis. 4 25 Justice Souter argued that even if neutrality and private
choice were proper constitutional factors, Everson and its progeny still
required the Court to examine the extent of the aid provided to religious
institutions. 4 26 Because the Court failed to examine the extent of the
government aid to the religious schools of Cleveland, as Everson4 27
and its
progeny required, Justice Souter rejected the majority's analysis.
Alternatively, Justice Souter contended that even if it was
unnecessary to examine the extent of the public aid, and the majority's
Establishment Clause test of neutrality and private choice alone was
proper, the voucher program failed to meet this test. 42 8 He opined that
the voucher program was not neutral because it provided financial
incentives to attend religious schools. 4 29 He then argued that parents
participating in the voucher program lacked true private choice because
43
few quality non-religious schools participated in the program. 0
Moreover, Justice Souter argued that the majority's analysis of
neutrality and private choice was so broad that neutrality and private
choice no longer functioned as criteria "with a practical capacity to
screen something out. 4 3 1

424. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2486 (Souter, J., dissenting).
425. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter claimed that the majority's holding created a
new stage in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, where the extent of aid had no constitutional
significance. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). He explained that from 1947 to 1968 the Court
prohibited all aid from reaching religious institutions, from 1968 to 1983 the Court permitted aid
to reach religious institutions only if the aid was divertible to secular activities alone, and from
1983 to date the Court permitted aid to reach religious institutions only if the amount of aid was
insubstantial. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Souter noted that even in the
recent cases of Witters, Zobrest, and Rosenberg the amount of "aid ... was isolated and
insubstantial." Id. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting). Therefore, he concluded that only in the
plurality opinion of Mitchell and the majority opinion of Zelman did the Court find the
substantiality of aid irrelevant. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
426. Id. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt was not until today that substantiality of aid has
clearly been rejected as irrelevant by a majority of this Court.
); see also supra notes 183-91
and accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
427. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 183-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
428. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven [the existence of neutrality
and private choice] cannot convincingly legitimize the Ohio scheme.").
429. Id. at 2491 (Souter, J., dissenting).
430. Id. at 2492 (Souter, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 2494 (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring only to the criterion of private choice in this
instance, although indicating similar sentiments toward neutrality earlier in his opinion).
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Citing Mitchell,432 Justice Souter noted that neutrality is
"evenhandedness in setting eligibility as between potential religious and
secular recipients of public money." 43 3 He then contended that the
voucher program was not neutral because the tuition program favored
religion by providing larger funds to private schools through the
voucher system than to public schools through tutorial aid.4 34 Justice
Souter also rejected the inclusion of community and magnet schools as
secular alternatives to the religious voucher schools when determining
the neutrality of the program because the voucher program did not
appropriate funds to community or magnet schools. 4 35 Therefore,
Justice Souter concluded
that the voucher program was not neutral with
436
religion.
to
respect
Furthermore, Justice Souter explained that the voucher program
failed to provide families with genuine options for non-religious
education because few quality non-religious private schools participated
in the program. 43 7 Justice Souter again rejected the inclusion of
community and magnet schools as secular alternatives to the religious
voucher schools because community and magnet schools did not receive
money through the voucher program but were funded through separate
state spending. 4 38 Thus, he concluded that the voucher program also
failed to meet the true private choice criterion of the majority's
Establishment Clause inquiry. 4 39 Accordingly, because the voucher
program failed to meet either prong of the majority's Establishment
4 40
Clause test, Justice Souter rejected the majority's opinion.

432. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also supra notes
252-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell decision).
433. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2491 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10).
434. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
435. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority looked beyond OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3313.976 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002), the specific section that authorized Ohio's Pilot
Project Scholarship Program, to every educational opportunity provided for within Ohio's Code
and rejecting this approach); see also supra note 171 (discussing the Pilot Project Scholarship
Program). The majority did note that the Ohio State Legislature funded neither the community
schools, nor magnet schools through the Pilot Project Scholarship Program. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at
2471 n.6.
436. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2492 (Souter, J., dissenting).
437. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
438. Id. at 2493 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority looked beyond OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3313.976 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002), the specific section that authorized Ohio's
Pilot Project Scholarship Program, to every educational opportunity provided for within Ohio's
Code and rejecting this approach); see also supra note 171 (discussing the Pilot Project
Scholarship Program).
439. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2494 (Souter, J., dissenting).
440. Id. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Souter contended that the program was "profoundly
at odds with the Constitution" for two reasons. 44 1 First, Justice Souter
concluded that the voucher program was at odds with the Establishment
Clause because the amount of money allocated to religious schools
442
Second, Justice Souter
through the program was unprecedented.
reasoned that the voucher program was in direct defiance of the
purposes of the Establishment Clause because the program entangled
the government with the religious community, creating religious strife
and a weaker democracy. 44 3 Thus, Justice Souter concluded that the
voucher program was impermissible, regardless of precedent and the
44 4
majority's faulty application of its own Establishment Clause test.
Accordingly, because the majority ignored Establishment Clause
precedent, wrongly applied its own criteria of neutrality and private
entirely at odds with the Establishment
choice, and validated a program 445
dissented.
Souter
Clause, Justice
Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, also dissented
from the majority's opinion. 446 Justice Breyer wrote his separate
dissent to stress the likelihood that Cleveland's voucher program would
create religious strife.44 7
Justice Breyer first noted that the Framers added the Establishment
Clause to the Constitution because they believed that liberty and social
stability could exist only with religious tolerance. 44 8 He then explained
that when governments allied themselves with a particular religion in
the past, those with minority religious beliefs faced hatred and
Justice Breyer stated that the purpose of the
persecution. 44 9
Establishment Clause was not to guarantee an equal opportunity for
6.

441. Id. at 2497 (Souter, J., dissenting).
442. Id. at 2497-98 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Ohio had already spent thirty-three
million dollars on the voucher program and that experts expected costs to rise).
443. Id. at 2498-99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the purposes of the Establishment
Clause were "freedom of conscience" and "to save religion from its own corruption").
444. Id. at 2502 (Souter, J., dissenting).
445. Id. at 2485, 2497 (Souter, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 2502 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
447. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I write separately, however, to emphasize the risk that
publicly financed voucher programs pose in terms of religiously based social conflict.").
448. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text
(discussing the role that religious tolerance played in the formation of the Establishment Clause).
449. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2502-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to the previous religious
strife in Europe and in America); see also supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing
the role that religious strife played in the formation of the Establishment Clause).
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each religion to secure public funds, for such an interpretation would
create religious conflict.4 50 Instead, Justice Breyer concluded that the
purpose of the Establishment Clause was to guarantee that no one
religion received advantages from the government over another
religion. 45 1 Because he strongly believed that religious strife always
followed government funding of religious activities, Justice Breyer
dissented from the majority's opinion and4 concluded
that the voucher
52
program violated the Establishment Clause.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court correctly held that
Cleveland's voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause
because the program had a valid secular purpose and did not advance or
inhibit religion.4 53 This Part first demonstrates why the majority
4 54
opinion is consistent with prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Second, this Part determines that the majority correctly analyzed all 4of
55
the education options available in Cleveland in reaching its decision
and correctly held that Nyquist was not controlling law. 4 56 This Part

then discusses the dissents' mistaken arguments, which incorrectly
focused on potential religious strife, incorrectly interpreted the Everson
holding, and incorrectly interpreted the majority's discussion of
Cleveland's educational crisis. 457 Finally, the analysis turns to Justice
Thomas's attempt to revitalize federalism in his concurring opinion, in

450. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2504 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Breyer stated that
it would be very difficult to provide all religions equal opportunity to public funds because of the
sheer number of religions in the United States. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
451. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 2508 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
453. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority's holding that the voucher program did
not violate the Establishment Clause).
454. See infra Part IV.A (demonstrating the consistency of the majority's opinion with prior
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
455. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the majority correctly analyzed all of the educational
options available to Cleveland parents, instead of limiting its analysis to the options created
through the challenged Pilot Project Scholarship Program).
456. See infra Part IV.C (demonstrating that the majority correctly held that Nyquist did not
govern the neutral voucher program in Zelman); see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying
text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
457. See infra Part IV.D (determining that the majority correctly refrained from placing
constitutional significance on the potential religious strife that could result due to the voucher
program, that the dissent incorrectly argued that the majority's reason betrays Everson, and that
the dissent incorrectly contended that the majority placed constitutional significance on the
condition of Cleveland's public schools).
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which he correctly questioned the propriety of incorporating the First
4 58
Amendment against the states.
A. The Majority Opinion Is Consistent with Prior
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The majority did not suddenly tear down the wall of separation
between church and state; the majority merely applied Establishment
Clause precedent to the voucher program. 45
In fact, a survey of
Establishment Clause case law reveals that, for over fifty years, the
4 60
Court has permitted public funds to reach religious institutions.
Moreover, the two pillars of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
religious neutrality and private choice, have remained consistent over
the years. 46 1 In 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education, the Court first
mandated religious neutrality, 462 and in 1983, in Mueller v. Allen, the
Court began to require private choice. 463 Because the Establishment
Clause merely requires genuine private choice and religious
disinterestedness, not religious hostility, the Court properly upheld
Cleveland's voucher program. 4 64 Accordingly, the Court simply
458. See infra Part IV.D (discussing Justice Thomas's invitation to the Court to reconsider the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states).
459. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 121 S. Ct. 2460, 2465-68 (2002) (noting that
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has remained "consistent and unbroken").
460. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (noting that in 1947, in Everson v. Board
of Education, the Court found that public funds could benefit religious institutions and upheld a
government program that reimbursed the bus fares of all children, regardless whether they
attended religious or non-religious schools).
461. Zelman, 121 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see McConnell, Defense of
Educational Choice, supra note 56, at 852 (noting that the Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld
government programs that are neutral with respect to religion and direct aid to religious
institutions solely as the result of private, independent choice); Davidson, supra note 37, at 48182 (arguing that modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has consistently examined whether
government programs have a secular purpose, are neutral with respect to religion, and direct aid
to religious institutions solely as the result of true private choice); supra notes 182-257 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
consistently examined whether the government program was neutral with respect to religion and
whether public funds reached religious institutions solely as the result of private choice).
462. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); see also supra notes 183-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
463. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400-01 (1983); see also supra notes 183-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision); supra notes 227-36 and accompanying text
(discussing the Mueller decision).
464. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 334-35 (discussing the Supreme Court's basic
requirement for school choice programs: neutrality and indirection); Davidson, supra note 37, at
481-82 (contending that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has consistently required
government programs to have secular purposes, to be religiously neutral, and to direct aid to
religious institutions solely as the result of true private choice); see also supra notes 182-257 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
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Clause precedent from Zelman to reach its
applied the Establishment
46 5
sound decision.

B. RealisticAnalysis of the Facts
The majority also correctly analyzed all of the education options
available in Cleveland when it evaluated whether Cleveland parents had
genuine opportunities to enroll their children in non-religious
schools. 466 The Court did not limit its inquiry to the two types of
schools participating in the voucher program; it considered every type
of school actually available in the Cleveland area (public schools,
magnet schools, community schools, non-religious private schools, and
religious private schools). 4 67 By examining every educational option,
regardless of which particular section of the Ohio Code provided funds
to the school, the Court could more accurately determine whether
Cleveland parents actually had the option to send their children to nonreligious schools. 4 68 As Justice O'Connor noted, "[t]o do otherwise
[would be] to ignore how the educational system in Cleveland actually
functions. 4 69 Therefore, the majority correctly examined all of the
analysis of
education options in Cleveland, providing a more 4accurate
70
the facts and a conclusion more in tune with reality.

consistently examined whether the government program was neutral with respect to religion and
whether public funds reached religious institutions solely as the result of private choice).
465. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466: Davidson, supra note 37, at 481-82 (arguing that the
Supreme Court's test for Establishment Clause cases has required government programs to have
secular purposes, be religiously neutral, and to direct aid to religious institutions solely as the
result of true private choice); see also supra notes 389-401 and accompanying text (examining
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, in which she stated that the majority's opinion was
consistent with precedent); supra notes 182-257 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
Supreme Court has consistently held that government programs did not violate the Establishment
Clause if the program was neutral with respect to religion and the public funds reached religious
institutions solely as the result of private choice).
466. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at2469.
467. Id. The Court concluded that Cleveland parents had genuine opportunities to enroll their
children in non-religious schools without even emphasizing that the failing Cleveland public
schools were secular options. Id. Commentator Richard Weicher, however, concludes that the
"failing" public schools of Cleveland should constitute educational options. Weicher, supra note
191, at 318-19. Weicher states that although the legislature has labeled the school as failing,
"presumably, however, that [the legislatures] left the school open means it decided that the school
can still educate a number of students, just not the number it typically expects from its schools."
Id. at 318. Therefore, Weicher believes that the failing public schools of Cleveland do constitute
educational options. Id. at 318-19. Weicher states that "[t]o do [otherwise] is to challenge, and
essentially overrule, a legislative determination that such a school is a viable option to which it
should continue to provide money and resources." Id. at 320.
468. Weicher, supra note 191, at 318-20.
469. Zelinan, 122 S. Ct. at 2473 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
470. See id. at 2469.
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C. Nyquist Was Not ControllingLaw
Finally, the majority correctly held that Nyquist was not controlling
law, for unlike the government program in Nyquist, Cleveland's
voucher program was neutral with respect to religion. 4 7 1 In Nyquist, the
government program provided financial assistance only to parents who
sent their children to private schools; the program expressly prohibited
the participation of public schools. 4 72 In contrast, the vouchers in
Zelman were available to students who chose to attend neighboring
public schools, non-religious private schools, and religious private
schools. 473 Moreover, Cleveland students could choose to attend a
community or magnet school. 474 Because Cleveland's voucher program
was neutral with respect to religion, the majority correctly held that
Nyquist did not control the constitutionality of the Zelman voucher
4 75
program.
Furthermore, the majority correctly held that Nyquist was not
controlling law because, in footnote thirty-eight of the Nyquist opinion,
the Court expressly limited the holding of Nyquist to non-neutral
government programs. 4 76 In this footnote, the Court distinguished the
non-neutral Nyquist program from the neutral programs in Everson and
Allen, as well as from the religiously neutral federal G.I. Bill, which
authorized the government to issue tuition grants to both non-religious
and religious private universities and colleges. 47 7 Thus, footnote thirtyeight suggested that government programs were constitutional if they
provided financial assistance without regard to the religious status of the

471. See id. at 2472; see also Frank, supra note 138, at 1047 (contending that the Sixth Circuit
incorrectly held that Nyquist governed Cleveland's voucher program); supra notes 193-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
472. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 4t3 U.S. 756, 783 (1973); see
also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
473. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463-65.
474. Id. at 2464-65.
475. See id. at 2472; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
Nyquist opinion).
476. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2472; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38 ("[W]e need not decide
whether the significantly religious character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the
present cases from a case involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the
institution benefited."); see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
Nyquist opinion).
477. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38; Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 321; see also supra
notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist opinion).
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beneficiaries. 4 78 Accordingly, because footnote thirty-eight implied that
neutral tuition grants were constitutional 479 and Cleveland's voucher
program was religiously neutral,4 the
Zelman majority correctly held that
80
Nyquist was not controlling law.
D. The Dissenting Opinions
1. The Constitutional Significance of Potential Religious Strife
All three dissenting opinions incorrectly placed constitutional
significance on the religious strife that possibly could follow the
voucher program. 481 The likelihood of such religious strife in the future
was simply too speculative to be constitutionally significant, especially
since the voucher program had not created any strife other than the
taxpayers' lawsuit. "° 2 Moreover, none of the dissenters cited authority
in support of this proposition, and all failed to provide the Court with
any standards to determine whether a government program likely would
produce religious strife.48 3 In addition, the Supreme Court had already
rejected placing constitutional significance on speculative religious
strife or political divisiveness in Mitchell v. Helms.48 4 Accordingly, the
majority correctly rejected considering
potential religious strife as a
48 5
analysis.
factor in its constitutional
478. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2472; Kemerer, Constitutionality of School Vouchers, supra note
127, at 20-21; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Nyquist
opinion).
479. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38; see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text
(discussing the Nyquist opinion).
480. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2472.
481. See id. at 2485 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2499 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2502-08
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra Part III.C.4 (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion); supra Part III.C.5 (discussing Souter's dissenting opinion); supra Part III.C.6
(discussing Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion). But see Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2472 n.7
(rejecting the dissents' contention that the voucher program would cause religious strife).
482. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2472 n.7 (noting that Justice Breyer's dissent lacks authority).
483. See id. at 2485 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2499 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2502-08
(Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2472 n.7 (noting that Justice Breyer's dissent lacks authority);
Ronald J. Pestritto, Is Religion Dangerous for America? The Supreme Court's Liberals Think So
(noting that all four dissenters in Zelman feared that voucher programs would create religious
strife and stating that these dissenters "intend to implement their own views should they ever gain
another vote on the Court," regardless of Establishment Clause jurisprudence), at
http://www.claremont.org/projectslconstitution/02070lpestritto.html (posted July 1, 2002); see
also supra Part III.C.4 (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion); supra Part III.C.5
(discussing Justice Souter's dissenting opinion); supra Part HI.C.6 (discussing Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion).
484. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2472 n.7 (citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825 (2000)); see
also supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell decision).
485. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2472 n.7.
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2. Betrayal of Everson
Justice Souter, in his dissent, incorrectly concluded that the
majority's Establishment Clause test of neutrality and private choice
betrayed the ruling of Everson v. Board of Education.486 In Everson,
the Court expressly stated that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions." 4 87 Yet,
despite this statement, the Court upheld a government program that
reimbursed parents for the transportation costs of sending their children
to both public schools and religious private schools. 48 8 In its reasoning,
the Court explained that the Establishment Clause merely required the
government to be neutral with respect to religious institutions, not to be
adversarial. 4 89 Thus, the majority's opinion in Zelman did not ignore or
betray Everson.49 0 The majority opinion merely refined Everson's
Establishment Clause analysis by also requiring government aid to flow
to religious institutions through true private choice. 4 9 1 In addition, this
refinement was not sudden because the Court has reuired true private
choice since Mueller v. Allen was decided in 1983. 92 Nevertheless,
Justice Souter contended that the majority drastically departed from the
precedent of Everson and others by not considering the substantiality of

486. See id. at 2486-90 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2476 (rejecting the dissent's contention
that the neutrality and private choice inquiries betray Everson): see also supra notes 419-27 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's argument that the majority effectively overruled
Everson through its decision in Zelnan); supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing
the Everson decision).
487. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); see also supra notes 183-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
488. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing
the Everson decision).
489. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 ("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary."); see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson
decision).
490. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2476 (rejecting the dissent's contention that the majority had
ignored the Everson decision by utilizing the neutrality and private choice inquiries); see also
supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision). But see supra
notes 419-27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's contention that, through the
Zelman decision, the majority effectively overruled Everson).
491. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2476 (rejecting the dissent's contention that the neutrality and
private choice inquiries betray Everson); see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the Everson decision). But see supra notes 419-27 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Souter's argument that the majority effectively overruled Everson through its
decision in Zelman).
492. See supra notes 228-57 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Court first
required aid to reach religious institutions solely through private choice in Mueller v. Allen and
that the Court has continued this inquiry in all subsequent cases).
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aid to the religious institutions. 493 However, Justice Souter refuted his
own argument by noting that the Court had upheld substantial aid 49to4
religious institutions in Agostini v. Felton and in Mitchell v. Helms.
Also, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
five members of the Court, in separate opinions, found the substantiality
of the aid irrelevant to the Court's constitutional inquiry. 4 95 Therefore,
Justice Souter incorrectly reasoned that the majority's Establishment
private choice betrayed the ruling of
Clause test of neutrality and 496
Everson v. Board of Education.
3.

The Constitutional Significance of Cleveland's Educational Crisis

Finally, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, incorrectly criticized the
majority for placing constitutional significance on the educational crisis
in Cleveland because the majority did not consider the failing school
district as a factor in its constitutional inquiry. 49 7 The majority did not
mention Cleveland's educational emergency at all when examining the
neutrality of the voucher program and the effect of private choice on the
program. 98 The majority noted the severity of Cleveland's educational
problem only while commenting on the facts of the case. 499 Thus, the
majority did not appear to place any constitutional significance on the

493. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[I]t was not until today that
substantiality of aid has clearly been rejected as irrelevant by the majority of this Court ...
see also supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
494. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]o be sure, the aid
in Agostini was systematic and arguably substantial" and noting that the aid in Mitchell was
substantial); see also supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Agostini
decision); supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell decision).
495. See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490-92 (1986); id. at
493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 490 (White, J.,
concurring); Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466-67 (noting that the Court already rejected considering
the substantiality of aid in Witters); see also supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text
(discussing the Witters decision).
496. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2486-90 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2476 (rejecting the
dissent's contention that the neutrality and private choice inquiry betrays Everson); see also supra
notes 419-27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's argument that the majority
effectively overruled Everson through its decision in Zelman); supra notes 183-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
497. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2483-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 410-18
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion).
498. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465-73 (examining whether the voucher program was
religiously neutral and whether the program directed aid to religious schools solely as a result of
true private choice); see also supra notes 353-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's reasoning in Zelman).
499. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463-65 (describing the facts of the case); see also supra notes
272-88 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Zelnan).
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educational crisis in 0Cleveland, and Justice Stevens's contention was
50
otherwise incorrect.
E. Justice Thomas's Invitation to Revitalize Federalism
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas interestingly invited the
Court to reconsider whether the Establishment Clause should apply to
the states. 50 1 He sent this invitation to the Court because he questioned
the propriety of using the Fourteenth Amendment to constrain
individual liberty, given that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to "ensure[] that states would not deprive citizens of liberty without
due process of the law." 50 2 Justice Thomas correctly noted the "tragic
irony" of using the Fourteenth Amendment to constrain, rather than
advance, individual liberty. 50 3
The purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, is not the only support for Thomas's contention;
additional support exists in the purpose of the Bill of Rights as a
whole, 50 4 the original draft of the Establishment Clause, 50 5 and the
reasoning, or6 rather the lack of reasoning, in Everson v. Board of
50
Education.

As scholar James McClellan noted, the Framers designed the Bill of
Rights not only to restrict the federal government from depriving
citizens of certain liberties, but also to restrict the federal government
from intruding upon the states' jurisdiction over such liberties. 50 7 In
500. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463-73; id. at 2484 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 272-88 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Zelman); supra notes 353-88 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority's reasoning in Zelman); supra Part Il.C.4 (discussing
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion).
501. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2480-84 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Meese & Eastman,
supra note 71 (noting that Justice Thomas invited the Court to reconsider its "wholesale
incorporation of the Establishment Clause"); supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause).
502. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2481 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra Part II.B (discussing
the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
503. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2482 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra Part II.B
(discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
504. See McClellan, supra note 69, at 45-46 (noting that the Bill of Rights was designed, in
part, to assure the states that the federal government would not infringe their jurisdictions); see
also supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause); supra Part II.A
(discussing the origin of the Bill of Rights and the Establishment Clause specifically).
505. McClellan, supra note 69, at 47; Meese & Eastman, supra note 71; see also supra Part
II.B (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
506. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 294-96; McClellan, supra note 69, at 44-45; see also
supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision); supra Part Il.B
(discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
507. McClellan, supra note 69, at 45; see also BARRON, supra note 48, at 379; see also supra
Part II.A (discussing the origin of the Bill of Rights and the Establishment Clause specifically).
Scholar Jerome Barron notes that the Supreme Court reasoned, in Barron v. Mayor & City
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fact, the dominant theme of the Bill of Rights for many was federalism
and states' rights. 508 Therefore, given the federalist purpose of the Bill
of Rights, Justice Thomas was correct to question the Establishment
Clause's application against the states in Zelman, especially because
traditionally have power and jurisdiction over matters
state governments
5 9
of education. 0
The original draft of the Establishment Clause provides additional
support for Justice Thomas's contention. 5 10 The first draft stated that
"'the Civil Rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established.' 5 11
This language indicates that the prohibition against the establishment of
religion applied only to the federal government, leaving the states free
5 12
to choose their relationship with and extent of support for religion.
Thus, Justice Thomas's invitation to the Court to reconsider whether the
Establishment
Clause should apply against the states is not without
5 13
merit.
Council, that "'[t]he constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States
for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual
states ....[T]he limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think,
necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument."' BARRON, supra note 48, at
379 (quoting Barron v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)). But see Eugene Gressman,
The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1336 (1952) (stating
that the Civil Rights Amendments "were of a most significant nature, altering substantially the
balance between state and federal power").
508. McClellan, supra note 69, at 46; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the origin of the Bill
of Rights and the Establishment Clause specifically). But see Gressman, supra note 507, at 1336
(contending that the Civil Rights Amendments inherently changed the relationship between the
United States Government and state governments).
509. See McClellan, supra note 69, at 45; see also supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause); supra Part II.A (discussing the origin
of the Bill of Rights and the Establishment Clause specifically). But see LEVY, supra note 34, at
226 (stating that it is completely "unrealistic" to expect the Supreme Court to reverse years of
precedent to reconsider the incorporation doctrine); Gressman, supra note 507, at 1336
(contending that the Civil Rights Amendments inherently changed the relationship between the
United States Government and state governments).
510. See McClellan, supra note 69, at 47; see also Meese & Eastman, supra note 71 (pointing
to the original wording of the Establishment Clause to prove the worthiness of Justice Thomas's
invitation to the Court to reconsider its incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the
states); supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
511. McClellan, supra note 69, at 47 (emphasis added) (quoting the draft language of the
Establishment Clause); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause).
512. McClellan, supra note 69, at 47; see also supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of
the Establishment Clause). But see Gressman, supra note 507, at 1336 (contending that the Civil
Rights Amendments inherently changed the relationship between the United States Government
and state governments).
513. See McClellan, supra note 69, at 47; see also Meese & Eastman, supra note 71 (noting
that Justice Thomas's invitation to the Court "is an invitation worthy of the Court's reply"). But
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Finally, Justice Thomas was correct to question the Establishment
Clause's application against the states because the Court first
incorporated the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board of
Education without any constitutional analysis or reasoning
whatsoever. 5 14 Instead, the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment 5to
15
simply incorporate the Establishment Clause against the states.
Unsupported propositions are far less persuasive than propositions
sustained after extensive analysis. 5 16
Therefore, Justice Thomas
properly questioned the wholesale incorporation of the Establishment
5 17
Clause against the states, which first occurred in Everson.
Accordingly, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose
of the Bill of Rights as a whole, the original draft of the Establishment
Clause, and the lack of reasoning in Everson all suggest that Justice
Thomas was correct to question the Establishment Clause's application

see LEVY, supra note 34, at 226 (stating that it is completely "unrealistic" to expect the Supreme
Court to reverse years of precedent to reconsider the incorporation doctrine); Gressman, supra
note 507, at 1336 (contending that the Civil Rights Amendments inherently changed the
relationship between the United States Government and state governments).
514. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 121 S. Ct. 2460, 2480-84 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (questioning the Court's conclusion in Everson); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
8 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states without thorough
constitutional analysis); see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 294-99 (noting that the
Everson opinion "displays little research and zero interest in conflicting evidence, competing
inferences, or alternative interpretations"); McClellan, supra note 69, at 44 (noting that the Court,
in Everson, applied the Establishment Clause against the states without a supporting argument);
Meese & Eastman, supra note 71 (pointing out that the Court incorporated the Establishment
Clause against the states without any constitutional analysis in Everson); supra notes 183-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision); supra Part H.B (discussing the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
515. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15; see also McClellan, supra note 69, at 44 (stating that
through a "radical innovation the Court overturned more than one hundred and fifty years of
constitutional law" without any support); Meese & Eastman, supra note 71 (noting that the
Supreme Court in Everson applied the Establishment Clause against the states without any
constitutional analysis); supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson
decision); supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
516. See LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS AND
ORGANIZATION 62 (2d ed. 1999).
517. See McClellan, supra note 69, at 44; see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 294-99
(noting that the Court first incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states in Everson,
with "little research and zero interest in conflicting evidence"); Meese & Eastman, supra note 71
(stating that the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause without any constitutional
analysis in Everson); supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson
decision); supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause). But see
LEVY, supra note 34, at 226 (stating that it is completely "unrealistic" to expect the Supreme
Court to reverse years of precedent to reconsider the incorporation doctrine).
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against the states. 5 18 The question remains, however, whether the
5 19
Court will accept Justice Thomas's invitation to revitalize federalism.

518. See McClellan, supra note 69, at 44-45; see also Meese & Eastman, supra note 71
(stating that Justice Thomas correctly questioned the Court's wholesale incorporation of the
Establishment Clause against the states due to the original wording and purpose of the Clause and
the Court's lack of constitutional analysis in Everson): supra notes 183-91 and accompanying
text (discussing the Everson decision); supra Part II.B (discussing the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause); cf Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 294-99 (noting that the purpose of
the Establishment Clause and the Court's lack of constitutional analysis in Everson all suggest
that the Supreme Court did not incorporate the Establishment Clause against the states based on
the Framer's intent, but incorporated the Clause due to the prevalent political views at the time of
Everson). But see LEVY, supra note 34, at 226 (stating that it is completely "unrealistic" to
expect the Supreme Court to reverse years of precedent to reconsider the incorporation doctrine);
Gressman, supra note 507, at 1336 (contending that the Civil Rights Amendments inherently
changed the relationship between the United States Government and state governments).
Scholars Edward S. Corwin and Robert G. McClosky also provide support for Justice Thomas's
contention that the Fourteenth Amendment should not incorporate the Establishment Clause
against the states. LEVY, supra note 34, at 228 (discussing Corwin and McClosky's views).
These scholars argue that the Establishment Clause is fundamentally different from the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights and should not apply against the states because the Establishment
Clause does not protect any individual freedom or provide individuals with the right to take some
action. Id. Indeed, the Establishment Clause restricts the government's actions. See U.S.
CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."). Corwin and McClosky, hence, contend that because the Establishment Clause does
not act as a special guarantor of a particular personal liberty, there is no true need to incorporate
the clause against the states. LEVY, supra note 34, at 228 (discussing Corwin and McClosky's
views).
519. See Meese & Eastman, supra note 71. Many scholars, including Edwin Meese, James
McClennan, Robert Cord, Charles Rice, and Daniel Dreisbach, contend that the incorporation of
the Establishment Clause rests on precarious grounds. LEVY, supra note 34, at 226 (discussing
those who question the propriety of incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states).
Yet, others, such as Leonard Levy, exclaim that "[tlo expect the Supreme Court to turn back the
clock by scrapping the entire incorporation doctrine is so unrealistic as not to warrant
consideration." Id. at 226. Levy explains that the First Amendment is, in fact, the least likely
amendment constituting the Bill of Rights for the Court to remove from the liberty box of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Court has stated that "no freedoms are more precious or
more basic than those protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 228 (quoting Palko v. Conn.,
302 U.S. 319 (1937)). Also, Levy argues that the Court will not reconsider the incorporation of
the Establishment Clause because both the liberal and conservative Justices of the Court are
respectful of the doctrine of stare decisis. Id. at 232. Levy notes that the Court avoids "dramatic
overruling of precedents" whenever possible and points to the Court's refusal to overturn Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, as an example of the Court's respect
for precedent. LEVY, supra note 34, at 232 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)). Therefore, Levy contends that the Court will not remove the Establishment Clause from
the liberty box of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Court can promote the interests of
religious institutions without overturning incorporation. Id. at 233.
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IMPACT

The Supreme Court's ruling in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris is a
5 20
victory for both religious groups and underprivileged urban children. 52 1
In fact, the ultimate impact of this case will likely be immeasurable.
With the fear of litigation gone, voucher programs are likely to grow
and emerge elsewhere. 5 22 Only the anti-religion clauses found within
many state constitutions still present legal hurdles. 523
Voucher
programs now have the constitutional authority to do the previously
unimaginable: to improve the educational setting for urban children in
the short run and to improve the entire education system in the long
run.5 24 Yet, the Court left one important question unanswered: What
regulatory strings may states attach to religious schools
participating in
voucher programs without violating the Constitution? 525
A. The Likely Expansion of Voucher Programs
With the threat of litigation reduced, voucher programs like
Cleveland's will emerge across the United States. 526 As of November
2002, voucher systems were in place in only Wisconsin, Ohio, and
Florida. 5 27 However, after Zelman, voucher programs no longer have
an uncertain constitutional status. 528 Thus, with the legal impediment
of the Establishment Clause eliminated, other states are sure to follow
Ohio's example. 529 Moreover, because the administration of President
520. A Chance for Choice, 14 NAT'L REV., July 29, 2002 (stating that Zelman was a victory
for urban children and for the proponents of publicly funded religious organizations within the
administration of President George W. Bush, which argued for the constitutionality of voucher
programs), available at 2002 WL 11777512 [hereinafter Chance]; see also Meese & Eastman,
supra note 71 (arguing that the Zelman decision will affect thousands of students).
521. See Meese & Eastman, supra note 71 (arguing that the Zelman decision will affect
thousands of students).
522. See infra Part V.A (discussing the likely expansion of voucher programs).
523. See infra Part V.B (discussing the limitation that Blaine Amendments place on the
impact of Zelman).
524, See infra Part V.C (discussing the impact of voucher programs on the education of
American children).
525. See infra Part V.D (discussing the uncertainties and fear that result from voucher
regulatory strings).
526. Greg Stohr, Tax-Funded School Vouchers Upheld: U.S. Supreme Court Overview,
BLOOMBERG L.P., June 27, 2002, available at http://www.nexis.com/research/search.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2003).
527. Id.; cf. Heytens, supra note 110, at 119 (noting that Florida enacted the first statewide
voucher program in June of 1999).
528. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002).
529. See Stohr, supra note 526. But cf. Peyser, supra note 99, at 631 (noting that California's
voucher referendum, Proposition 174, lost by a margin of more than two-to-one and that not one
significant constituency embraced the voucher system); Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court:
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George W. Bush argued for the constitutionality of Cleveland's voucher
program and President Bush publicly supported the Court's decision in
Zelman, there
is a possibility that a federal voucher program could
530
emerge.
B. The Limitation that the Blaine Amendments
Place on Voucher Expansion
Although the Zelman Court gave its stamp of approval to voucher
programs, Zelman's stamp covered only one legal challenge: the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. 53 1 For voucher
programs to thrive across the nation, they must also withstand state
constitutional challenges. 532 As noted previously, more than half of the
School Tuition; Supreme Court, 5-4, Upholds Voucher System that Pays Religious Schools'
Tuition, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at A] (noting that the National School Board Association
calculates that twenty-six state legislatures have already rejected voucher proposals), available at
LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File; Editorial, Vouchers One Way to Abandon
Public Schools, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 7, 2002, at E2 (noting that in 1996 "[tlhe
[voucher] proposal [in the State of Washington] was trounced at the polls, and for good reason"),
availableat 2002 WL 5937163.
530. See Chance, supra note 520 (noting that the Bush administration had argued for the
constitutionality of voucher programs); John J. Miller, School Choice, Not An Echo, 14 NAT'L
REV., July 29, 2002 (noting President Bush's support of the Court's decision in Zelman),
available at 2002 WL 11777515; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court is
Wrong About the Establishment Clause, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 221 (2001) (noting that soon
after taking office, President George W. Bush created the office of faith-based programs to direct
public funds to religious institutions). Legislation creating a voucher program for the District of
Columbia reached President William J. Clinton's desk in 1998, but Clinton vetoed the bill
"quietly and out of sight because he didn't want to broadcast his opposition." Miller, supra. In
2001, President George W. Bush proposed a federal voucher program; this proposal received
criticism from both Republicans and Democrats and did not receive the necessary votes. Neal,
supra note 5, at 357. In fact, President Bush conceded defeat on his voucher proposal before
Congress voted on it. Id. at 357 n. 100. He explained: "There are people that are afraid of choice.
They really are. And, I'm a realist. I understand that. It doesn't change my opinion [regarding
vouchers], but it's not going to change the votes, either." Id. The Senate also rejected President
Bush's voucher proposal. Garnett, supra note 252, at 1284 n. 15. Senator Hillary Clinton of New
York explained that although choice "sounds so good ... we know that vouchers do not help the
students who need the help most. They do nothing to help improve public schools. Vouchers
only further segregate and stratify our public schools." Id. Nevertheless, Bush's 2003 budget
proposed money for school choice. Miller, supra.
531. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465. The Ohio Supreme Court, in 1999, found that the
voucher program did not violate its state constitution in any respect, except for the procedural
one-subject rule. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211-16 (Ohio 1999), rev'g 1997 WL
217583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The legislature then cleared the procedural defect. Zelman, 122 S.
Ct. at 2465. Thus, when the taxpayers brought suit in federal court, they contended that the
voucher program violated the Establishment Clause only. Id.
532. See Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutionsand School Vouchers, 120 EDIJC. L. REP. 1, 2
(1997) [hereinafter Kemerer, State Constitutions];Heytens, supra note 110, at 123; Treene, supra
note 118, at 2; see also infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Blaine
Amendments).
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states enacted Blaine Amendments in an attempt to curtail Catholic
political gains. 533 If state courts interpret these Blaine Amendments
more strictly than the Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment
Clause, then the possibility of expanding voucher programs across the
5 34
nation is greatly reduced.
Therefore, the essential question is whether state courts are likely to
interpret their Blaine Amendments more strictly than the Supreme
Court interpreted the Establishment Clause. 5 35 Unfortunately, research
indicates that many of the Blaine Amendments will be interpreted more
strictly, thus precluding the expansion of voucher programs. 53 6 For
instance, the State of Washington has already interpreted its antireligion clause more strictly than the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind.5 3 7 In Witters, the United States Supreme Court
held that, without violating the Establishment Clause, a state vocational
rehabilitation services program could financially assist a blind student
as he studied to become a minister. 538 The Washington State Supreme
Court, however, invalidated the tuition grant based on its Blaine
Amendment. 539 Moreover, almost twenty state courts have expressly
stated that they will not be bound by the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause when examining their state
533. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 106, at 305 (stating that twenty-nine states adopted
establishment clauses); Margaret Graham Tebo, Seeking the Right Equation: Educators and
Parents Seek Legal Answers on How to Balance Students' Special Needs with Broader School
Goals, 2002 A.B.A. J. 48, 54 (stating that thirty-eight state constitutions have establishment
clauses); Heytens, supra note 110, at 123 (stating that thirty state constitutions have Blaine-like
amendments); Treene, supra note 118, at 3 (stating that thirty-seven state constitutions have
establishment clauses); see also supra Part II.C (discussing the origin of the Blaine
Amendments).
534. Kemerer, State Constitutions, supra note 532, at 2; Treene, supra note 118, at 4; see also
supra Part II.D (discussing the origin of the Blaine Amendments).
535. See Kemerer, State Constitutions, supra note 532, at 2; Heytens, supra note 110, at 123;
Treene, supra note 118, at 2; see also supra Part II.D (discussing the origin of the Blaine
Amendments).
536. Kemerer, State Constitutions, supra note 532, at 20 (concluding, after examining the
language of each state's clause, case law, and attorney general's opinion, that seventeen states
will interpret their establishment clauses more strictly than the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause); Tony Mauro, Next School Voucher Case to Contest Ancient Ban Born
of Anti-Catholic Bias, 169 N.J. L.J. 486 (Aug. 5, 2002) (stating that seventeen states will interpret
their Blaine Amendments more strictly); Heytens, supra note 110, at 126-31 (discussing the
results of Kemerer's extensive study); see also supra Part II.D (discussing the origin of the Blaine
Amendments).
537. See Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
538. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986).
539. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. 1989) (en banc);
Heytens, supra note 110, at 128-29 (discussing the Washington State Supreme Court's decision).
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establishment clauses. 54

557

Consequently, the Blaine Amendments are a

54 1
formidable obstacle for voucher programs.

Yet, the Blaine Amendments may be susceptible to challenge under
542 or the Free Exercise Clause 54 3
either the Equal Protection Clause
because of their historical context and blatant discrimination against
religious institutions. 54 4 Accordingly, if the Supreme Court were to
hold the Blaine Amendments to be unconstitutional, voucher programs
5 45
could still prevail in states with restrictive Blaine Amendments.

540. Heytens, supra note 110, at 127. Heytens observed that scholars Frank Kemerer and
Joseph Viteritti both conclude that almost twenty state courts will interpret their establishment
clauses more strictly than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Id. In
an extensive study, Frank Kemerer states that Michigan's state constitution actually prohibits the
use of vouchers and tax benefits by those attending religious private schools and notes
Michigan's restrictive interpretation of its establishment clause. Kemerer, State Constitutions,
supra note 532, at 4-5. Kemerer also notes that the state constitutions of Florida, Georgia,
Montana, New York, and Oklahoma specifically prohibit direct and indirect aid to religious
schools. Id. at 5. Moreover, Kemerer states that twelve state constitutions impose more general
restrictions on aid to religious schools: California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. at 7. Finally,
Kemerer observes that some state supreme courts, such as those in Idaho, South Dakota, and
California, have already indicated that federal Establishment Clause case law is not applicable
when examining their state establishment clauses. Id. at 7-8.
541. See Kemerer, State Constitutions, supra note 532, at 2; Heytens, supra note 110, at 123;
Treene, supra note 118, at 2; see also supra Part II.D (discussing the origin of the Blaine
Amendments).
542. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
543. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibitingthe free exercise thereof .. " (emphasis added)).
544. Treene, supra note 118, at 12-13; see Heytens, supra note 110, at 118 (arguing that the
Blaine Amendments violate the Equal Protection Clause); see also supra Part II.D (discussing the
origin of the Blaine Amendments). Treene suggests that because the Supreme Court often looks
at the motivation for legislation when determining its constitutionality, the Court is likely to find
the Blaine Amendments in violation of the Equal Protection Clause due to their nefarious origin.
Treene, supra note 118, at 12-13. Also, the Supreme Court has noted in dicta that religion is a
suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny. Id. In fact, several Supreme Court opinions have
already disapproved of government actions that single out and hinder religious institutions. See
Heytens, supra note 110, at 118 (arguing that the Blaine Amendments violate the Equal
Protection Clause); Treene, supra note 118, at 12-13 (suggesting that the Blaine Amendments
may violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Free Exercise Clause). Moreover, in Mitchell v.
Helms, the Court mentioned its disgust of the "shameful" historical context of the Blaine
Amendments. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) ("[H]ostility to aid to pervasively
sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow."). However, unless
the Supreme Court holds the Blaine Amendments to be unconstitutional, they could significantly
limit the impact of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. See Heytens, supra note 110, at 123; Treene,
supra note 118, at 2. A thorough discussion of the constitutionality of the Blaine Amendments is
beyond the scope of this Note.
545. See Heytens, supra note 110, at 118 (arguing that the Blaine Amendments violate the
Equal Protection Clause); Treene, supra note 118, at 12-13 (suggesting that the Blaine
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C. Improved Education System
With the Establishment Clause no longer an impediment, voucher
programs now have the full opportunity to impact the education of
children across the nation. 546 In the short run, children in failing school

districts in jurisdictions that adopt voucher programs will have the
option of attending better performing schools. 547 Research indicates
that children who have already exercised the option of attending a
private school have improved their test scores immensely. 54 8 Moreover,

in the long run children will perform better in school because voucher
programs require parents to take an active role in their children's

Amendments may violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Free Exercise Clause); supra Part
II.D (discussing the origin of the Blaine Amendments).
546. See infra Part V.C.1 (discussing the effect of parental empowerment); infra Part V.C.2
(discussing how voucher programs decrease segregation); infra Part V.C.3 (discussing the effect
of market competition on the public school system). The impact of Zelman is not limited to
education, for the Court gave its constitutional blessing to all neutral government programs that
direct funds to religious institutions through private, independent choice. Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2472-73 (2002). With this blessing, religious special interest groups are
sure to increase in number. Frank, supra note 138, at 1059. In fact, the Court has repeatedly
noted that government programs tend to increase in cost and produce aggressive constituencies.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797 (1973) ("[A]id
programs of any kind tend to become entrenched, to escalate in cost, and to generate their own
aggressive constituencies."). Thus, religious groups might become some of the most proactive
and powerful special interest groups on Capitol Hill. Frank, supra note 138, at 1059. Moreover,
religious institutions are likely to become more dependent on the government as the amount of
money directed toward them increases. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2501 (Souter, J., dissenting); Frank,
supra note 138, at 1059; The Voucher Ruling; The Supreme Court Approves The Cleveland
Program. That Doesn't Mean That Public Dollars Are Well-Spent, AKRON BEACON J., June 28,
2002, at AI0. Therefore, Zelman is likely to increase both the number of religious special
interests groups and their dependence on the government. See Frank, supra note 138, at 1059
(noting, prior to the Zelman decision, that if the Supreme Court upholds Cleveland's voucher
program, then religious special interest groups will increase along with their dependence on the
government). The effect of this proliferation of religious special interest groups is beyond the
scope of this Note.
547. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463 (stating that the voucher program enabled Cleveland
students to attend any participating public or private school).
548. Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 373-95; see also Ted Cruz, A Critical Day,
NAT'L REV., Feb. 20, 2002 (discussing Ellig and Kelly's study), available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-cruzprint022002.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2003). Ellig and Kelly's study examined all of the research compiled on the school choice
programs in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida. Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 376-85. Most
of the research demonstrated that students who received vouchers subsequently improved their
academic performance. Id. For instance, research indicated that the Milwaukee students with
vouchers improved their language and math skills. Id. at 379-80. Also, research regarding the
Cleveland program showed an increase of seven percentile points in reading and an increase of
fifteen percentile points in math. Id. at 383. Furthermore, not one study demonstrated that
children left in the public schools performed worse due to the voucher program. Id. at 376-85.
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education. 5 49 Also, voucher programs enable children to learn in more
racially integrated school settings. 5 50
Finally, because voucher
programs force public schools to compete with private schools,
the
551
condition of the public school system will improve in the long run.
1. Parental Empowerment
Voucher programs empower parents, which in turn improves their
children's scholastic achievement. 552
Parents want to take
responsibility for the education of their children. 5 53 Voucher programs
provide parents with this much-desired responsibility by enabling them
to choose where their children will attend school.5 54 This parental
empowerment encourages parents to take a more active role in other
aspects of their children's education. 55 5 For example, vouchers
motivate parents to improve their family practices regarding homework
and studying. 556 Such parental involvement is sure to improve
children's success in school.55 7
549. HARRY BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 29 (2000); see Garnett &
Garnett, supra note 4, at 355-56 (stating that parental empowerment will equalize educational
opportunities)'; infra Part V.C. I (discussing the effect of parental empowerment); cf Gilles, supra
note 133, at 953 (arguing that students will perform better in school if parents are empowered
because parents have the inherent incentive to act in their children's best interests).
550. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 353; see infra Part V.C.2 (discussing how
voucher programs decrease segregation).
551. See Jonathon Rauch, Reversing White Flight: Even if Vouchers Don't Improve Schools,
They Will Almost Certainly Improve Neighborhoods, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2002, at 32
(noting that the strongest argument for vouchers is that they will improve public schools through
competition); Bodemner, supra note 2, at 303; see infra Part V.C.3 (discussing the effect of
market competition on the public school system).
552. BRIGHOUSE, supra note 549, at 29; see also Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 355-56
(stating that parental empowerment will equalize educational opportunities); cf Gilles, supra note
133, at 953 (arguing that students will perform better in school if parents are empowered because
parents have the inherent incentive to act in their children's best interests).
553. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 358 ("Parents welcome responsibility; they are
tired of being subjects.").
554. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 359 (explaining that school choice provides
parents with "the ability to control their children's destiny [sic]"); Bodemner, supra note 2, at
280.
555. See H.M. Levin & C.R. Belfield, Families as Contractual Partners in Education, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1799, 1804-05 (2002) (suggesting that school choice will invigorate parents not
only to choose their children's schools, but also to improve other aspects of their children's
educations); see also Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 358-59 (noting that school choice
created "enormous enthusiasm" among parents participating in Milwaukee's voucher program).
Research from Cleveland does indicate that families that participated in Cleveland's voucher
program took a more active role in their children's educations thereafter. BRIGHOUSE, supra note
549, at 29.
556. Levin & Belfield, supra note 555, at 1804.
557. BRIGHOUSE, supra note 549, at 29; see Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 355-56
(stating that parental empowerment will equalize educational opportunities); cf. Gilles, supra note
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2. Integration
Voucher programs also decrease segregation. 5 58 Currently, the
majority of public schools are segregated. 559 In areas with low minority
populations, white children attend public schools; however, in areas
with high minority populations, white children often abandon the public
schools and attend private schools. 5 6 In fact, white families often do
not live in areas with large minority populations, obstructing
white
56 1
children.
minority
as
schools
same
the
attending
from
children
Private schools, on the other hand, are consistently more racially and
socio-economically integrated. 562
Although the total number of
minorities admitted to private schools is less than the total number of
minorities attending public schools, integration is much more prevalent
within each private school.5 6 3 Moreover, research indicates that
students of different racial groups socially interact more often in private
schools than in public schools. 5 64 Therefore, with vouchers, children
133, at 953 (arguing that students will perform better in school if parents are empowered because
parents have the inherent incentive to act in their children's best interests).
558. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 353; cf. Rauch, supra note 551, at 32. A study by
Thomas Nechyba suggests that vouchers will decrease the segregation within communities by
permitting families to move to areas with undesirable public school districts and yet still provide
their children with good educations. Id. Nechyba explains that many white families stretch their
budgets simply to live in good school districts; thus, through the voucher system, these parents
can live in larger, more affordable homes by moving to undesirable school districts, with larger
minority populations, and by using vouchers to send their children to private schools. Id. But see
Rebecca E. Lawrence, The Future of School Vouchers in Light of the Past Chaos of the
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 419, 423 (2001) (noting that voucher
opponents contend that vouchers will increase social divisions); cf. Gary W. Ritter et al., How
Might School Choice Affect Racial Integration in Schools? New Evidence from the ECLS-K, 7
GEO. PUB. POL'Y. REV. 125, 130 (2002) (arguing that private schools are more segregated than
public schools).
559. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 353.
560. Id. at 352.
561. Rauch, supra note 551, at 32.
562. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 351 (observing that private schools "have
consistently succeeded in breaking down the economic and racial barriers that still divide students
in our public schools"); see also Ryan & Heise, supra note 148, at 2097 (noting that private
schools are more racially and socioeconomically integrated than public schools). But see Ritter,
supra note 558, at 130 (arguing that private schools are more segregated than public schools). In
fact, using data that the Department of Education had collected from 60,000 students, one study
determined that, "even after controlling for students' family background, private schools
produced better cognitive outcomes, [and] provided safer, more disciplined and more racially
integrated learning environments." Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 344-45.
563. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 351; Ryan & Heise, supra note 148, at 2097.
564. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 354; Holland & Soifer, supra note 1, at 364
("Observations of public and private school lunchrooms also revealed that private-school students
mingle interracially more freely than do public-school students. By one measure there was by
almost a 2-to-1 margin more voluntary socializing among the races in private lunchrooms than
public ones.").
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have the opportunity to leave their segregated public schools and attend
the more integrated private schools. 56 5 Furthermore, this integration
can only increase
as more minority children use vouchers to attend
566
schools.
private
3.

Competition

Moreover, voucher programs create competition for the public school
system, which forces the public school system to improve its
performance. 56 7 Competition is "the effort or action of two or more
568
commercial interests to obtain the same business from third parties.
Because of competition, America's economy has flourished.5 6 9
Competition creates better-made products, lower prices, and a wider
range of services and products. 570 Moreover, competition has created
what many regard to be the best public universities in the world.57 ' Yet,
the benefits of competition do not extend to primary school education
because the public school system holds a monopoly on free
565. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 353; see Holland & Soifer, supra note I, at 363-64
(noting that research regarding the voucher programs of Cleveland and Milwaukee already
indicate that the voucher students are learning in more integrated school settings); Ryan & Heise,
supra note 148, at 2097 (noting that research regarding the voucher programs of Cleveland and
Milwaukee already demonstrate that voucher students are learning in schools with increased
racial integration). But see Lawrence, supra note 558, at 423 (noting that voucher opponents
contend that vouchers will increase social divisions); Robert K. Vischer, Racial Segregation in
American Churches and Its Implications for School Vouchers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 193 (2001)
(contending that school voucher programs will increase segregation due to segregation within
churches).
566. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 353.
567. Rauch, supra note 551 (noting that the strongest argument for vouchers is that they will
improve public schools through competition); Bodemner, supra note 2, at 303 (arguing that
competition within a public school system creates more efficient schools that provide a better
product through improve services). But see Eric Bredo, Choice, Constraint, and Community, in
THE POLITICS OF EXCELLENCE AND CHOICE IN EDUCATION 67, 69 (William Lowe Boyd &
Charles Taylor Kerchner eds., 1988) (contending that competition will not improve public
schools because parents will not make logical patterned decisions that schools can learn from and
respond to, given the nature of education's short-run and long-run benefits); Lawrence, supra
note 558, at 423 ("By introducing competition into education, some schools will attract the best
students, parents, and teachers. The resources provided by certain parents and students, which
now are dispersed, will become concentrated into particular schools ...[and s]tudents in poorer
schools will have even fewer resources than before."); cf ROBERT BOSTON, WHY THE RELIGIOUS
RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT SEPARATION OF CHURCH & STATE 132 (1993) (arguing that real
competition will not exist between public and private schools because private schools have the
right to expel students at anytime and have selective admissions policies).
568. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 228.
569. Bodemner, supra note 2, at 288.
570. Id.
571. Rauch, supra note 551, at 32 ("American higher education has long been effectively
voucherized, because students can take their government loans and grants to private colleges.
Not coincidentally, America's public universities are the best in the world.").
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education. 572 Vouchers, however, bring competition and its benefits
into the grade schools and high schools of America. 5 73 With a voucher
system in place, the public schools must fight to maintain and attract
clientele. 57
Therefore, just as competition has improved the
performance of America's businesses and public universities, it will
also improve the performance of America's public schools. 575 In fact,
research already indicates that the quality of public576schools has
improved in areas where voucher programs were enacted.
Accordingly, voucher programs are likely to improve the educational
setting for urban children in the short run and improve the education
system as a whole in the long run because Zelman has removed the
Establishment
Clause as a legal impediment to enacting voucher
57 7
programs.
D. The Unanswered Question: Regulatory Strings
The Court in Zelman clearly held that religiously neutral voucher
programs of true private choice are constitutional. 578 The Court,
however, left one important question unanswered: What regulatory
strings may the government attach to religious schools
participating in
579
Constitution?
the
violating
without
programs
voucher
572. See Bodemner, supra note 2, at 302.
573. Id. at 287; Rauch, supra note 55 1, at 32 (noting that the strongest argument for vouchers
is that vouchers will improve public schools through competition).
574. See Levin & Belfield, supra note 555, at 1804; Bodemner, supra note 2, at 304.
575. See Rauch, supra note 551, at 32 (noting that the strongest argument for vouchers is that
vouchers will improve public schools through competition); Bodemner, supra note 2, at 304
(arguing that competition within a public school system creates more efficient schools that
provide a better product through improve services). But see Bredo, supra note 567, at 69
(contending that competition will not improve public schools because parents will not make
logical patterned decisions that schools can learn from and respond to, given the nature of
education's short-run and long-run benefits); cf BOSTON, supra note 567, at 132 (arguing that
real competition will not exist between public and private schools because private schools have
the right to expel students at anytime and have selective admissions policies).
576. See Ellig & Kelly, supra note 145, at 373-95; see also Cruz, supra note 548.
577. See supra Part V.C (discussing the impact of voucher programs on the education of
American children).
578. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002).
579. Johnson, supra note 179, at 41-43; Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case
Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 375, 395-96 (1999);
Greenhouse, supra note 529. The only other legal question that the Court left unanswered is
whether it is constitutional to exclude religious schools from voucher programs. Thomas C.
Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private and Public Education, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
531, 570-71 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Educations: Is There a Constitutional
Difference?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 51 (1991). Scholar Thomas Berg contends that the
exclusion of religious schools from school choice programs would constitute a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause. Berg, supra, at 570-71 (noting several cases in which the courts forbid
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Regulatory strings are requirements that the government places on
institutions that receive public funding; often these strings are quite
Thus, many advocates of religious freedom oppose
restrictive. 58
vouchers because they fear that the government will require religious
schools to "water down" their religious character in order to receive
public funding. 58 1 To demonstrate the effect of regulatory strings, these
religious-freedom advocates point to religious universities and colleges,
which abandoned much of their religious character in order to retain

discriminatory denial of aid to individuals or entities with religious affiliations, specifically
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia and Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also
Treene, supra note 118, at 12-13 (citing Peter v. Wedl as an example in which the Free Exercise
Clause barred state action, but noting that the Ninth Circuit found that the Free Exercise Clause
was irrelevant in a case with similar facts to those of Peter v. Wedl). On the other hand, Toby
Heytens argues that excluding religious schools from voucher programs would violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Heytens, supra note 110, at 153-55. Nevertheless, because the emphasis of
this Note is on the Establishment Clause's effect on voucher programs, the question of whether it
would be unconstitutional to exclude religious schools from voucher programs will remain
unanswered. See supra Part II.A (discussing the origin of the Establishment Clause); Part II.G
(discussing modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
580. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 339 (discussing regulatory strings generally);
Johnson, supra note 179, at 41-43 (same). For instance, to receive federal education grants, state
universities must agree to enroll students based on affirmative action. See Lynn A. Baker, The
Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 214-15 (2001) (noting that
when a state chooses to prohibit affirmative action, the choice "can be understood as a state's
determination that, for it, the benefits of a particular provision of state statutory or constitutional
law exceeds the costs" of foregoing federal funding). Similarly, to receive federal money to
repair interstate highways, states have to agree to prohibit persons under twenty-one years of age
from purchasing or possessing in public any alcoholic beverage. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional
Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1978 (1995). Thus, Susan RoseAckerman notes that the "federal programs that have caused the most controversy and opposition
at the state level are those with small appropriations tied to large regulatory strings," pointing to
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the 1978 amendments to the
Developmental Disabilities Act, as examples. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism
and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346 (1983). For more information on Congress's spending
power and its threat to federalism, see generally Baker, supra, at 195. State legislatures have
already attached some regulatory strings to voucher programs; for instance, schools participating
in Cleveland's voucher program could not discriminate on the basis of religion. Zelman, 122 S.
Ct. at 2463. In Milwaukee, schools participating in the voucher program could not discriminate
on the basis of religion and had to permit students to "opt out" of religious activities. Garnett &
Garnett, supra note 4, at 339 n.200. On the other hand, some "schools are freed from complying
with various regulations-relating to such issues as teacher hiring, curriculum, calendar, and
length of school day-in exchange for accountability for performance." Ryan & Heise, supra
note 148, at 2074.
581. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 339; Chemerinsky, supra note 530, at 228 ("[W]hen
the government gives money, it must make sure that the funds are used for their intended purpose.
This necessarily involves the government placing conditions on the funds and monitoring how it
is [sic] spent. Such government entanglement is a threat to religion."); see Paul J. Weber,
Neutrality and FirstAmendment Interpretation,in EQUAL SEPARATION 1, 11 (Paul J. Weber ed.,
1990) (noting that if the Court uses neutrality as a factor in its constitutional analysis, many fear
that religious institutions will be secularized).
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federal funding. 582 Similarly, religious-freedom advocates point to the
government program upheld in Board of Education v. Allen. 58 3 In
Allen, the Supreme Court permitted the state to provide textbooks to
religious schools; however, to receive the textbooks, parochial schools
were forced to use the same secular textbooks that the public schools
used.
Scholar Michael McConnell remarks that this decision
effectively forced religious schools to secularize their lesson plans in
order to receive public aid.5 85 Moreover, advocates of religious
freedom realize that voucher opponents will subject religious
586
institutions that receive public funds to increased oversight.
If regulatory strings truly require religious institutions to compromise
their religious character and mission, however, such secularizing
regulation would likely violate the Free Exercise Clause. 587 The
government's authority to regulate private religious schools does not
increase simply because the religious school accepted public aid

582. BOSTON, supra note 567, at 136-37; Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 339.
583. See McConnell, Defense of Educational Choice, supra note 58, at 133 (noting that the
government program in Allen involved regulatory strings); see also supra note 191 (briefly
discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Allen).
584. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968); see also supra note 191 (discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in Allen).
585. McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 58, at !33; cf Johnson, supra note 179, at 41 (noting
that regulatory strings also required religious schools to water down their religious character in
Lemon v. Kurtzman).
586. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 339.
587. McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 58, at 185-86. McConnell first notes that the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits the government from discriminating against an institution solely
because the institution is religious. Id. at 185. He explains that it "follows that if religious
organizations have a constitutional right to equal access to public programs, the government may
not condition their access on rules which burden their practice of religion, unless the rules are
closely related to the purposes of the program." Id. at 186. Therefore, he concludes that the
government could not require Catholic schools participating in a voucher program to distribute
birth control devices because such devices compromise the religious principles of Catholics,
unless birth control distribution was necessary for education. Id. Similarly, he states that the
government could not provide funds to all entities that wish to create vocational training
programs but require all recipients of the funds to remain open on Saturday, because the condition
would effectively exclude Jewish organizations from participating in the program. Id.; cf Garnett
& Garnett, supra note 4, at 340 ("Perhaps the better argument is that any secularizing strings
would themselves be unconstitutional if they required religious schools to compromise their
religious mission as a condition of participating in an otherwise neutral school-choice programthat is, as a condition of anti-religious discrimination."); Gilles, supra note 133, at 1008. Gilles
explains that "government may not do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly." Gilles,
supra note 133, at 1008. He cites commentator Cass Sunstein and states that "when the
government... attach[es] 'strings' to the exercise of constitutional rights, and although this may
sometimes be permissible, 'the pressure imposed by the strings.., is constitutionally
troublesome."' Id. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 303 (1993)).
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through a voucher program. 5 88 Thus, the government may continue to
impose safety requirements and anti-discrimination laws on private
schools, but the government may not suddenly expand its influence and
impose all-encompassing curriculum requirements. 5 89 Nevertheless,
the fear of secularizing regulation is not unreasonable or unfounded, for
if religious schools must dilute their religious character to receive public
schools
are not offering a clear alternative to the
funds, then religious 59
0
system.
school
public
Accordingly, although the Court, in Zelman, did not address what
type of regulatory strings are constitutionally permissible, regulation
that effectively eliminates the non-secular character of religious schools
is most likely unconstitutional, 5 9 ' while basic safety measures are
probably constitutional.5 9 2

588. Johnson, supra note 179, at 43 (quoting Michael Strokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on 'Equal
Access'for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 713 (1996)).
589. Johnson, supra note 179, at 42-43 (noting that religious schools and public schools alike
are already subject to a variety of state and federal regulations, even in the absence of financial
aid to the religious schools); CLINT BOLICK & RICHARD D. KOMER, INST. FOR JUSTICE, SCHOOL
CHOICE: ANSWERS TO THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED LEGAL QUESTIONS (4th ed. 2003), at
http://www.ij.org/cases/school/faq.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). Bolick and Komer note that
most, if not all, states already require private schools to comply with safety and health
requirements, as well as minimum days and hours and standard courses. Id. Moreover, Bolick
and Komer note that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which the Supreme Court found applicable to private
schools in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), already prohibits schools from
Id. However, no federal statute prohibits gender
discriminating on the basis of race.
discriminatory admissions processes because Title IX contains a religious exemption, permitting
public aid to reach religious schools that engage in gender discrimination. See 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a)(3) (2000 & West Supp. 2002). Also, no federal statute prohibits religious discriminatory
admission processes. BOLICK & KOMER, supra. Thus, unless state law or the voucher program
itself prohibits such discrimination, religious schools will be free to use religious criteria when
admitting students into their schools. Id.
590. See Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 340. But see Dwyer, supra note 181, at 992
(stating that regulatory strings are necessary and beneficial to children to assure that the public
"money is being used to provide secular education, rather than to support denial of a good secular
education and perhaps even activities that affirmatively harm children-for example, explicit and
aggressive sexist teaching").
591. See McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 58, at 185-86 (arguing that if the government
conditions receipt of funds by secularizing strings, the regulation probably violates the Free
Exercise Clause); Garnett & Garnett, supra note 4, at 340 (contending that regulatory strings are
probably unconstitutional if they require religious schools to compromise their religious mission);
Gilles, supra note 133, at 1008 (noting that regulatory strings are constitutionally "troublesome").
592. See Johnson, supra note 179, at 42-43 (noting that religious schools and public schools
alike are already subject to a variety of state and federal regulations, even in the absence of
financial aid to religious schools).
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VI. CONCLUSION

In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court correctly held that
Cleveland's school voucher program did not violate the Establishment
Clause.
Although the Establishment Clause prohibits government
programs that overtly advance or inhibit religion, Cleveland's voucher
program did not offend the Establishment Clause because it was neutral
with respect to religion and aid reached religious schools solely as a
result of genuine and independent private choice. Both Establishment
Clause precedent and the specific facts of the case support the Court's
decision. Consequently, voucher programs now have the constitutional
authority both to improve the educational setting for urban children in
the short run and to improve the entire education system in the long run.
Nevertheless, voucher programs must withstand yet another legal
challenge: the state establishment clauses. Therefore, although Zelman
established that voucher programs do not violate the Establishment
Clause, the ultimate legality of voucher programs remains precarious.

